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The classic distinction between the body schema and the body image received renewed 
interest in cognitive psychology, in part because of the attempts by the leading psychologist 
Charles Spence and his co-authors to synthesise a mounting body of research into the 
multisensory nature and functional properties of the neural structures in primate cortex that 
are sensitive and responsive to cross-modal stimuli generated from the body and objects 
located close to the body, and the famous rubber hand illusion which purported to illustrate 
how the perception and understanding of what counts as one’s body,  i.e., our body image,  
can be manipulated to include foreign, body-part-like, objects such as a rubber hand. This 
approach was intended to settle age old questions about how the body schema – the system 
sub-personal sensorimotor system that shapes, facilitates and regulates motor control – is 
implemented in the brain and address historic confusions about how the body schema should 
be understood as an explanatory concept, as well as the problems surrounding the body 
schema and image distinction on the grounds of the persistent conflation between the two 
concepts. However, after offering several proposals as to how the body schema should be 
used to organise and interpret the empirical data, the distinction fell out of favour with 
Spence and his colleagues on the grounds of the very problems they intended to resolve. The 
proposed solution is an alternative theoretical framework that, I shall argue, never 
materialised. Instead, the various definitions they disseminate, I will claim, simply serve to 
further perpetuate the same problems and confusions about the body schema. Thus, the 
current state of the literature on the body image and schema in cognitive psychology is in dire 
need of a conceptual framework that would help us situate and interpret the important 
empirical data. I propose that we revisit the philosophical debates that were inspired by the 
philosopher Shaun Gallagher as part of his project to provide a conceptual analysis of the 
body schema and image distinction and vindicate its status as an important explanatory 
device for the explanatory ambitions of embodied cognition. Gallagher’s analysis opens up 
important questions about how the sub-personal multisensory processes of the body schema 
not only facilitate moment-by-moment motor behaviours, but how they shape and optimise 
motor control across developmental timelines, as well the importance of the embodied 
configuration of an agent and its particular eco-niche for shaping and facilitating its motor 
behaviours. The second important argument of the thesis is that the response to Gallagher’s 
analysis has simply served to suppress the line of research that Gallagher inspired because the 
questions his analysis raises have been overshadowed by more general disputes between 
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Gallagher and his opponents about the shape an analysis of the body schema from the 
perspective of embodied cognition should take. As such, potentially promising lines of 
research in relation to the body schema have since dried up.  As part of my attempt to make 
progress on the issues that are laid out at the first and second stages of the thesis, the third 
stage will involve an exploration into the seminal Bayesian approach to understanding cross-
modal cue optimisation as it applies to object perception (Banks & Ernst, 2002) and the 
recent extension of this paradigm to the multimodal sensorimotor processes that underpin 
motor behaviour in action-oriented cognitive science (e.g., Friston, 2010). The conclusion of 
the thesis is that the move from an embodied to an action-oriented analysis of the body 
schema, and the conceptual distinction of which it is part, provides us with the right kind of 
theoretical resources to begin to pursue fruitful avenues of research that allow us to begin to 
address the questions set out by Gallagher’s analysis whilst avoiding (some of) the pitfalls 
that beset the embodied approach. In the final chapter I use this model of the body schema to 
illustrate how it can provide the basis for working back up towards a comprehensive theory 
of the body image and schema distinction, which I then bring to bear on current, as-yet-

















To effectively move our body around in our surroundings we (or rather our brain) must 
continually keep track the changing spatial relations between the body and objects in space to 
prevent harmful collisions and work out how we need to move our body in to interact with 
objects of interest. To achieve this endeavour, our brain is tasked with the ceaseless job of 
processing and utilising the various sources of sensory information that it is constantly 
bombarded with, e.g., from vision, audition, touch and proprioception (i.e., information from 
our body about its postural configuration and the position of our limbs). A key question that 
is of interest to psychologists is how the brain uses this information for the purposes just 
mentioned. Does it just use one source of information, several, or all? What happens if two or 
more sensory channels provide conflicting information? Such questions shape the research 
area known as ‘multisensory integration’ which involves the collaborations between 
philosophers, psychologists, roboticists, and the like to understand the significance of 
multisensory collaboration for our mental and cognitive lives. Perhaps the most interesting 
challenge for multisensory integration theorists is to understand and explain why, and how, 
some of the multisensory information that is processed by the brain enters our conscious 
awareness, and some does not. Specifically, we will look at the questions why and how the 
brain synthesises multisensory information to produce motor responses without us being 
aware of it. For instance, as you are driving along in your car thinking about what you’re 
going to have for tea, your body will be making all sorts of adjustments. For instance, your 
hands might subtly guide the steering wheel as you travel along the road in very subtle ways. 
Likewise, as you reach your hand downwards to shift gears you may be unaware of the fact 
that, at some point, your fingers have formed into a grasp to clutch the gear stick. To 
distinguish the aspects of your experience of the movement of your body of which you are 
aware from those you are not, neurologists, philosophers and psychologists make a 
distinction between the ‘body image’ and the ‘body schema’, respectively. The body image 
categorises the multisensory processes pertaining to body perception and the body schema 
pertains to the multisensory processes that facilitate our motor responses outwith the scope of 
attention and awareness.  However, this distinction has a long and troubled history because of 
the regular conflation between the two concepts. As such, when theorists talk of the body 
schema and body image they are often talking at crossed purposes and this has long stood in 
the way of collaborative research.  The purpose of the first stage of this thesis is to show that 
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these problems still thrive in the literature. The second stage of the thesis is to make use of 
current developments in cognitive science pertaining to how multisensory processing 
facilitates perceptual and motor processes. The third stage is to show how we can use this 
model to resolve the problems surrounding the body image/body schema distinction and how 
this new-and-improved analysis of the distinction can help developmental psychologists who 
are interested seek an analysis of this distinction to assist their developmental studies into the 
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This key objective of this thesis is to revisit and re-evaluate concurrent discussions that took 
place in cognitive psychology and philosophy about the optimal significance of multisensory 
integration for motor processes around a decade ago. Broadly speaking, the guiding question 
is why information from multiple sources of sensory information from the body and 
environment is required for motor output. In psychology, the question is how the brain 
represents the body and its relation to objects within reachable distance (also called 
‘peripersonal space’). The rationale is that objects which are closer to the body require 
different motoric responses relative to those which are farther away. For example, as I’m 
walking along the pavement and overhanging tree branch will not cause a change in my 
motor responses until my I get relatively close to it, at which point I may duck my head. 
Likewise, objects that are closer to the body offer different opportunities for interaction 
compared to objects that are farther away. For example, I can grasp the cup that’s in front of 
me by reaching my arm out towards it. However, if it is in a separate room I must relocate my 
entire body by walking to, say, the kitchen. As we will see in chapter one, the discovery of 
neural structures in non-human primate cortex showed that there are a population of neurons 
in regions of the brain known to be involved in localising the body in space and motor 
planning, which are simultaneously responsive to tactile and proprioceptive (i.e., the sensory 
modality responsible for providing information about the spatial position and movement of 
the body parts) information from the body and to visual information from objects that are 
within very close range of the body. Such discoveries, the story goes, provide empirical 
leverage to the existence of the so-called ‘body schema’. The body schema is an explanatory 
concept which refers to the system of processes involved in localising the body parts in space 
to regulate the motor responses of the body. Importantly, the body schema is a sub-personal 
system that operates below the threshold of consciousness. The body schema is one half of an 
important conceptual distinction (along with the body image) that had, by the time this 
important body of work was taking place, repeatedly fallen in and out of favour with 
cognitive psychologists on the grounds of the persistent conflation between the two concepts. 
Thus, the discovery of this class of neurons holds promise of localising the neural 
underpinnings of the so called ‘body schema’ and tells us something additional about their 
nature: that its sensory processes are multisensory and are also responsive to objects close to 
the body. The significance of this, the authors claim, is that it goes some way towards 
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resolving the age-old confusions which surrounded the distinction. However, despite the 
seemingly straightforward implications of the empirical data for our understanding of the 
body schema, the direction in which the authors take the concept only serves to further 
perpetuate the conceptual confusions already associated with the concept, and puts the future 
of the distinction in jeopardy, or so I will argue in chapter one.   
    At around the same time the philosopher Shaun Gallagher established his final attempt at 
providing a clear conceptual dissociation between the concept of the body image and the 
body schema and provided an analysis of the functional components that make up each 
system and provided an analysis of how the two systems work in conjunction in the context 
of everyday action (amongst many other things). In a similar fashion to the approach in 
cognitive psychology just outlined, Gallagher defines the body schema in terms of a sub-
personal system of multisensory sensorimotor processes that are involved in producing and 
regulating motor behaviour. In contrast, the body image is comprised out perceptual, 
conceptual and affective processes that shape our personal-level awareness and apprehension 
of our body. Therefore, the distinction is, for the most part, functional because Gallagher 
outlines the components in terms of what they do. Within his analysis, Gallagher throws up 
important questions about how the body schema and body percept, individually and 
collectively, optimise motor performance. To my mind, the importance of his analysis has 
gone unrecognised for the one response to his framework from Vignemont mounts an 
objection against Gallagher’s conception of the body schema because he doesn’t 
conceptualise the body schema in terms of mental representation in the brain. I will argue that 
this objection is unwarranted, and that her alternative model perpetuates the very confusions 
that Gallagher was trying to eradicate. However, I will claim that there is an important line of 
thought that Vignemont raises but does not explore: the importance of prediction for action. 
   This provides the basis for chapters 3 and 4 of the book which explore two mathematically 
inspired models of the optimising strategies of sensory evaluation and integration. In chapter 
3 we will explore a seminal study from Marc Ernst which shows that visuo-tactile inputs are 
brought together to provide a calibrated estimate of a perceptual input. This is based on the 
idea, taken from Bayesian models of neural functioning, that the brain is not just a reactive 
mechanism which recapitulates the inputs it receives as outputs. Rather the brain actively 
integrates cross-modal inputs that carry equivalent information to maximise the accuracy 
(i.e., optimise) of its outputs. This is based on the principle that the reliability of the 
information provided by each sensory modality is task- and context- dependent. To evaluate 
the inputs in the specified the brain brings any relevant prior-knowledge and beliefs (i.e., 
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‘priors’) to bear on the incoming sensory data to provide the best possible output. 
Importantly, this Bayesian model takes perceptual processes to be probabilistic in nature. 
Thus, the outcome of perceptual processes is the best possible guess about the source of the 
inputs. Then in chapter 4 we will consider a recent Bayesian inspired model which extends 
Ernst’s story about perceptual processes to sensorimotor processes. This is the prediction 
error minimisation theory. This model accepts the Bayesian tenets just outlined, however one 
the distinctive hallmarks of this model is the claim that the bulk of the knowledge-driven 
estimation processing occurs prior to the stimulus entering the low-level sensory organs. 
Thus, instead of estimating the cause of the inputs based on the information that is received, 
the optimising strategies of the brain estimates the likely incoming sensory data before they 
come in. The critical background story is that the optimal existence of classes of biological 
agents, and their individual members, entails the existence of a generative model (or 
generative models) in the agent’s brain of the two-way causal interactions between its 
internal states (i.e., its neural economy) and the activities of its body and environment, e.g., 
how its internal states bring about causal changes to its body and environment, and vice 
versa. To best serve the homeostatic requirements of the agent, the generative model should 
be able to accurately predict the consequences of changes to its embodied states and its 
interactions with the environment before those changes are brought about, and constrain the 
activities and behaviours of the agent on that basis. Thus, the goal of the brain is to maximise 
its predictive powers to optimise the behaviours of the agent whilst respecting the 
morphological constraints set by its embodied configuration and this necessitates the 
minimisation, if not elimination, of prediction errors (mismatches between the anticipated 
changes that are set by the brain and the actual feedback). This principle applies across 
different timelines, e.g., evolutionary, developmental and real time and is the process through 
which we come into meaningful (perceptual and motoric) contact with the world around us. 
This model, I will argue, has far-reaching consequences for our concerns about how to build 
a theory of the general optimisation strategies the brain employs to optimise the outputs of 
perceptual and sensorimotor processes that will allow us to proceed towards an analysis of 
the individual and collective contributions that the body image and the body schema make to 
the optimisation of motor behaviour in the environment. 
      Chapter five will apply the insights provided by the prediction error minimisation 
framework to the concerns of chapter two pertaining to the conceptual analyses of the body 
schema. In this chapter I will argue that it is consistent with the opposing requirements from 
Gallagher and Vignemont for a conceptually satisfying analysis of the body schema. With 
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respect to Vignemont’s model I will show how the interpretation of the body schema I offer 
provides a more plausible reading of her conception of the body schema in terms of action-
oriented representation, and can make good headway on the important issue that her account 
raises nonetheless: the importance of prediction for optimising motor behaviours. The 
overarching conclusion is that with the background story about the implementation strategies 
of multisensory processing, my account can synthesise the important insights her model 
provides. With respect to Gallagher’s account, I will claim that my interpretation is broadly 
consistent with his functional reading of the components of the body schema. I will then 
proceed to show how my interpretation meets additional requirements Gallagher sets for a 
theory of the body schema; how to explain the responsiveness of the body schema to the 
constraints placed on its operations by the individuals’ embodied configuration, its 
environment and intentional purposes. The upshot is that it allows us to synthesise the 
insights Gallagher provides in an illuminating way. This line of argument is provided in 
anticipation of a line of objection that I expect Gallagher might level against my 
interpretation of the body schema in terms of a prediction-error minimising action-oriented 
representation. Gallagher is staunchly against the idea that mental and cognitive phenomena, 
in general let alone the body schema, should be defined in terms of mental representation. I 
will respond by claiming that whilst Gallagher’s line of objection might be applicable to 
Vignemont’s model, my account can withstand the criticisms.   
    Having provided an interpretation of the body schema in chapter 5 from the perspective of 
the prediction error minimising framework, I then apply the insights from this model to 
Gallagher’s analysis of the body image as a basis for explaining a) how the multisensory 
processes of the body image bring us into meaningful perceptual contact with our body and 
b) how the body image and body schema work together to optimise behaviour. The objective 
is not just to make headway on Gallagher’s model, but to use it as a framework for 
establishing a developmental theory of the interaction between the body image and the body 
schema with which we can begin to address two important deficits in developmental 
psychology pertaining to a) the lack of an analysis of the body image and the body schema 
and b) the need for an accompanying causal theory to explain how mental and cognitive 
phenomena develop and transform across different timelines.  
    The overarching conclusion is that the concurrent analyses of the body schema in cognitive 
and psychology opened potentially productive avenues of research pertaining to the optimal 
importance of multisensory integration for perceptual and motor processes. However, the 
direction in which the leads were taken has led to a dead end. Nonetheless, considering the 
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mounting interest in the optimisation strategies of perceptual and motor processing in 
Bayesian inspired cognitive science there is no better time to re-evaluate those discussions 
and I hope that bringing the theoretical resources these models provide to bear on Shaun 
Gallagher’s analysis of the body schema, and the body image/schema distinction, gives it the 
proper acknowledgement it deserves.  
        
     
 
 





















The importance of synthesising sensory information from the multiple sense modalities, such 
as vision, audition, touch and proprioception, for determining the character of perceptual 
experience has been acknowledged throughout the history of philosophy and psychology. 
However, it is only in recent times that multisensory integration has been afforded its overdue 
status as a worthwhile research program on its own right. Research interests in contemporary 
multisensory integration were initially organised around a conceptual distinction between the 
body image and the body schema. To address the historic conceptual confusion over the 
concept of the body schema, the psychologists Nicholas Holmes & Charles Spence surveyed 
a wealth of empirical data which cuts across neurological studies, behavioural studies, and 
phenomenological studies about the multisensory underpinnings of body perception. I claim 
that the treatment of the concept of the body schema in this paradigm violates the intended 
definition of this concept and propagates the conceptual confusions associated with the 
distinction between the body schema and the body image. However, instead of 
acknowledging the possibility that the problems might be caused by their approach, Holmes 
& Spence cite the problematic nature of the body schema as the cause of the problem and 
conclude that the distinction should be abandoned in favour of an alternative model which 
unifies neuroconstructivism and Bayesian causal inference. Ultimately, I will conclude that 
the root of the problem for the approach to defining the body schema in cognitive psychology 
is threefold. First, the authors disseminate several readings of the body schema across their 
work that perpetuates the very problems they set out to resolve. Second, the call to abandon 
the distinction has fallen on deaf ears in current developmental psychology, and the misuse of 
this concept continues to propagate. Third, the alternative model they provide is promising 
but their account is a) under-developed and b) is best construed as a theoretical framework 
that the body image and schema can be incorporated into. This sets up the basis for chapter 6 
of the thesis where I will show how the body schema and image distinction can be 
incorporated into their model.    
	
	
1.1. Old and New Observations about the Multisensory Nature of Perception.  
 
From our waking moment, we are continually bombarded with a plethora of sensory 
experiences, such as sights, smells, and noises, which are provided by the information from 
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our various sense modalities such as the visual, olfactory and auditory systems, respectively. 
As such, it would be uncontroversial to say that the perceptual experiences of humans, and 
other suitably constituted agents, are multisensory in nature. Consider the following example. 
As I swirl the spoon around the coffee that’s in my cup I simultaneously see and feel my hand 
moving around in a circular motion and hear the noise of the spoon as it meets the inside of 
the cup.  From my perspective, my visual, tactile and auditory experiences are not three 
experientially distinct events that just happen to occur simultaneously. Rather, they constitute 
the character of a unified experience of a particular event. The important questions that 
emerge pertain to how and why cross-modal inputs are integrated to produce a combined 
percept1. The former requires an explanation of the nature of the underlying operational 
principles that govern the interactions between the senses. The latter requires an explanation 
of the adaptive advantages, if any, that are brought about by the collaboration between the 
senses for perception. The former question has long entertained philosophers and 
psychologists who have sought to understand the nature of the process (or processes) through 
which the data provided by the distinct sense modalities produce a coherent percept.  
    Much ink has been spilt on the ‘how’ question over the history of philosophy. Proposals to 
this question can be traced back to at least Plato and Aristotle both of whom agree that 
perception requires not just the cooperation between the sense modalities in some loose 
sense, but rather the active integration between the distinct inputs for the purposes of 
producing a coherent percept that somehow combines the informational input from each. This 
type of claim is the working assumption of the multidisciplinary research program that is now 
known as ‘multisensory integration’, which seeks to understand the neural underpinnings and 
cognitive significance of cross-modal integration (more on this below). However, the views 
of Plato and Aristotle come apart over the issue of where sensory integration occurs. For 
Plato, the site of sensory integration is in the brain, whereas for Aristotle the input from the 
distinct modalities was linked by ‘the common sense’ (or intellect), a property he ascribed to 
the heart2. Perhaps the most influential precursor to modern ways of thinking about sensory 
integration comes from George Berkeley3. As part of his attempt at establishing a new theory 










multisensory integration literature. The first is the idea of ‘sensory capture’ where the data 
from one sense modality is made to conform with the input from another in cases where the 
informational input that is provided by each modality is equivalent4. Second, as an empiricist, 
Berkeley proposes that sensory relations are experience dependent. This Berkeleyian model 
was influential for psychologists such as James Gibson5 who, like Berkeley, tried to establish 
a new vision science which was based on the premise that the active interactions of sensory 
agents in their environment are driven by their information seeking sensory systems which 
extract invariant features of the environment. We will see in chapters 3 and 4 of the thesis 
that the Platonic and Berkeleyian proposals outlined here are implicit in the current 
theoretical models for understanding the dynamic nature of the multisensory processes that 
underpin perceptual and motor processes. First, there exists an overwhelming, and still 
growing, body of evidence which points towards the idea that a diverse range of mental and 
cognitive phenomena are dependent upon the synthesis of cross-modal data in various regions 
of the brain; second, it indicates that cross-modal information processing is responsive to the 
dynamical interactions between the body and the environment (more on this below)6.  
 
1.2 The Role of the Body Schema Concept in Contemporary Multisensory Integration Research.  
 
The preceding considerations provide a rough sketch of the philosophical issues about the 
significance of multisensory integration that have echoed down through the ages. However, it 
is only in relatively recent times that multisensory integration has been afforded its status as a 
worthy research paradigm on its own right. Over the past three decades an outpouring of 
empirical data from studies on the superior colliculus in cats has provided important insights 
about where in the (feline) brain cross-modal integration takes place, and how cross-modal 








specific	 processes	 are	 encapsulated	 which	 means	 that	 they	 remain	 insulated	 from	 one	 another	 i.e.,	 vision	
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2004). More recently, this methodology has motivated further investigation into the 
significance of multisensory integration for a wide range of mental and cognitive capacities 
as they apply to (mature and developing) humans, primates, other non-human animals and 
robots. One key player who has influenced the general shape of more contemporary work in 
multisensory integration research in philosophy and psychology is the perceptual 
psychologist Charles Spence who has provided a plethora of useful surveys of empirical 
studies on the significance of cross-modal integration for body perception across a series of 
co-authored works (e.g., Holmes, Spence et al, 2003, Driver & Spence, 2004, Holmes & 
Spence, 2006)7. His work is of no small importance as any student or interested party who 
wishes to acquire a solid grounding in more contemporary issues in multisensory integration 
research will almost certainly need to familiarise themselves with the works of Charles 
Spence in one way or another (the relevance of this point is explained below). Nowadays, 
Spence focuses his attention on the general question of how the interactions between the 
distinct modalities are expressed in experiential consciousness, particularly how the causal 
interactions between visual, tactile, auditory and olfactory information influence or enhance 
taste perception, respectively8.  However, the defining objective of his earlier work centred 
around two more specific questions about the significance of multisensory integration: 1) 
what role does the collaboration between the distinct modalities play in determining the 
adaptive motor responses of the body? 2) how is the perception of the body shaped by cross-
modal interactions? To answer such questions, Spence and his colleagues bracketed them 
under a conceptual distinction between the body schema and body image, respectively.  
   Understanding the significance of this approach requires a brief explanation of the wider 
contextual motivations at play. At the time of writing, there was sufficient reason for thinking 
that questions about how cross-modal relationships shape behaviour and perception should be 
kept separate. For instance, the two-visual systems hypothesis from Goodale & Milner (e.g., 
Milner & Goodale, 1992) is grounded in empirical work that seems to indicate that the 
underlying visual processes of perceptual and motor processes are neurologically and 
functionally distinct. Therefore, to keep the questions Spence and his contemporaries were 
interested in apart, they categorised them under the body schema and body image distinction 
which is, in principle, supposed to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the 








sensory underpinnings of motor control come under the concept of the body schema, whereas 
questions about the sensory underpinnings of body perception come under the body image. 
Around 2003 to 2006 Spence and his colleagues focus their attention on the first question and 
so their initial research is best understood as an empirical analysis of the body schema (I’ll 
come back to this point). The concept of the body schema has been deployed across the 
cognitive sciences and beyond for quite some time after it was popularised just over a century 
ago by Henry Head & Gordon Holmes9. Head & Holmes refer to two distinct ‘body schemes’ 
that are ‘organised models of ourselves’; so-called because they coordinate sensory 
information that is generated by the body for organising motor control and localising 
sensations on the surface of the body. First, there is the body schema which is understood to 
be a ‘postural model of ourselves’ that involves a ‘combined standard against which all 
subsequent changes of posture are measured before they enter consciousness’ where ‘every 
new posture or movement is recorded on this plastic schema and the activity of the cortex 
brings every fresh group of sensations evoked by altered posture in relation with it’ (Head & 
Holmes et al., 1920, p.187). In other words, the body schema registers the sensory 
information that is generated by the postural changes of the body by comparing incoming 
information with the inputs from recent postural changes as the body proceeds through its 
current motor trajectory. Second, there is the ‘superficial schema’ that registers 
somatosensory inputs from tactile receptors on the surface of the skin. Importantly, the body 
schema and superficial schema operate below the level of consciousness. This means that 
their respective processes and outputs ‘cannot be called into consciousness’ (Head & Holmes 
et al., 1920, p.187). Contemporary evidence for the existence of a non-conscious superficial 
schema can be found in empirical studies on a condition called ‘numbsense’10. Individuals 
with this condition are unable to consciously feel tactile stimulation on their body, for 
instance they will not be able to experience the felt sensation of touching, or being touched 
by, an object. That being the case, they will be unable to feel someone touching the affected 
part of their body for the individual would have no qualitative experience of being touched. 
Nevertheless, experimental studies show that these individuals can accurately locate where 
they have been touched previously (in the absence of obvious visual feedback)11. This would 
suggest that tactile information is being registered, even if this information does not arise at 







superficial schema. Similarly, the processes of the non-conscious body schema are revealed 
by the apparent fact that the body produces movements that do not require conscious 
deliberation or monitoring; indeed, some of those movements occur outwith the scope of 
conscious awareness. To validate this distinction Head & Holmes draw upon their studies on 
intramedullary lesions to the upper end of the spinal cord just prior to the junction between 
the dorsal column and the medulla oblongata. Such a lesion affects only one side of the spinal 
column. One such case is W.C. who, following a car collision, suffered such a lesion to the 
left side of his spinal column. As a result, he exhibited motor weaknesses to the right side of 
his body, but could nonetheless feel sensations like heat, pain and coldness on this side. On 
the other hand, the motor capabilities of the left side of his body remained preserved, yet this 
side of his body was insensitive to skin pricks, other tactile stimuli and heat. Broadly 
speaking, this leads Head & Holmes to conclude that the sensory underpinnings of the 
experience of sensations on the body must be neurologically and functionally distinct from 
those that facilitate motor control12.   
   Importantly, if the postural schema can function independently of the sensory processes 
which underpin conscious sensations, and the superficial schema registers sensations below 
the threshold of consciousness, then there must exist a third system of sensory processes that 
can be ‘called into consciousness’ (Head et al., 1920, p.187) to facilitate experiential 
awareness of the body. Clearly, we do have qualitative sensory experiences of our body. As 
we walk about, for instance, parts of our body routinely appear in our visual field and 
experience the felt sensation of its movement. Thus, we don’t just have qualitative sensory 
experiences of what’s out there in the world. Rather, some aspects of experience are directed 
the body. The question is what category such sensory experiences come under. They cannot 
be accommodated by the concept of the superficial schema for its outputs are not accessible 
to consciousness. They presumably cannot be accommodated for by the concept of the body 
schema either for the body schema pertains to the sensory processes that underpin the 
movement of the body, not the perception of it. Enter the concept of the body image to cater 
for this class of body experience (e.g., Lhermitte, J & Tchehrazi, E: 1937). Thus, sensations 
on the body can be registered yet do not arise to the level of awareness are categorised under 
the superficial schema; sensations which do are categorised under the body image. The 
important upshot is that a very broad distinction can be made between the sensory processes 





are involved in the registration of sensations on the body, which may scale up to the personal 
level or not (i.e., the body image or superficial schema, respectively).  
   Nowadays, philosophers and cognitive scientists make use of the very general distinction 
between the body schema and the body image, and it is important to note that Spence and his 
colleagues follow suit13. For the provisional purposes of this chapter it suffices to say that the 
concept of the body schema should, in principle, refer to the consciously inaccessible system 
of proprioceptive processes that are involved in registering the position and movement of the 
body. The body image, by contrast, is the system of consciously accessible multisensory 
processes which shape and support personal level awareness of the body.  
   With these considerations in place, it is important to note that the distinction between the 
body schema and the body image can be drawn up in three distinct ways. The first concerns 
the sensory information each system works over. The body schema is a proprioceptive 
system, whereas the body image is a multisensory system. Secondly, whilst the processes of 
the body schema are inaccessible to consciousness, the processes of the body image are. 
Thirdly, whilst the body schema processes proprioceptive information for registering the 
postural changes of the body to appropriate motor control, the processes of the body image 
process multisensory information for structuring experience of sensations on the body. This 
much sums up the motivations behind, and the nature of, the body image and schema 
distinction14. As such, we can now proceed to consider the important issues for the distinction 
that emerge out of more contemporary work on multisensory integration.  
	
1.2. The Body Image and the Body Schema: A Distinction without a Difference? 
 
The preceding section lays out the general distinction between the body schema and the body 
image. This is important for understanding the rationale of Charles Spence and his co-authors 
who, just over a decade ago, inspired renewed interest in the concept of the body schema as 
an explanatory tool for organising multisensory integration research. They do so by surveying 
a wealth of research on the neural architectures in various cortical regions of the monkey 
brain that are simultaneously responsive to multisensory stimuli from the body and non-







interested in is peripersonal space which is the space surrounding the body that is within 
reaching distance of the effectors, relative to the current position of the body. The 
significance of this pertains to the fact that objects which exist in body space (i.e., the space 
occupied by the body) and peripersonal space are adaptive in ways that behaviours in relation 
to objects outwith these spatial regions are not. When objects are located outwith peripersonal 
space they are said to be in extrapersonal space. The important point is that non-bodily 
objects can be included as part of our body space when they are incorporated into our body, 
for instance when a fork is incorporated into the hand during mealtimes. Furthermore, objects 
that are in peripersonal space require a different class of behaviours compared with those in 
peripersonal space.  For example, when, say, a coffee cup is in peripersonal space an 
individual can retrieve it by reaching out their hand and arm, but if it is in extrapersonal space 
they may have to get up and walk towards the location where the mug is, such as the coffee 
table. Furthermore, objects in peripersonal space have a different adaptive significance to 
objects located in extrapersonal space for they can potentially present a bigger threat. Objects 
close to the body present a greater risk for hazardous collision than objects which are far 
away. Therefore, the authors speculate that the responsiveness of the brain to objects in 
peripersonal and extrapersonal space must be different. Furthermore, they claim that 
accommodating for the on-going changes to the spatial relations that obtain between the body 
and non-bodily objects requires a body schema that is regularly updated to facilitate 
appropriate behavioural responses in relation to objects when they are in body space, 
peripersonal and extrapersonal space. As such, Spence and his colleagues seek to answer the 
question of whether the brain is responsive to objects in peripersonal space in a way that it is 
not towards objects in extrapersonal space via an empirical analysis of the neural 
underpinnings of the body schema. This approach has an additional advantage for an 
investigation into where the body schema is in the brain should help to resolve age-old 
problems that had surrounded the body schema since its conception. At the time of writing, 
the distinction between the body image and body schema had been falling in and out of 
favour across the cognitive sciences for some time because the persistent and pervasive 
conflation between the two concepts caused deep seated terminological and conceptual 
confusions. Such problems had been acknowledged for some time15, yet remained 






       ‘The image of the human body means the picture of our own body which we form in our  
        mind, that is to say the way the body appears to ourselves…We call it a schema of our  
        body or bodily schema, or following Head, …postural model of the body. The body  
        schema is the tri-dimensional image everybody has about himself. We may call 




This is a very clear example where the body schema is simultaneously described in terms of 
an ‘image’ or ‘picture’ of the ‘appearance’ of the body or ‘oneself’ that’s formed in the mind, 
or indeed as a kind of ‘body image’. Clearly, this only serves to collapse the distinction17. 
However, an equally problematic implication is that because the body schema is so ill-
defined it is not easy to mount a clear research project to investigate the nature of the body 
schema. To make headway with respect to understanding what the body schema is and how it 
functions the authors propose their own definition of the body schema (more on this below) 
and mount a clear research project which allows them to pursue a clearly defined 
investigation into its nature. I’ll explain how they attempt each goal in the ensuing sections.  
 
 
1.3. Evidence for the Existence of the Body Schema from Single-Cell Studies in Monkey Cortex.  
 
 
With the intention of remaining faithful to the definition from Head & Holmes, Spence et al. 
2003 start with a provisional definition of the body schema in terms of an ‘integrated 
multisensory representation of the body’ in the brain. So defined, the body schema is 
reducible to the neural architectures that are responsive to cross-modal stimuli from the body. 
As such, the distinctive hallmark of their definition is that, contra Head & Holmes, the 
processes of the body schema are multisensory, not proprioceptive.  
    The important upshot is that a comprehensive story about what the body schema is and 
how it operates requires an account of not just the neural populations that are responsive to 
stimuli from the body, but also how incoming streams of sensory relations calibrate and re-
calibrate motor behaviour in the kinds of ways the preceding examples suggest. To address 
this very issue Holmes & Spence18 summarise a comprehensive body of empirical data from 







neurons in various brain regions to stimuli from the body (see below) which, the authors 
suggest, is important for appropriating behavioural responses in the environment. For 
instance, a class of neurons in the cortical regions of the monkey brain which are thought to 
be involved in encoding the posture and movement of the body and the planning and 
execution of movement, such as Brodmann’s areas 5 and 2, were discovered to be 
simultaneously responsive to visual and proprioceptive information about limb position 
(Graziano et al, 1999). Because the neurons are responsive to information from at least two 
modalities they are referred to as ‘bi-modal’ neurons. Bimodal neurons, which are responsive 
to tactile input from the head and auditory input immediately surrounding the head, can also 
be found in the ventral pre-motor cortex (Graziano et al 2002)19. Similar studies (e.g., from 
Graziano et al 1995) investigated the responsiveness of visuo-tactile neurons in several 
interconnected brain areas including inferior area s6 in the frontal lobe and 7b in the parietal 
lobe, as well as the putamen in the monkey brain. The receptive field of the bi-modal neural 
circuits in question is responsive to tactile stimulus that is produced by stroking the hair 
located on the arm, hand and face and visual stimuli surrounding each respective body part up 
to twenty centimetres beyond the skin of the arm and hand and ten centimetres beyond the 
face (Graziano, M.S & Gross, C, 1995, p.1023). Therefore, while the tactile receptive field of 
these neural circuits is limited to the surface of the skin, their responsiveness to visual stimuli 
extends beyond the body. Furthermore, the responsiveness of the neurons to visuo-tactile 
stimuli is body-part specific. For example, the neurons that are responsive to tactile stimuli 
from, say, the hands are only responsive to visual stimuli from within twenty centimetres of 
these parts of the body and no other. This is demonstrated by an increase in the activation rate 
of the neural circuits that are responsive to tactile stimuli from a specific body part whenever 
visual objects move towards that body part. Likewise, their firing rate decreases as the object 
moves outwith their visual receptive field (Graziano, M.S &Gross, C, 1995, pp.1023-1025). 
Furthermore, the visual field of body-part specific classes of neurons shifts relative to the 
movement of the relevant effector. For example, their firing rate increases and decreases 
when the relevant body part is brought closer to, or farther away from, a visual object 
(Graziano, M.S & Gross, C, 1995, p. 1024).  The crucial conclusion is that bi-modal neurons 
are simultaneously responsive to stimuli from the body and objects in peripersonal space, but 
not extrapersonal space. The only way these neurons can become sensitive to an object that is 





After summarising these kinds of studies, Holmes & Spence draw several important 
conclusions about where the body schema is distributed in the monkey brain, such as 
Brodmann’s areas five and two; the parietal lobe; the ventral premotor cortex, and the 
putamen, respectively. Furthermore, the fact that the neural populations in these regions are 
bi-modal, and in some cases tri-modal, means they are multisensory neural populations. 
Furthermore, these neural populations are responsive to stimuli from the body (i.e., body 
space) and peripersonal space, but not extrapersonal space. Thus, if the neural regions just 
specified can be understood as part of the monkey body schema we can say that it can be 
understood in terms of the multisensory neural architectures that are sensitive to the body and 
objects within proximity to the body.  
 
 





The next step Holmes & Spence take is to show that the body schema exhibits a functional 
plasticity of sorts in the sense that the bi-modal properties of the body schema are flexibly 
responsive to stimuli from objects that are within reach of a tool when it is incorporated into 
the body when it is out of reach of the effectors. In the preceding section I gestured towards 
the idea that incorporating a tool alters the spatial dimensions of our body. We can use tools 
to alter the spatial dimensions of our body in various ways. For example, incorporating a tool 
into our hand lengthens our arm and extends its reaching distance. If my ball falls into a river 
and I can’t reach it with my hand without the risk of falling into the water, I may use a stick 
instead to try to retrieve it. Thus, the guiding question which underpins the review of the 
second set of studies (more on this below) asks whether the neural mechanisms that are 
responsive to visual objects that are within reach of the effectors readapt to non-bodily 
objects when are temporarily incorporated into the body for task specific purposes. The short 
answer is ‘yes’. In support of this claim Holmes & Spence review studies from Atsushi, Iriki, 
Tamaraya et al20 that investigate the sensitivity of bimodal neurons (visual and tactile) in the 
intraparietal area of the cerebral cortex in the brain of macaque monkeys to objects within the 





At the first stage of the experiment, the responsiveness of the bi-modal neurons to visual 
stimuli from objects within the peripersonal spatial region of the effectors was tested for by 
placing a raisin within reaching distance of the monkey’s hand. In a similar vein to the 
studies from Graziano et al., it was found that the responsiveness of the neurons to the 
presence of the raisin increased and decreased as the raisin was placed closer to, and farther 
away from, the hand, respectively. At the second stage of the experiment, the raisin was 
placed outwith the reach of the monkey’s hand and, as would be expected, this was met with 
a radical decrease in the activation rate of the neurons and in some cases they stopped firing 
completely. At the third stage of the experiment, the monkeys were trained to use a small 
rake to bring raisins that are outwith the reach of their hand. The important upshot is that 
when the raisins are placed outwith the maximal reaching range of their hand the neurons 
would show little to no activity. However, after being trained to use the rakes to bring the 
raisin into reach, the activity of the neurons would reactivate when the raisin was within 
reach of the rake. What this shows, so the story goes, is that the cross-modal relations that 
underpin the localisation of the body and objects in peripersonal exhibit a sort of functional 
plasticity insofar as the visual responsiveness of the neurons can readapt to tools when they 
are incorporated into the body to fulfil a given task. I use the term ‘functional plasticity’ to 
emphasise that the readaptations of the underpinning cross-modal relations is purely 
functional in the sense that inputs from each modality can be coupled and de-coupled for the 
requirements of a specific task. This is to distinguish the kind of plasticity in mind from the 
more traditional understanding of neuroplasticity in terms of the more substantial, and 
sometimes permanent, re-routing of the material architecture of the brain. The important 
conclusion that Holmes & Spence draw from studies of this kind is that if the same 
multisensory neural circuits which are responsive to stimuli from the body and objects in 
surrounding space are classed as part of the body schema of macaque monkeys, and those 
neural regions also readapt to tools when they are incorporated into the body for some task 
specific purpose, then the body schema exhibits functional plasticity.  
    The preliminary conclusions Holmes & Spence draw from the single-cell studies are that 
the neurological substrates of the body schema in the brain of macaque monkeys, such as the 
inferior area 6 in frontal lobe, area 7b in parietal lobe and the putamen, are multisensory; 
responsive to the position of the body and objects in peripersonal space and exhibit functional 
plasticity.  
    Despite the important insights that the studies provide into the nature of the body schema 
in monkeys, the reader might still question how we can make similar observations about the 
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human body schema. To address this, Holmes and Spence outline a study that would seem to 
demonstrate that the same kinds of re-adaptations to non-bodily objects that can be observed 
at the neurological level in the studies on macaque monkeys could also be observed at the 
experiential level in humans.  The study they appeal to is the now well-known rubber hand 
illusion (e.g., Botnivik, 1998). During this experiment one of the participant’s hands is placed 
behind a screen so that he or she can no longer see their hand. A realistic looking, human-
like, rubber hand is then situated in its place. Afterwards, the experimenters introduce 
identical tactile stimulation to the participant’s occluded hand and the rubber hand. Therefore, 
the subject sees the rubber hand being stroked but feels the sensation on their real hand that is 
out of their view. The important result from the experiment is that when the subject is asked 
to locate the position of the tactile sensation, the participant will indicate that they feel the 
sensation on the rubber hand. In effect, the rubber hand illusion creates competition between 
visual and tactile input about the spatial location of the stimulus, as well as a disconnection 
between visual and proprioceptive input about the position of the hand. The rubber-hand 
illusion provides a clear illustration of the phenomenon of sensory capture that was 
mentioned earlier. In this case, tactile and proprioceptive inputs are made to conform to the 
visual input about the location of the tactile stimulus and the position of the hand, 
respectively21.  
     What this gives us, Holmes & Spence claim, is an insight into the different ways in which 
the body schema is responsive to non-bodily objects. The first set of single cell studies 
demonstrates the multisensory and functionally adaptive nature of the body schema at the 
neurological level, and the rubber-hand illusion reveals similar properties of the human body 













1.7. Problems for the Interpretations of the Body Schema from the Empirical Studies of the Multisensory 
and Functionally Adaptive Properties of the Cortical Regions in Monkeys.   
 
The preceding considerations make it clear that the approach to explaining the nature and 
functional properties of the body schema perceptual psychologists take largely involves 
identifying the neural populations that are responsive to cross-stimuli from the body and 
objects within reach of the body and analysing some of their properties, such as their 
responsiveness to objects that are incorporated into the body. Such an approach not only 
allows us to pin down (some) of the underlying neural architecture of the body schema, it 
also allows us to say something about its nature (as specified above). The explanatory goal of 
this approach is to better understand the multisensory mechanisms that are responsive to 
stimuli from the body and non-bodily objects (i.e., as they approach or are incorporated into 
the body). As such, Holmes & Spence claim that this approach takes cognitive scientists 
some way towards addressing perennial questions about where the body schema is in the 
brain and how it operates.   
   However, the implications of this kind of approach are not as straightforward as Holmes & 
Spence suggest, and they acknowledge this point in their 2004. To understand the 
significance of the ensuing commentary, remember that the principled basis on which the 
distinction between the body schema and the body image is drawn is the fact that the 
processes of the body schema are not accessible to consciousness, whereas, the processes of 
the body image can, in principle, be consciously accessed. Holmes & Spence recognise the 
possibility that visual attention and the expectation of reward might play a significant role in 
determining the results of the single-cell studies. For instance, in the first set of studies on the 
responsiveness of bimodal neurons to tactile stimuli from the body and visual stimuli from 
nearby objects, the experimental design meant that the monkeys’ visual attention was drawn 
to a particular body part and a visual stimulus (a cotton bud in this case). In the second set of 
studies it is not clear whether the excitability of the neurons was generated by the visual 
stimulus or the expectation of a treat. The possible influence of personal level capacities like 
attention and expectation of rewards makes it difficult to make decisive interpretations from 
the data in relation to the body schema that are supposed to work independently of personal 






problem for the experiment gives us access to the results of the readaptations to the cross-
modal relationships which underpin the individual’s sense of where an individual experiences 
tactile sensations on his or her hand, and their sense of where their hand is located. As such, 
the rubber hand illusion experiments might be best considered as not so much an illusion that 
is generated by the readaptations of the multisensory processes of the body schema, but of the 
body image. The question, then, is how perceptual psychologists should proceed with their 
investigation into the body schema if the data doesn’t quite fit their conception of the body 




1.8. Problems for the Working Concept of the Body Schema in Perceptual Psychology. 
 
 
From the fact that the empirical evidence they survey is apt to cause confusion between the 
body image and the body schema, Holmes & Spence (and their collaborators) eventually 
come to the conclusion that rather than tackle the ‘slippery issue’ of clearing up the 
conceptual confusion between the two concepts (Holmes & Spence: 2006, p.6), the 
distinction between the body image and the body schema should be abandoned from the 
multisensory integration theorist’s conceptual toolbox altogether (e.g., Holmes & Spence: 
2004, 2006). Instead the multisensory integration theorist should seek an alternative 
explanatory framework. The proposed alternative will be outlined below. First, I want to 
address their first claim about the future of the distinction in cognitive scientific theorising.  
    The reader may have some degree of sympathy with this suggestion because the distinction 
doesn’t lend itself easily to a clear interpretation of the aforementioned empirical data. 
However, I propose that the grounds upon which Holmes & Spence make their claim are 
problematic for several reasons. Their reasons for rejecting the distinction based on age-old 
problems that are associated with the body schema are unwarranted because by the time the 
authors get around to this suggestion, they had already disseminated various definitions of the 
body schema (see below). This is no small matter for in section 1.3 of this chapter I 
mentioned the importance of their work in relation to the body schema for getting to grips 
with contemporary research interests in the multisensory integration research. Any student, of 





whom it is required to have a basic grounding in contemporary multisensory integration 
research, will be introduced to the key research paradigms in terms of an empirical analysis 
of the body schema. However, no two definitions of the body schema are ever the same. As 
such, I claim that they cannot appeal to old problems in support of the rejection of the 
concept, and the concept of the body image with it when they are very much responsible for 
propelling the same confusion forward into the most contemporary discussions about the 
body schema at the time. Let me explain. In their seminal 2003 Holmes et al. offer the 
following definition of the body schema: 
 
 
              The body schema has often been invoked as an explanatory concept when it  
              should perhaps rather be considered as a label for a set of problems still requiring 




The kinds of problems in mind are as-yet unanswered questions about how the causal 
relationships between cross-modal inputs support and transform body perception and motor 
control in adaptively important ways, in which case there is no need for a distinction between 
the body image and the body schema as questions that are typically segregated under these 
categories can be bracketed under the term ‘body schema’. However, the empirical research 
we have just considered from their 2004 is framed around an understanding of the body 
schema in terms of an ‘integrated multisensory representation’ in the brain that is responsive 
to the body and objects that are within proximity of the body.  
   What Holmes & Spence fail to recognise is that it is the inconsistent definitions of the body 
schema they work with that leads them to their problematic conclusions, not the historic 
conceptual confusions that have always surrounded the distinction. Furthermore, the proposal 
to jettison the distinction from the literature has done nothing to quell the use, nor the misuse, 
of the concept of the body schema. For instance, Mendoza defines the body schema as the 
‘personal awareness of one’s body’23. Likewise, Reid defines the body schema as in terms of 
an ‘understanding of the biomechanical constraints inherent in the physical makeup of the 
human body’24. In doing so, they attribute properties to the body schema that are usually the 






attributed to the body image. The take home message is that conveniently sidestepping the 
hard task of cleaning up the conceptual confusion by disposing of the distinction does not 
magically make the concept of the body schema and its associated problems go away. The 
issue is how perceptual psychologists should proceed from here, and it seems that they have 
two choices: they can either 1) make a more concerted effort to utilise the distinction 
correctly or 2) provide a viable alternative model that can do the same kind of work as the 
body image and schema distinction. We will see in chapter six of the thesis that 
developmental psychologists propose the first option. However, to my mind it seems that 
Holmes & Spence aim for the second. In the remainder of this chapter I will outline their 
proposal and (briefly) assess whether their model is a natural competitor to the body image 
and body schema framework.  
 
 
1.9. A Neuroconstructivist Account of the Multisensory Underpinnings of Body Perception: A Satisfying 
Alternative to the Body Image and Schema Distinction? 
 
 
In their 2006 Holmes & Spence suggest that the best way to move forward is to replace the 
body schema and body image model with an alternative classification system that categorises 
questions about the causal significance of cross-modal processing for body perception and 
motor control (Holmes & Spence, 2006, p.3). In their 201225, Holmes & Spence give some 
indication of the kind of theoretical model that could be interpreted as an alternative to the 
body image and schema model: Neuroconstructivism (e.g., Mareschal et al, 2007). 
Neuroconstructivism is not an explanatory theory. Rather, it is a prescriptive model for what 
an explanatorily complete model of mental and cognitive phenomena should look like. 
Neuroconstructivists seek to explain how the structural and functional properties of the brain 
are developed, shaped and transformed by the interactions between the embodied states of the 
agent at all levels of description, e.g., the interactions between individual neighbouring 
neurons, domain-general and domain-specific brain regions, as well as the interactions 
between the brain and the body, and the interactions of the body in the (physical and social) 
environment. Importantly, the explanatory aim of neuroconstructivism is to synthesise the 





enabled and constrained at different levels of explanation, e.g., genetics; cellular, 
neurological and behavioural studies; embodied cognition; phenomenology and social 
cognition. Furthermore, it specifies that a complete explanation of a particular mental or 
cognitive phenomenon, and mental and cognitive phenomena in general, requires a 
supplementary story about the causal processes that drive the interactions at the specified 
levels of description across different timelines (e.g., in real time, and across evolutionary and 
developmental timeframes). Thus, a story about the nature of a given mental or cognitive 
phenomenon must tell a story about how its emergence at one level of explanation (e.g., at 
the behavioural level) arises out of the activities of processes at another (e.g., the 
neurological). Furthermore, the underlying causal story about how the explanandum emerges 
as it does must explain how this process is developed and transformed at different stages of 
development (I return to this point in chapter 6). Clearly, neuroconstructivism isn’t a theory 
of what those causal processes might be for it only specifies that an explanatory model should 
have something positive to say about the nature of those processes and how they operate. 
   In their 201226 Bremner, Holmes & Spence adopt a neuroconstructivist approach to explain 
the transformative effects that conflicts between cross-modal relations have on the 
developing infants’ ability to (visually) localise tactile sensations on moving parts of their 
body (more on this below). Therein, they also give some indication of what they take to be 
the most promising supplementary story about the underlying causal processes at play: 
Bayesian inference e.g., Bernardo & Smith, 1994; Gelman et al, 2004). Bayesian causal 
inference is a mathematically specified process by which the brain actively anticipates 
sensory signals before they are delivered by the peripheral sensory systems in an on-going 
way. To do so the brain brings relevant prior-knowledge about the most probable cause of the 
current stimulus based on the nature of the sensory data and any relevant contextual 
information (more on this in chapter 3). Therefore, under this framework the nature of 
sensory processing is determined by feed-forward, probabilistic prediction. 
   By supplementing neuroconstructivism with Bayesian causal inference, Bremner, Holmes 
& Spence attempt to tell a story about how the development of the capacity to experience 
sensations on moving parts of the body is underpinned by Bayesian style expectations about 
the effects of bodily movement on visuo-tactile relations. To explain the underlying rationale 
of the approach the authors take up consider the following scenario. When a particular limb is 





example, the right hand normally occupies the right side of the visual field, and vice versa for 
the left hand. Therefore, there is a direct spatial correspondence between the spatial position 
of a body part and the spatial region it occupies in visual space. As such, an individual would 
expect that tactile stimulus from a specific body part can be visually accessed at the 
corresponding region of his or her visual space. For example, suppose that his or her left hand 
is in its typical resting position (i.e., at the left side of their body), then they will understand 
that visual contact with an object that is felt pressing against, say, the left hand can be 
brought about by glancing to the left. Of course, there is an exception to this rule when an 
individual crosses his or her body part over to the opposite side such that it now occupies the 
opposite side of visual space. For example, when an individual crosses their left hand over to 
their right, it now occupies the part of their visual space of their visual space that is normally 
occupied by the right side. In this instance looking to the right, not the left, brings about 
visual contact with the left hand.  
   As mundane as this line of thought may seem, the studies from Bremner & co27 
demonstrate that whilst human adults are capable of flexibly readjusting their visual 
responses to the movement of their body, this ability only develops in young infants at some 
point between their sixth and tenth month. The authors use the preferential looking paradigm 
to investigate the developmental stages at which this adult-like ability to visually track tactile 
sensations when their body parts are spatially displaced is absent and present in young 
infants. The short version of the outcome is that this capacity is absent in infants at six- 
months-of-age and present in young infants aged 10-month. This is demonstrated by the fact 
that once the left hand is crossed over to the right the younger infants glance to the left when 
a tactile stimulus is introduced to their left hand, whereas the older infants correctly look to 
their right. The explanation Bremner, Holmes & Spence provide is that the visuo-motor 
responses of the younger infant are shaped by expectation about how visual access to their 
left hand can be brought about which has been shaped by previous multisensory experiences 
when their left hand is in its typical position. In this case, there is no conflict between vision, 
touch and proprioception about the location of their left hand. However, when the left hand is 
crossed over and introduced to some sort of tactile stimulation this generates new tactile-
proprioceptive relations which requires a novel visuo-motor response that is sensitive to the 
change of position (Bremner, Holmes & Spence, 2012, p.120) Therefore, the visuo-motor 





of the hand. Nevertheless, sometime between the age of six-and-a-half and ten-months-of age 
the developing infants progress beyond their reliance on multisensory information about the 
limbs when they are in their typical position and exhibit visuo-motor responses which 
demonstrate a sensitivity to the movement of their body. The different visuo-motor responses 
at these stages of development, the authors speculate, is driven by the experience of changes 
to the systematic causal relationship between the displacement of the body parts and their 
visuo-tactile-proprioceptive experiences of the changing positions of their body parts. For 
instance, the six-month-old infant still expects to see their left hand in its typical position, 
even when it is crossed over to the right, however, infants aged ten-months expect that tactile 
stimulation from the left hand can be visually accessed by looking to the region of visual 
space it occupies when it is placed to their right. In turn, this expectation is determined by the 
belief that changes to proprioceptive feedback from the body which reports a spatial 
displacement of the limb to the opposite side of the body will drive a change in visuo-tactile 
expectations about the seen and felt location of the stimulus. Therefore, the different visuo-
motor responses of the two age groups is anchored in an experienced based belief about the 
causal effects of body movement on sensory stimulation and visuo-tactile-proprioceptive 
experience. The presence or absence of this belief determines the prior expectation that a 
change in body position requires the same visuo-motor response that would be generated if 
the body part were in its typical position; or a different visuo-motor response to locate tactile 
sensations on the displaced body part. The behavioural responses of the older infants would 
suggest that they have this belief while the younger infant is yet to acquire it 28.    
    The overarching point is that the experimental paradigm is neuroconstructivist in nature 
because the experimental designs provides access to the results of the interplay between the 
sensory modalities via observations of visuo-motor behaviours, and a Bayesian inspired story 
about the underlying causes of the observed behavioural differences in infants at different 
stages of development allows the authors to provide a plausible story about one of the 
processes which drive the capacity to visually track tactile stimulus on the moving body.  
    The question is whether this model provides a satisfying alternative to the body image and 
body schema distinction. In one sense, the answer is ‘yes’ for it holds promise of providing a 
story about the underlying, motor-generated, causal processes which shape and transform the 
multisensory processes that determine perceptual apprehension of the body. In this sense, a 






understanding the underlying processes of the body image. However, in another sense the 
answer is ‘no’ for this one example hardly constitutes a full fleshed theory of what a 
neuroconstructivist/Bayesian model should offer in the place of the body image and body 
schema model insofar as there is, yet, no satisfying interpretation of the distinction on the 
table. At most, this model provides a brief snapshot into the kind of approach that might be 
useful for analysing the developing body image. However, this doesn’t quite take us as far as 
explaining how the processes of the body schema are shaped and transformed, nor its 
relationship with the body image, and vice versa. The question of whether this model 
qualifies as a competing model to the distinction is still very much open to question. 
    However, there are reasons for thinking that instead of conceiving the body schema/image 
distinction and the neuroconstructivist/Bayesian models as opposing frameworks, the former 
can act as an important explanatory tool for the purposes of the latter. As we will see in 
chapter 6, developmental psychologists are looking to the body image and schema distinction 
to do the kind of explanatory work Holmes & Spence aim for with their 
neuroconstructivist/Bayesian paradigm. The central issue concerning developmental 
psychologists now is that while much ink has been spilled on the issue of how to dissociate 
the body image and the body schema, there is a dearth of theory concerning how the body 
image and body schema interact. Such a story is required, so the story goes, to understand 
scale errors. Scale errors are motor errors that infants make because of their failure to 
apprehend the scale of their body, such as its size. For example, they may attempt to enter a 
car that is the same size of their foot.29. The lack of theory about the relationship between the 
body image and the body schema, and the lack of a causal story about how the interactions 
between each system work to shape and influence perceptual and motor processes, is an 
important deficit in developmental psychology. My first step towards addressing these issues 





In summary, Holmes & Spence, along with their co-authors, have played a key role in 
bringing the concept of the body schema back into prominence in perceptual psychology as 





the neural regions involved in responding to stimuli from the body and peripersonal space in 
monkey; behavioural studies which analyse the systematic causal relationship between bodily 
movement, the location of sensory stimulation and perceptual experience (i.e., the rubber-
hand illusion), and developmental studies which investigate the developmental processes 
which underpin the capacity to visually track tactile stimulus on the static and moving body. 
However, their handling of the concept of the body schema only serves to further perpetuate 
the kind of conceptual confusion that already surrounded the concept (i.e., the confusion 
between this concept and the concept of the body image). By failing to recognise this, 
Holmes & Spence wrongly attribute the problems their approach fosters to the body schema 
and insist that the distinction between the body schema and body image is dropped in favour 
of a neuroconstructivist model of development that is supplemented by Bayesian causal 
inference. Up to now, their proposal for the distinction to be retired has gone unchecked and I 
have argued that it is unwarranted. Furthermore, their supposed alternative model remains 
underdeveloped. At this point in time residual confusions over how to understand the body 
schema concept, and its relationship with the body image, remain. Furthermore, I indicated 
that developmental psychologists have called out for a proper analysis of the distinction. As 
such, there is no better time than now to revisit the philosophical analyses and arguments 














Philosophical Analyses of the Body Image and Schema Distinction 
 
Introduction 
The distinctive hallmark of philosophical analyses of the body schema is their inclusion of a 
motor component that is directly involved in the organisation and production of motor output. 
As such, the body schema doesn’t just plot the spatial layout of the body; it is also directly 
involved in producing and regulating behaviours. Another key emphasis is the role of the 
body schema in optimising (human) behaviours. This issue emerges in Shaun Gallagher’s 
influential analysis of the body image and body schema distinction, as well as the 
philosophical debates his account has inspired about how to conceptualise the body schema 
in a way that will deepen our understanding of its nature and its functional role. In this 
chapter I will rehearse Gallagher’s analysis of the distinction and outline a critical response 
from Frederique de Vignemont in relation to his interpretation of the body schema. I will 
conclude by drawing out the important questions that the respective interpretations of the 
body schema open. I will conclude that Vignemont’s critical response to Gallagher is 
baseless. On Gallagher’s behalf, I will argue that her interpretation of the body schema does 
not possess the additional explanatory power Vignemont thinks it has. I finish by showing 
how her account of the body schema in a later paper only serves to further perpetuate the 
conceptual confusions that surround the body schema. The overarching conclusion is that the 
direction in which Vignemont has taken the existing philosophical analyses of the body 
schema has left potentially fruitful avenues of research unexplored and the confusions over 
the body image and body schema distinction unresolved.     
 
2.1 The Objectives and Implications of Shaun Gallagher’s Analysis of the Body Image and Schema 
Distinction: A Brief Summary.   
 
From the considerations that were discussed in chapter one, it seems clear that if we are to 
avoid the confusions that are traditionally associated with the concept of the body schema 
then we must go back to basics and refer to the intended definition from Head & Holmes. So 
defined, the body schema is a system of sensory processes that are responsible for registering 
the postural configuration of the body, and for comparing new inputs which are generated by 
the changing postural disposition of the body during movement. Somehow, though their 
account doesn’t quite extend so far as to explain how, these processes of the body schema 
play an important role in organising and facilitating motor output below the threshold of 
personal-level awareness.   
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In response to the same kinds of problems that motivated the approaches to redefining the 
body schema in perceptual psychology, and to build on the story told by Head & Holmes, the 
philosopher Shaun Gallagher has been attempting to clear up the conceptual confusions that 
have plagued the distinction since at least the 1980s30. Broadly speaking for now, he does so 
by attempting to provide a clear definition of the body schema that remains faithful to the 
definition provided by Head & Holmes that is rooted in principled lines of demarcation 
between the body schema and body image. Crucially, what sets Gallagher’s analysis apart 
from the approach in perceptual psychology is that once he makes the conceptual dissociation 
between each system, he then proceeds to provide an analysis of the relationship between the 
body image and body schema during every day perceptual activity and motor behaviour. In 
turn, this analysis provides a revealing insight into the individual and collective contribution 
that the body image and the body schema make to the optimisation of perception and action. I 
will return to these important strands of thought at various stages throughout this chapter. 
First, I turn to Gallagher’s interpretation of the body schema (as a concept); his account of 
what the body schema (as a system) consists of, and how it should be differentiated from the 
body image.   
 
2.2 Gallagher’s Functional Interpretation of the Components of the Body Schema 
 
For ease of exposition, I will mostly concern myself with the account of the human body 
schema and analysis of the body image and schema distinction Gallagher provides in his 
2005. To my understanding this is the latest, and most up-to-date, version of his framework. 
In accordance with the account from Head & Holmes, Gallagher concedes that the behaviours 
produced by the body schema are prenoetic by which he means the operations of the body 
schema do not require personal-level intervention and/or monitoring (see, e.g., Gallagher, 
2005, pp.24-26). In the interests of clarity consider the following examples from Gallagher. 
Whilst you reach over to pick up your coffee cup you may be visually and proprioceptively 
aware of the movement of your arm as it extends outwards toward the cup. In other words, 
you may simultaneously see and feel your arm moving towards the cup. Meanwhile, you may 





for picking up the cup. This motor adjustment is carried out regardless of whether you are 
aware of it. Likewise, you may rapidly duck your head out of the way of an overhanging tree 
branch whilst your attentional focus is directed elsewhere, such as the engrossing 
conversation you are having with your friend as you walk along the pavement. On reflection, 
such motor responses seem to be not so much volitional as automatic. However, Gallagher is 
clear about the fact that the behaviours produced by the body schema are not automatic. 
Retrospectively, it may seem as though they are automatic in the same way reflex movements 
are, but this would be to underestimate the complex neurophysiological underpinnings of 
those motor behaviours. Rather, the behaviours produced by the body schema are mediated 
by a complex matrix of top-down influences (such as intentions) and multisensory 
calibration, as well as bottom up influences such as the environment (more on this in chapter 
5). For now, it suffices to say that for Gallagher, integrated sensorimotor processes underpin 
the motor behaviours that are produced by the body schema. To explain Gallagher 
characterises the body schema in functional terms. In other words, Gallagher provides a 
description of the entire body schema system, and its sub-components, in terms of their 
function. For instance, here he describes the body schema in terms of:    
                  
                 […] a system of motor capabilities, abilities and habits that enable posture and 
                 movement.  The body schema is not a perception, attitude or belief. Rather, it is 
                 a system of motor and postural functions that operate below the level of self- 
                 referential intentionality, although such functions can enter into and support such 
                 intentional activity. The preconscious sub-personal processes of the body schema 
                 system are tacitly keyed into the environment and play a key role in governing  
                 posture and movement. Although the body schema can have specific effects on 
                 cognitive experience…it does not have the status of a conscious representation or 




The italicised parts of the passage are the aspects of Gallagher’s analysis of what the body 
schema is that I will be concerned with at this stage31. The body schema is a system of motor 
‘capabilities’, ‘habits’ ‘functions’ and ‘performances’ of the body which enable the 
maintenance of balance and movement. What, then, does this mean? With respect to the body 
schema, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the body schema is a system of motor 






Gallagher probes more deeply into the details of what he means by a behavioural capability, 
habit and performance which he explains in terms of a pattern of sensorimotor processes that 
underpin individual motor behaviours and our complete motor repertoire. For instance, a 
hand grasp employs a different musculoskeletal network to wiggling an individual finger. 
Likewise, some motor behaviours engage more and less of our musculoskeletal system, for 
instance swimming, walking and cycling make more complex demands on our motor system 
than, say, blinking (see Gallagher, 2005, p.44-46.).  
      For the purposes of the ensuing discussion acknowledge Gallagher’s claim that the body 
schema operates ‘below the level of self-referential intentionality’. This means that the 
processes of the body schema are not directed towards the body in the same sense that an 
individual takes his or her body as an object of perception, say, when they wilfully move their 
body in some manner32. Instead, the body schema governs movements that are directed away 
from the body towards the environment. Think again of the example of your hand forming 
into a grasp in the right way for picking up the cup. In this case your motor behaviour was 
directed towards the cup. It is for this reason we are told in the passage above that the 
processes of the body schema are keyed in to the environment for the body schema would 
need to work out the dimensions of the mug to appropriate you hand into the right kind of 
grasp for picking up the cup. Objects of a different three-dimensional configuration would 
require a different formation of the hand. 
       The preceding considerations lead Gallagher to conclude that the body schema is best 
considered in terms of three functional sub-components. The first receives sensory 
information from the environment about the spatial configuration, position and movement of 
the body and objects in nearby space. Therefore, the first component processes sensory 
information that localises the position and relative spatial relations between the body and 
objects in its surroundings. The second component consists of what Gallagher calls 
‘intermodal capacities’ that ‘facilitating the communication’ between proprioception and the 
other sensory modalities, such as vision, about the position and movement of the body and 
surrounding objects. In other words, the second component somehow calibrates multisensory 










the ‘motor schema’ facilitates bodily movement by recruiting all the informational resources 
that are required to activate the body in the way required to produce behaviour, such as the 
cortical and sub-cortical regions of the brain (Gallagher, 2005, p.46).  
This much sums up the important aspects of Gallagher’s line of thought with respect to the 
functional profile of the body schema insofar as it consists of multisensory processes that 
register and calibrate cross-modal information about the body and environment, and motor 
processes that are important for activating the musculoskeletal networks which are necessary 
for producing behaviours. It also lays down the foundations for his account of how the body 
schema can be differentiated from the body image insofar as its processes are prenoetic; 
involve the calibration of multimodal inputs from the body and the environment; and its 
processes are (mostly) directed towards the environment. To prove the reader with a full 
appreciation of these remarks I now turn to Gallagher’s account of the body image, and his 
analysis of the relations between the body image and the body schema.  
 
 
2.3 Gallagher’s Functional Interpretation of the Body Image 
 
Outwith academia the concept of the body image is the more familiar out of the two. To our 
common-sense understanding, the body image refers to the evaluative judgements and beliefs 
an individual may have about their body, such as the belief that their body is too short or too 
thin; too fat or too thin. We all have these kinds of beliefs and make such judgements about 
our body on their basis. There is a sense in which the scientific understanding of the body 
image concept is not so different from this folk conception. This aspect of the body image is 
known as the body affect. However, the scientific notion of the body image is more multi-
faceted for it also includes the body concept which refers to the conceptual scheme that we 
use to label and identify our own body (i.e., ‘my body’); its individual parts (e.g., ‘arm’; ‘leg’ 
and ‘head’), and ascribe to them a relative spatial location (e.g., ‘left arm’). The most 
important aspect of the body image for our purposes is the body percept, which pertains to 
our personal-level percept of our own body. An individual’s body percept may include 
information about the perceptible features of his or her body, such as the contours of his or 
her face; the relative relations between the different parts of their body, as well as the 
physical proportions of their body, etc. In other words, the body percept is best thought of in 
terms of a pictorial map of the body. It also includes motor generated sensory feedback. For 
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example, the qualitatively visual and proprioceptive experience an individual undergoes as 
she wiggles her fingers. The body percept also includes the experience of sensations on the 
body such as itches and pains33.  
     In contrast to the processes of the body schema, the three distinct components of the body 
image make respective and collective contributions to an individuals’ perceptual awareness, 
identification, and recognition of his or her body. For example, the aspect of my current body 
percept about a pain in my arm can only be an experience of a pain on my arm provided I am 
equipped with the ability to identify that the pained arm is part of my body, and not yours. 
Likewise, my current affectual feelings towards my body may be the product of the intricate 
interactions between my body percept and body concept. For instance, say I look at my hand 
which is identified as mine by my body concept, I may not like (my current affectual state) 
the way my skin looks (my current visual body percept) because of the inevitable 
consequences of the aging process. It is for reasons such as these that the body image is 
implicated in the development and transformation of the sense of bodily ownership over our 
own bodies; the sense of agency over our own actions, and our perception and understanding 
of the boundaries of our own body. In short, the processes of the body image play a key role 
in developing and shaping the different aspects of our perceptual apprehension of our body.   
     We are now in a position where we can draw up a provisional characterisation of 
Gallagher’s interpretation of the distinction between the body image and the body schema. 
His account is consistent with the account from Head & Holmes on many fronts. For 
example, he defines the body schema as a sub-personal system of sensory processes that are, 
in part, implicated in registering proprioceptive inputs about the postural configuration and 
movement of the body. However, in the same vein as cognitive psychologists he concedes 
that the sensory processes of the body schema are multisensory and include information from 
the environment. The real distinctive mark of his account however is the additional motor 
component that actively produces motor outputs. When it comes to Gallagher’s interpretation 
of the body image, he also includes the body concept and the body affect. Therefore, in 
accordance with the traditional characterisation of the distinction, Gallagher concedes that the 
processes of the body schema are sensorimotor and implicated in motor control, whereas the 





the processes of the body schema and their behavioural outputs are not phenomenologically 
accessible, whereas the processes of the body image can be34.  
 
 
2.4. Empirical Evidence in Support of the Body Image and Schema Distinction 
 
 
Having provided an initial characterisation of the body image and schema distinction based 
on their distinct functional components, Gallagher lends empirical credence to the claim that 
the body image and the body schema must be neurologically and functionally distinct by 
appealing to case studies which show that disruptions to the sensory systems which underpin 
one system don’t affect the performance of the other, and vice versa. Recall from chapter one 
that this endeavour was already taken up by Head & Holmes as part of their attempt to lay out 
the distinction. In the same spirit, Gallagher offers two types of cases that demonstrate this 
same point. The first class of case studies pertain to deafferented patients who have a normal 
body percept but exhibit motor deficits35. The second class of case studies indicate that the 
opposite is also true; that is, an individual with a disrupted body percept may exhibit little to 
no motor weakness. One such case is case is unilateral hemi-spatial neglect (e.g., Denny-
Brown, 1952) Because of a lesion or stroke an individual may only be able to consciously 
perceive one side of their body, but may still be capable of carrying out coordinated motor 
tasks. Their incomplete body percept is manifested in many of their behaviours, such as 
failing to dress one side of their body and only shaving half of their face, etc. Furthermore, 
this kind of lesion doesn’t just engender an incomplete body percept; there is some indication 
that the effects of the lesion bleed into other aspects of their body image, as it is defined by 
Gallagher. For example, the individual may fail to recognise that a perceptually neglected 
body part belongs to his or her body. Feelings like the sense of ownership over one’s body 














subjects who exhibit personal level neglect towards half of their body are still capable of 
using the neglected side of their body to produce motor behaviours that require left-to-right 
motor coordination, such as using both of their hands to tie up their shoe laces and walk in a 
coordinated fashion To a first approximation, this indicates that motor performance remains 
insulated from disruptions to the components of the body image which and this, in turn, lends 
empirical credence to the claim that the processes of the body schema are neurologically and 
functionally distinct from the processes of the body image36.   
     By this stage of his analysis Gallagher has provided us with a clear conceptual 
dissociation between the body image and the body schema in terms of their respective 
functional properties (i.e., an account of what each system does), and the underlying 
functional components of each system. Furthermore, the cases of deafferentation and hemi-
spatial neglect provide empirical support in favour of differentiating the processes of the 
body schema from the body image in this way. This conceptual framework offers a clearer 
idea of the processes that make up each system and the question is what we can then do with 
Gallagher’s model. The available options, it would seem, are many. By prizing the body 
image and body schema systems apart in the way he does, Gallagher opens a window of 
opportunity to provide separate analyses of the body image and body schema. For example, 
one could probe more deeply into the details of the nature body image based on such 
questions as: what sorts of processes enable and shape our body percept, body concept and 
body affect? What defining and transformative effects, if any, do the causal interactions 
between each system have on our perceptual, conceptual and affective apprehension of our 
body? With respect to the body schema we may ask how do the ‘intermodal capacities’ 
calibrate cross-modal information about the body and environment; how the multisensory 
processes of the body schema work in conjunction with the motor processes to produce 
appropriate motor outputs? This list is by no means exhaustive, indeed the kinds of questions 
that we will be concerned with are questions about the nature of the relationship between the 
body image and the body schema, and how the relations between them are manifested at the 












2.5 Gallagher’s Behavioural Analysis of the Interactions between the Body Image and Body Schema for 
Action through the Case of Deafferentation.  
 
 
In the first section of this chapter I gestured towards the idea that the ingenuity of Gallagher’s 
approach is that once he makes the conceptual separation between the body percept and the 
body schema, he then proceeds to work his way towards an account of the relationship 
between the two in the context of everyday action38. The guiding question of this part of 
Gallagher’s analysis is why we need such a dual-system, each of which are equally capable of 
guiding and producing movement independently of the other. To address this question 
Gallagher appeals to a particular case of deafferentation which will be the subject of this 
section.	
				The aforementioned considerations make it clear that the distinction between the body 
image and body schema is drawn up, in part, on the basis of their distinct functional roles. 
However, what Gallagher tells us is that the relationship between the two systems is much 
more intricate than that in the context of day-to-day, moment-by-moment, perceptual and 
motor activity. For instance, the postural positions and movements our body schema can 
influence our body percept. As a mature adult, we can walk without consciously thinking 
about how to put one foot in front of the other. Nonetheless, aspects of the motion of our 
body as we walk appear in our current body percept. Likewise, our current body percept can 
also play a role in guiding and monitoring our movements. For example, imagine that you are 
to thread, then you might visually guide the movement of your fingers to insert the thread 
through the eye of the needle. Clearly, we are not just experientially blind automata and so 
we know that we are not entirely dependent upon our body schema. If that’s the case then 










of consciousness, as well as a body percept that is implicated in the conscious guidance of 
movement? Why can’t we just rely on a body percept? Why, then, do we need the two 
systems? Why do we not have just one or the other? 
    Gallagher’s answer to the question of why we need a sub-personal body schema lies in his 
analysis of deafferentation (more on this below) and his answer to the question of why the 
body percept is implicated in the guidance of movement is provided in his behavioural 
analysis of the interrelations between the body schema and the body percept in the context of 
everyday behaviour. I will deal with each in turn.  The first issue arises in the context of 
Gallagher’s commentary in relation to the case of Ian Waterman (henceforth, IW), a 
deafferentated patient who lost all volitional control over his bodily movements because of 
flu-induced damage to his large myelinated nerves (e.g., (Cole:1995, Cole & 
Gallagher:1998). Ian lost the sense of touch, therefore he is unable to consciously feel, say, 
his hand gripping onto an object. He has also lost proprioception; the sense of the sensation 
of the position and movement of his body from below his neck. However, given that IW still 
receives visual feedback about the position and movement of his body and the interaction of 
his body in the environment; we can say that IW has retained some of his body percept that is 
anchored in what Gallagher calls visual proprioceptive awareness. Visual proprioceptive 
awareness is the visual feedback that’s provided about the position and movement of his body 
which underpins an individual’s qualitatively visual experience of the postural position and 
movement of the body and its parts. Visual proprioceptive awareness is distinct from the sub-
personal visual feedback that’s provided about the position and movement of the body. 
Gallagher calls the latter visual proprioception3940. This notion of visual proprioceptive 
awareness is similar to what psychologist J.J. Gibson calls visual kinaesthesis which he 
defines in terms of the ‘awareness of the locomotion of the body’41. Visual kinaesthesis can 
be active or passive. Active visual kinaesthesis refers to the active seeking out of information 
by the visual system about the movement of the body, such as when you track the movement 
of your hand that is holding the thread as it moves towards the eye of the needle. Passive 
visual kinaesthesis is the aspects of the movement of your body that you may be visually 
aware of, even though you do not actively seek such information, such as your visual 








more likely to be implicated in the conscious guidance and monitoring of bodily movement 
than the latter.  
     Immediately after his illness IW lost all control over his motor skills. For instance, he was 
unable to keep his body and limbs in a fixed position and he was unable to instruct his body 
and limbs to move in determinate ways. On occasions when he would will his body to move 
in a certain way, the elicited movements would be unpredictable and uncontrollable. 
However, over an extended period IW regained most of his motor capabilities in the sense 
that he was eventually able to carry out the same tasks as he was capable of performing prior 
to his neuropathy. As such, he can lead a fully functional and independent life. However, to 
do so Ian needs to retain constant visual contact with his body and must constantly deliberate 
and monitor his movements at every stage of the movement trajectory. Therefore, to move his 
body effectively, IW is completely reliant on a constant supply of visual proprioceptive 
awareness. For instance, in darkness he is not able to control his movements and when he 
anticipates that he is about to sneeze he must sit down to avoid collapsing to the floor. IW 
must continually keep track (visually) of his body and his environment. To maintain his 
balance, he uses external objects as a fixed reference point and consciously tenses his 
muscles to freeze his body into its current position and to write he must constantly attend to 
his grip of the pen.  
    The important point is that visual proprioceptive awareness now undertakes the role that 
was previously taken on by the visual proprioception of his body schema (Gallagher, 2005, 
pp. 43-45). He later qualifies this statement by speculating that perhaps the motor programs 
which are usually available to the body schema to produce motor output remain unaffected 
and, through the rehabilitation process, have been re-accessed by the sensory components of 
the visual percept in the same way they are accessible on occasions when an individual 
recruits his or her body percept to consciously guide the movement of their body (Gallagher, 
2005, p.47). Crucially, behaviours dependent on his body percept are not as effective as they 
were when they were produced by his body schema for his new motor routines are relatively 
slower and less precise, and they make more demands on his personal-level resources such as 
his attentional resources. Thus, IW reports that he is exhausted by the end of the day because 
of the concentrated effort that his day-to-day activities require.  
    The conclusions we are to draw from the case of Ian Waterman are threefold. First, it 
serves as another source of empirical evidence for the neurological and functional 
dissociation between the body image and the body schema. Second, having two functionally 
independent systems that can perform the same function in cases where the other is damaged 
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means that at least one of the systems is still available to allow an individual to perform the 
same task. The third is that having a fully functioning body schema which can produce and 
regulate our motor behaviours without the need for personal level intervention and 
monitoring optimises our behavioural performance in two important ways. First, the 
processes of the body schema make fewer demands on our personal-level mental and 
cognitive resources and the behaviours it produces are more effective and precise.  The third 
revelation may seem surprising because it is very easy to underestimate the complexity of the 
neurophysiological underpinnings of even the simplest of motor behaviours. For instance, a 
single step recruits over two hundred muscles. Just imagine how long it would take us to 
walk if we had to consciously deliberate over how to retract and flex every muscle network 
from our toes to our head to keep our body and head upright whilst also deliberating about 
how to move each foot in front of the other. Thus, although I know how to walk in terms of 
the mechanics of the movement, I still do not know the exact muscle groups that are required 
to walk and maintain balance at the same time. Furthermore, it should come as a surprise to 
most of us that the orientation of the head tenses and relaxes the muscles surrounding the 
knee joints (Gallagher, 2005, p. 48). The take-home message is that having a body schema 
that can recruit the complex interconnected musculoskeletal networks required for our motor 
behaviours below the threshold of consciousness as adaptively advantageous because it 
relieves us of this burdensome and seemingly impossible task.   
    Nonetheless, there are two important exceptions to this general rule. Recall that the 
overhanging question of this section pertains to why we need a body schema and a body 
percept given that each system is capable of producing body movement independently of the 
other. The case of IW has illustrated the advantages of having an independent body schema. 
However, this doesn’t respond to the issue of why we have a body percept. Gallagher 
addresses this issue in the context of his behavioural analysis of the relationship between the 
body schema and body percept during the process of motor learning, and when an individual 
must manoeuvre their body in hazardous conditions. I will explain the underlying rationale of 
each case in turn.  
    Gallagher’s first claim is that the body schema and the body percept will be implicated in 
the day-to-day motor routines of a typical adult in complex, flexible and adaptive ways. 
However, during the process of developing their motor skills an adult is perhaps more 
dependent on their body percept than their body schema. The initial stages of the learning 
period are filled with awkwardness and uncertainty with respect to what one should do with 
their body. For example, as I am learning to shoot a basketball through a net I will pay closer 
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visual attention to, say, the force of my grip and the trajectory of my arm as it follows 
through to launch the ball towards the net. As I go I will learn to alter the force with which I 
throw the ball and readjust my aim in accordance with each miss. Meanwhile, other parts of 
my body will also readjust as I go along, such the force with which I push my knees down 
towards the floor before pushing up to get the right momentum for throwing the ball at the 
required speed. Therefore, motor learning is a process through which we continually develop 
and transform our motor repertoire and we do so through a trial-and-error period during 
which we consciously guide our movements and closely monitor the interactions of our body. 
Once we master these skills, so the story goes, they are then deferred to the body schema to 
be produced and regulated at the sub-personal level (see Gallagher, pp.45-54).  
   The same principle holds for the developing infant who is in the process of adding novel 
motor skills to her pre-existing skill set, albeit at a quicker rate. Through his analysis of 
neonatal imitation Gallagher tentatively suggests that some of the motor behaviours produced 
by the body schema are developed during gestation, such as opening and closing the mouth; 
sticking out the tongue, and bringing the hand to the mouth42. As such, a primordial body 
schema is already in formation when we are born. He then claims that, post-gestation, 
learned behaviours, such as sitting up; reaching and grasping; crawling, and walking are 
developed by a process through which the infant pays close attention to the movement of 
their body. For example, think of the little toddler who pays close visual attention to the 
wobbly movements of his or her legs as one foot moves in front of the other. After an 
extended trial-and-error period, which is fraught with unsteadiness and uncertainty, he or she 
becomes able to walk without needing to constantly pay close visual attention to their legs. In 
other words, the developing infant is, Gallagher speculates, more reliant on their body percept 
during the process of motor learning before those behaviours are deferred to the body schema 
when the behaviours can be carried out in a relatively stable and effective way, and this 
principle holds for motor learning in general under Gallagher’s framework.  
    The next condition under which an individual may recruit their body percept in a more 
explicit way obtains when they must manoeuvre their body in potentially hazardous 
conditions, for instance when they are walking along an icy pathway or across a high ledge. 
In both situations, an individual must proceed with a degree of caution for one misstep or 
miscalculated move could cause a potentially painful or fatal injury. Therefore, in this kind of 





body by monitoring the progression of, say, their feet as they put one foot in front of the 
other. Thus, contra the case of IW, it pays to guide and monitor the movement of the body at 
the personal-level under these kinds of conditions.  
      The important upshot is that there are two conditions under which the body percept plays 
a more prominent role in the guidance and regulation of movement; namely, during motor 
learning and in hazardous conditions. Furthermore, Gallagher seems to be suggesting that this 
increased reliance on the body percept occurs when the likelihood and risk of making a motor 
error is increased and so it makes sense to elicit and readjust our bodily movements in 
accordance with personal-level feedback. In the case of motor learning this seems to be 
because the body schema is too underdeveloped with respect to the given motor skill. In the 
case of manoeuvring our body in dangerous conditions the implication(s) of making a motor 
error is increased because the outcomes of such mistakes carry a greater risk than normal. 
Thus, in situations where the rate of motor errors increase in an atypical way, and the stakes 
of such mistakes are higher, we are more reliant on our body percept for the guidance and 
regulation of movement.  
 
 
2.6 An Analysis of Gallagher’s Account of the Body Image and Schema Distinction.  
 
 
At this stage let’s just take stock of the key developments that have been outlined in the first 
half of this chapter. In response to the conceptual confusions that surround the distinction 
between the body image and the body schema, and to vindicate its status as a useful 
explanatory tool for cognitive scientists, Gallagher offers a conceptual dissociation between 
each system that is, in all essential respects, consistent with the traditional characterisation of 
the distinction. First, he defines the body schema in terms of a sub-personal system of 
multisensory processes which are, in part, involved in registering new inputs about the 
postural configuration of the body; second, he defines the body image as the system of 
processes that are involved in the perception of the body. Furthermore, his analysis of each 
concept also advances our understanding of the nature and functional role each system plays 
in the cognitive capacities they support. His analysis from the perspective of the 
phenomenology tells us that the body schema can produce motor behaviours which are out 
with the scope of our body percept. This reveals the second important point that because the 
body schema can produce behaviours independently of the body percept, it must consist of a 
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motor component that can directly produce bodily movements. Furthermore, the body image 
is much more than a sensory system that registers visual, tactile and motor induced feedback 
about the location of sensations on the body. This aspect of the body image, the body percept, 
also works alongside the body concept and the body affect to shape and transform our 
perceptual awareness and apprehension of our body. In general, Gallagher’s analysis allows 
us to make a distinction between the body schema and the body image that is based on their 
different functional components. The body schema includes ‘intermodal capacities’ which 
facilitate the collaboration between the various sense modalities about the position and 
movement of the body and its relation to objects in peripersonal space, and a motor 
component which activates the parts of the musculoskeletal system required for movement 
and balance maintenance and is dependent upon gestational and post-gestational motor 
learning. In contrast, the body image is not only made up of sensory processes (i.e., the body 
percept), it is also made up conceptual processes (i.e., the body concept) and affective 
processes (i.e., the body affect) which underpin personal level perceptual recognition, 
identification and recognition of the body, as well as any evaluative feelings and beliefs 
which are directed towards the body. 
    Perhaps the most significant insights to emerge out of Gallagher’s model of the distinction 
come from his behavioural analyses of deafferentation and the interaction between the body 
percept and the body schema in the context of motor learning and everyday action. With 
respect to the case of deafferentation, the important conclusion is that having a body schema 
that can elicit and regulate motor behaviour independently of the body percept optimises our 
motor performances because its operations make fewer demands on our cognitive resources, 
and its outputs are more effective and precise. With respect to motor learning and everyday 
action, the first important conclusion is that the relationship between the body percept and the 
body schema is much more delicate than the coarse conceptual dissociation between each 
system seem to suggest. The body percept has an important role to play in shaping and 
facilitating the motor repertoire of the body schema during motor learning, and is also 
recruited on occasions where an individual must manoeuvre his or her body in potentially 
hazardous conditions. Ultimately, an individual employs his or her body percept when the 
risk and rate of error is increased; either because his or her body schema is underdeveloped or 
because of the current situation that they find themselves in. Thus, under these conditions the 
body percept plays an equally important role in the optimisation of motor behaviour.       
   In sum, Gallagher offers a clear framework for understanding how the distinction should be 
carved up and a clearly defined set of issues about the importance of the body image and 
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body schema for the production, transformation and optimisation of our motor skills. 
Nevertheless, it also seems to me that his analysis throws up as many questions as it 
answers43. I will outline the explanatory gaps that I intend to fill in the remainder of this 
thesis. The first set of questions pertain to the nature of the body schema. For example, how 
is cross-modal information calibrated (i.e., what is the ‘intermodal capacity’? and how does it 
function?), and how does this information figure in the development, transformation and 
selection of motor output? The second set of questions pertains to the relationship between 
the body percept and the body schema and its significance for the development, 
transformation and selection of our motor output. First we might ask what is the nature of the 
processes through which the interactions between the body percept and the environment 
shape the motor component of the body schema? Second, if the likelihood of error explains 
the alternation between the body percept and the body schema, what role, if any, do those 
errors play in determining and transforming our motor repertoire? Another way of putting 
this same question is how does the minimisation of error figure in the optimisation of the 
behaviours that are produced by the body percept and the body schema? 44. This list of 
questions is by no means exhaustive, but these are the questions that I will content myself 
with in the remaining chapters of the thesis. Ultimately, a comprehensive model of the role 
that the body percept and the body schema play in the production and optimisation of motor 
behaviour must provide a rationale for addressing such questions.  
 
 
2.7 The Argument against Gallagher’s Account of the Body Schema from De Vignemont 
 
Gallagher’s analysis of the body image and schema distinction is perhaps the most widely 
acknowledged. However, to the best of my knowledge there is only one existing critical 
response to his treatment of the body image and schema distinction in the philosophical 
literature and it comes from Frederique de Vignemont as part of her short review of his 
200545. Therein Vignemont analyses several important strands of thought that feature in his 









schema. Recall the passage from Gallagher that’s quoted in section 2.2 above wherein he 
defines the body schema as a sub-personal system of sensorimotor functions, capabilities, 
etc., none of which have ‘the status of a conscious representation’. Vignemont finds both 
aspects of this claim problematic for quite distinct reasons. I will rehearse and discuss each in 
turn. With respect to Gallagher’s conceptualisation of the body schema in terms of 
sensorimotor functions and the like she says: 
 
 
            ‘One may first notice that Gallagher defines the body schema as a set of capabilities. 
             I have some difficulty understanding what these capabilities are and Gallagher does 
             not provide any help on this topic. He remains very vague about the components of 





I think there is a way of reading this line of thought which is correct. I mentioned earlier that 
perhaps it would be more effective to describe the body schema in terms of the set of 
functions that underlie motor behaviour. This is quite consistent with Gallagher’s general 
functional description of the components of the body schema, and it is on this point that I 
disagree with the latter point in the passage from Vignemont. She argues that Gallagher 
remains vague with respect to the components which make up the body schema. But in 
section 2.2 of this chapter I explained that Gallagher clearly lays out what he takes the 
functional components of the body schema to be. The first component registers cross-modal 
inputs; the second component (i.e., the so-called ‘intermodal capacities’) calibrate the 
information that’s provided by the first component and the third component is the motor 
component that produces motor outputs by activating the musculoskeletal underpinnings of 
our behaviour patterns. Thus, it is not quite accurate to say that Gallagher is vague in his 
description of what he thinks the body schema consists of.  
    Nevertheless, her critique of his statement that the body schema does not have the status of 
a conscious representation is perhaps the more important of her objections to his account. 
Gallagher tells us in the passage quoted above that the body schema is not a conscious 
representation. This statement seems uncontroversial because the body schema is inaccessible 
to personal-level consciousness. De Vignemont’s argument is not that the body schema must 
be a conscious representation; rather, she claims that Gallagher’s non-representational 
analysis of the body schema is explanatorily impotent in virtue of the very fact that he omits 
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all talk of internal representation from his conception of the body schema. This is peculiar, 
she says, for ‘it seems clear that we do need information about the state of our own body’ to 
move our body and this, she claims, ‘argues in favour of pragmatic body representations for 
action’ which are implemented in the brain and are part of the body schema (De Vignemont, 
2006, p.3).   
   The natural question at this stage is what Vignemont means by a ‘pragmatic body 
representation for action’. To explain, Vignemont draws upon a distinction between higher-
order visual representation and pragmatic visual representation of physical objects (Jacob & 
Jeannerod, 2007). A higher-order visual representation of an object represents what you can 
do with the object, in other words the range of actions that can be taken up with respect to it. 
For instance, a knife can be used to saw, slice and chop various objects. Thus, the functional 
property of an object puts constraints on what an individual can typically do with it46. In 
contrast, a pragmatic visual representation represents the perceptible features of the object 
that are relevant for action, such as its size and its shape. This puts further enabling 
conditions and constraints on the ways in which the object can and cannot be used. For 
example, its shape will determine how it can be grasped and its size may determine whether 
an individual will need to use one or both of their hands to pick it up. Together, higher-order 
and pragmatic representations play an important role in determining the scope of possible 
actions that can be performed with respect to an object based on its functional properties and 
its objective configuration.  
    At the next step of her argument, Vignemont transposes this distinction to the body schema 
by conceptualising it in terms of a higher-order and pragmatic body representation. The 
higher-order body schema represents a ‘functional map’ of the motor repertoire of the 
‘human body in general’. This amounts to the idea that the higher-order body schema 
represents the range of actions that the human body can perform in virtue of its anatomical 
configuration. It also represents the constraints of the human body for ‘what is true of my 
kinaesthetic constraints is normally true of your kinaesthetic constraints’ (De Vignemont: 
2006, p.6). This representation also represents the more or less economical and efficient ways 
of carrying out certain tasks.  In contrast, the pragmatic (or ‘first-order’) body schema 
represents the perceptible features of the body and its parts; such as the spatial configuration 
of the body, and the size and shape of the body parts. Importantly, the latter also consists of 






the body is processed by a forward model (which she also ascribes to this component of the 
body schema) which uses occurrent inputs for comparison with recent inputs to predict the 
future postural positions of the body based on its current movement trajectory. 
    By construing the body schema in this way, Vignemont sees is that her model has more 
explanatory leverage than Gallagher’s. However, I think this argument rests on two 
unwarranted assumptions. The first assumption is that by refusing to conceptualise the body 
schema in terms of a representation Gallagher overlooks the obvious fact that, as she says, we 
need information about the current state of our body to move. This is clearly not the case as 
he ascribes this function to the first and second component of his tripartite account of the 
body schema. The other side of the coin is her assumption that by construing the body 
schema in terms of representation her model possesses explanatory leverage that she thinks 
Gallagher’s interpretation lacks. I find this assumption more problematic for it is not at all 
obvious that conceiving of the body schema in terms of internal representation imbues her 
conception of the body schema with some sort of magical explanatory power that she seems 
to think non-representational accounts lack. For instance, it’s not at all clear to me that ‘first-
order body representation’ has a kind of explanatory power that ‘intermodal capacity’ lacks 
insofar as both are described as the integrative processes by which multimodal information is 
received and calibrated. I italicise the word ‘described’ here intentionally for I think that 
Vignemont is confusing a description for an explanation, and if Gallagher’s account is 
problematic, in her view, because it is descriptive and not explanatory, then it seems to me 
that her account faces the same problems, at least until she probes more deeply into the nature 
of the representations in question that would allow us to understand the functional properties 
she ascribes to each representation47. My overarching point is that a functional description of 
the body schema doesn’t quite add up to a comprehensive explanation of the neural basis of 
multisensory processes in the brain until it is supplemented an additional story about how 












2.8 De Vignemont’s Conception of the Body Schema in Terms of Forward Modelling, Bayesian 
Sensorimotor Prediction and Action-Oriented Representation.      
 
   
Insofar as her critique of Gallagher’s conceptualisation of the body schema goes, I think 
Vignemont’s model of the body schema is problematic for reasons I have already expressed 
in the preceding section. Nonetheless, this isn’t the only interpretation of the body schema 
that Vignemont offers for in her 2010 she proceeds to develop her account of the body 
schema further. Importantly, this analysis goes some way towards filling the explanatory gap 
I just mentioned with respect to the idea that a functional description of the body schema 
that’s construed in representational terms doesn’t add up to an explanatorily superior model. 
In a similar vein to Holmes & Spence, Vignemont puts the general Bayesian model of 
sensorimotor processes forward as a plausible theoretical framework for understanding the 
nature of the body schema. Furthermore, she re-conceives of the body schema in two distinct 
ways. The first offers a reading of the body schema in terms of a predictive inverse-forward 
model. The second offers a reading of the body schema in terms of action-oriented 
representation. The first key argument of this section is that the first reading raises important 
questions pertaining to the importance of Bayesian style sensorimotor prediction for motor 
control, whereas the second reading is problematic on the grounds that her definition of 
action-oriented representation is too restrictive and her analysis of the body schema, so 
defined, regularly confuses the body schema for the body percept.        
       First, let’s consider her conception of the body schema in terms of a forward model. As 
we will see in more detail in chapter 4 in the thesis the concept of a forward model is an 
important explanatory concept for outlining the computational structure of the informational 
processes that underpin the planning, production and re-modification of motor output. The 
following account from Vignemont should provide the reader with a clear enough idea of 
what a forward-model entails. Vignemont provides an interpretation of a forward model in 
terms of three distinct aspects of the body schema. First there is the initial body schema 
which computes the motor commands necessary to move the body to a desired state, relative 
to its current position and its movement capabilities and/or constraints. The second 
component is the predictive body schema that ‘anticipates the sensorimotor consequences of 
the body’ and ‘allows for the anticipatory control of movement’. Then there is the updated 
body schema which ‘carries sensory information only about the bodily parameters that have 
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changed’ on the basis of the instructed movement (De Vignemont, 2010, p.672)48. Thus, the 
operations of the initial body schema occur prior to motor output and presumably the 
predictive body schema is in operation prior to (and presumably during) the motor activity. 
The updated body schema is in operation once the movement trajectory unfolds and provides 
a continual flow of sensory information that’s fed back to the predictive schema.  
      The interesting part of this analysis is that it raises the question of the importance of 
sensorimotor prediction for the planning and execution of motor control. This is an aspect of 
the body schema that Gallagher’s analysis does not consider. Recall that Head & Holmes 
interpret the body schema in terms of a ‘combined standard against which all subsequent 
changes of posture are measured before they enter consciousness’ (Head & Holmes, 1911-12, 
p.187). This is another way of saying that the body schema is a forward model of sorts. 
However, the real distinctiveness of Vignemont’s conception of the body schema is her 
emphasis on the importance of the interactions between top-down and bottom-up processes 
for determining the outputs of the body schema. To get a handle on these two important 
issues she appeals to the Bayesian model of sensory processing. Recall from chapter 1 that 
the relevant top-down processes are probabilistic predictions about the sensory consequences 
of bodily movement which are brought to bear on motor induced sensory data.  
    However, Vignemont doesn’t quite get as far as addressing the question of how Bayesian 
style sensorimotor predictions shape and facilitate the operations of the body schema for what 
she provides is an explanation of how the body percept is enabled by Bayesian predictions. 
This story is established in three steps. First, she claims that whatever the body schema is, it 
must be conscious. A compressed version of the story goes like this. The body schema may 
not require consciousness to be able to perform its function, but that doesn’t necessarily mean 
that the outputs of the body schema do not enter consciousness. She appeals to motor imagery 
as an example. For instance, If I close my eyes and form a visual picture of my body moving 
in my mind without actually moving my body and it is the body schema that is responsible 
for movement related processes, then this visual imagery of my body in movement must be 
produced by my body schema. This can’t be caused by my body image because that is only 











story goes, ‘the body schema must be conscious’ and thus ‘the availability to consciousness is 
not a criterion to differentiate the body schema from the body image’ (De Vignemont, 2010, 
p. 673). However, Vignemont proceeds to use such criteria to claim that the body-schema is a 
particular species of representation: action-oriented representation. By her definition: 
 
 
        A body representation is action-oriented if and only if it carries information about the 
        bodily effector (and the bodily goal in reflexive actions) that is used to guide bodily 
        movements (De Vignemont, 2010, p. 672).  
 
 
This means that the processes of the body schema are exclusively directed towards the body. 
Thus, the body is both the performer of actions as well as the intended subject of those 
actions. The line of justification is this: 
 
 
         ‘The body as a goal does not seem to differ from any other bodily goals. I can reach for 
          for my head or I can reach for my book, and it seems strange to think that the body 
          schema represents the book. When I reach for my book, my movement is guided by  
          a visuo-motor representation of the book that recruits the dorsal system. Similarly, 
          it makes sense to assume that when I reach for my head to scratch it, my movement 
          is guided by a proprioceptive-motor representation that recruits the body schema. 
          (De Vignemont, 2010, p. 672). 
    
 
The plausibility of the claim that it is ‘strange to assume that the body schema represents the 
book’ rests on what it means for the body schema to represent something. The succeeding 
statement would suggest that the notion of representation Vignemont is working with consists 
of a contentful percept of the book. Whether this is true is an open question. However, 
considering Gallagher’s analysis we have sufficient reason for thinking that the body schema 
can, and indeed does, direct motor responses that exhibit a sensitivity and responsiveness to 
the configuration of our environment. Think again of the example of reaching out for your 
coffee-cup whilst your hand forms into a grasp outwith the scope of your awareness. This 
would suggest that the conception of the body-schema in terms of action-oriented 
representation that is directed only towards the body is too restrictive. It also goes against the 
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grain of the standard view of action-oriented representation49. This brings me to the next 
point when Vignemont claims ‘my movement is guided by a visuo-motor representation that 
recruits the dorsal stream’. The flip side of the coin of Gallagher’s analysis is that conscious 
visual guidance is only responsible for the guidance of the more coarse-grained aspects of the 
reaching movement. The body schema takes care of the rest (i.e., the more fine-grained motor 
adjustments and the maintenance of balance). As such, there is no reason to think that only 
visual guidance is at play here. The key question is why, in this scenario, the visual guidance 
of the movement of the arm is not the outcome of the processes of the body schema, but yet 
motor imagery is the product of the body schema? In other words, why is my imagining 
seeing my body move the outcome of my body schema but my seeing my body move not? 
What’s the difference between an imaginary and a bona-fide visual percept of the moving 
body?  
     The source of the problem for Vignemont is rooted in the failure to respect the boundaries 
between the body percept and the body schema, i.e., whether their outputs are directly 
available to consciousness, which she initially rejects based on the case of motor imagery, but 
then uses to justify the claim that the processes of the body schema are exclusively directed 
towards the body. The case of motor imagery doesn’t rule out the possibility that it is the 
body percept that is responsible for this mental exercise. Perhaps it could even be said that 
motor imagery is an offline reconstruction and/or recombination of the relevant aspects of the 
body percept. For example, when I close my eyes and visualise, in my mind, my body 
moving in some way, my mental vision has similar phenomenological content to my veridical 
visual experiences. Likewise, a physically impaired individual could, with the right amount 
of mental effort, form a similar mental image.  
 
 
2.9. How to Make Progress on the Philosophical Analyses of the body schema and its relation to the 
body Percept: A Concluding Summary 
 
	
The significance of this line of criticism I have levelled against Vignemont’s characterisation 
of the body schema in terms of a conscious action-oriented representation is that it only 






into the same pitfalls as cognitive psychologists. The implication for her model is that her 
account of the body schema in terms of a forward-model that subscribes to Bayesian driven 
sensorimotor prediction fosters a productive avenue of research that the contemporary 
analyses of the body schema do not consider, yet this has ultimately led her to a dead end 
because we are still no closer to a Bayesian interpretation of the body schema and Vignemont 
now concedes that the distinction ought to be dropped on the same familiar grounds as 
Holmes & Spence who say that the distinction just causes too much confusion and no 
consensus can be found over how these concepts should be dissociated and analysed. 
    In response, we can say that representational analyses in cognitive psychology and 
philosophy are equally responsible for that for note that they always take the same course and 
end up with the same outcome. A definition of the body schema is provided in broad 
representational terms, however the conception of the body schema in such terms is too 
liberal to respect the intended boundaries of the distinction. As such, the confusion persists 
and the diagnosis is that the problem must lie with the distinction. A different outcome thus 
requires a different approach. The question is what such an approach should look like if we 
are to make any headway. The approach I will take up will preserve (most of) the 
unproblematic insights associated with the representational analyses of the body schema 
whilst respecting Shaun Gallagher’s non-representational analyses of the body schema and 
the body percept/body schema distinction.  In what follows I will pursue the currently 
abandoned line of thought from Vignemont’s analysis of the body schema in terms of an 
action-oriented representation that is guided by Bayesian sensorimotor prediction and, by 
doing so, I will take the necessary steps towards providing a reconciliatory approach to 
defining the body schema which neatly straddles the pro- and anti-representational divide.  
 
    
  
              
 





A Bayesian Perspective on the Optimising Principles of Cross-Modal Cue Integration 
 
Introduction  
The analysis of the issues pertaining to the body schema and body schema distinction across 
chapters one and two make it clear that multimodal sensorimotor processes optimise our 
behavioural interactions in the environment. Furthermore, Shaun Gallagher’s analysis of 
deafferentation and the relationship between the body image and the body schema in the 
context of everyday action showed that this is true of the sub-personal processes of the body 
schema which work independently of the body percept. This is also true of the body percept 
during motor development and hazardous conditions. To begin to build our story about how 
to conceptualise the body schema and its relationship with the body percept, we first need a 
more fundamental story about the optimisation strategies which maximise the effectiveness 
of the outputs of perceptual and motor processes. In this chapter, I will outline and examine 
empirical evidence from Marc Ernst and his interpretation of the data from the perspective of 
Bayesian causal inference which suggests that sensory information isn’t just passively 
received and recapitulated into given outputs.; rather, the brain evaluates and integrates cross-
modal signals based on their task-specific and context dependent reliability. The story to 
emerge is that this process optimises the output signal in two ways. First, calibrating the 
signals improves the accuracy of the output; second, flexibly weighing up and recalibrating 
the signals in accordance with their task- and context-relative strengths and weaknesses under 
different conditions ensures that the outgoing processes remains stable and unperturbed by 
disruptions to the signals. This will provide the foundations required for the ensuing line of 
thought that will be developed in the subsequent chapters of the thesis.      
 
3.1 Bayesian Models of Perception: The Inherently Unstable Nature of Sensory Processing and Why 
Context Matters 
 
In chapter one of the thesis we got a brief flavour of the central tenets of the Bayesian vision 
of sensory processing (e.g., Bernardo & Smith (1994) &. Gelman, 2004). In this chapter I 
will further explore how Bayesian causal inference has been used to establish a general 
theory of perception. To better understand the motivations of the Bayesian picture let’s begin 
by considering the implications of two problems the brain must overcome to ensure the 





question of how the perceptual outputs of sensory processing remain stable in the face of 
inherent disruptions to the feeding signals that are brought about by the inevitable noise that’s 
caused by sensory signal transfer. Sensory processing, by its very nature, inevitably causes 
random fluctuations to the information that’s carried by the incoming signals. As such, the 
information provided by the unending flow of new and updated signals can never fully 
accurate. As such: 
 
        […] no information-processing system, neither technological nor biological, is powerful 
        enough to ‘perceive and act’ accurately under all conditions.  
        (Ernst & Bulthoff, 2004, p.162).  
 
 
Furthermore, the severity of the degradation a signal undergoes is also proportionate to the 
conditions under which the sensory signalling is taking place for information provided by the 
sensory modalities may be stable and accurate in some conditions, and not in others. For 
example, as I type this chapter in broad day light I can see the features of my visual 
surroundings in clear detail. This is because vision is a very reliable source of sensory 
feedback in normal lighting conditions. However, in complete darkness I may not be able to 
see very much at all. I may be able to identify the contours of some objects around me, but 
the visual information I am getting is not as reliable as the information I am provided with in 
broad daylight. It certainly isn’t reliable enough for me to completely rely on it to get myself 
out of a dark room safely. Instead, the best thing to do is to feel my way around the room to 
feel for objects to avoid a collision and perhaps feel for a wall or a door to feel my way out. 
In this case, touch is more reliable than vision. However, there are some occasions in which 
vision is more reliable than touch. For example, we have all had the experience of our fingers 
going numb from holding onto a freezing cold object, such as an ice lolly, for so long that we 
can no longer feel our fingers.  
    Against this backdrop, the guiding question is how the brain manages to synthesise the 
sensory information available to it from its perceptible surroundings into a coherent, accurate, 
unified and world-reflecting percept to compensate for the degradations to the signals. 
What’s interesting is that from a first-person perspective we are not aware of the fluctuations 
to the sensory signals, however the fact that the brain does compensate for the context-
dependent fluctuations to the signals is manifested in our behaviour. In the scenario just 
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outlined, we increase our reliance on the available signal and decrease our reliance on the 
unavailable signal. The fundamental issue that must be addressed is how the fluctuations are 
registered and how they are compensated for at the neurological level in a way that helps us 
make sense of the changes in our reliance to the signals.   
 
3.2. The Maximum Likelihood Principle 
 
To address this question Ernst proposes what he calls the maximum likelihood principle (or 
MLEP) which claims that the brain utilises prior-beliefs (‘priors’) to evaluate the incoming 
sensory data and calibrates redundant cross-modal signals based on the current quality of the 
contributing signal to produce the most accurate estimation of the causes of the input that it 
can produce (Ernst, 2006, p.6). Under MLEP perceptual outputs are, at best, estimations of 
the cause of the stimulus. A clear illustration of this comes from Green & Swets51 who 
showed that if an individual is asked to provide one hundred estimations of the size of an 
object, all one hundred estimates will be different. Thus, perception is a probabilistic process 
that provides estimations of what our perceptible surroundings are like52.  
 
3.3 Empirical Evidence for the Maximum Likelihood Principle  
 
To empirically verify the claim that cross-modal signals are processed in accordance with 
MLEP Ernst appeals to earlier studies of his (e.g., Martin Banks & Marc O Ernst (2002)) to 
explore the possibility that the perceptual system does maximise the accuracy of perceptual 
outputs by combining cross-modal signals to provide a combined estimate that reflects the 
current quality of the signals. The general methodology the authors apply is one we are 
already familiar with considering the rubber hand illusion experiments which were discussed 
in chapter one. The methodological strategy seeks to create competition between a visual and 






two objects by deliberately increasing noise to one signal to see if the weighing up of the 
signals flexibly recalibrates in accordance with the MLE principle. If this is the case, the 
weight of the tactile signal should increase proportionally to the decrease in availability of the 
visual signal.     
    During the task the participants had to estimate the comparative size of paired objects. The 
perceived objects were paired in terms of the time delay between them, with shorter time 
delays between the presentation of each object that were part of a pair and longer time delays 
between each pair. As the paired objects were presented in sequential order the participant 
had to estimate whether the objects in each pair were the same or different in size (see Ernst, 
2006, pp11-13). For test purposes, there were three conditions under which the objects could 
be perceived. Under the first condition the objects could only be seen; under the second 
condition they could only be touched, and in the third they could be simultaneously seen and 
touched. Using Bayesian inspired sophisticated mathematical statistics53 Ernst & Banks 
worked out the respective initial estimation of the visual and haptic signals and the respective 
estimates each provides about the comparative size of each set of paired objects. For test 
purposes, they worked out how the individual signals were weighted in the seen only and felt 
only conditions in response to paired objects with no difference in size. What’s interesting is 
that in the simultaneously seen and felt condition, the final estimation was a combination of 
the visuo-tactile signals which was weighted slightly in favour of the visual input. This 
suggests that the default response of the brain is to combine the signals (more on this below).  
    Using the principle that interference to the dominant visual signal should systematically 
reduce its influence to the weighting of the combined signal and increase the weighting of the 
less dominant signal, Ernst & Banks systematically introduced noise to the visual signal 
(Ernst, 2006, pp. 8-11). The upshot is that in accordance with their mathematical calculations, 
the weight of the visual signal did systematically decrease and the influence of the haptic 
signal increased proportionate to the decrease in the weight of the tactile signal. When the 
input from the visual signal was reduced to 0% it was completely overridden by the tactile 
signal54. Under the MLEP this would be expected because additional noise reduces the 
salience of the information from the interfered signal. In turn, this increasingly undermines 
the accuracy of the information it is providing. With decreasing accuracy comes a decline in 
the reliability of the signal and this means that its assigned weight gets smaller and smaller. 






gets proportionally higher to compensate for the interruptions to the affected signal. And 
when one signal is unavailable, the other takes over (Ernst, 2006, p.11). 
The importance of these studies is threefold. First, the default response of the brain in 
response to signals that report on the same property or event is to bring the signals together to 
provide a combined estimate; second, the weighing up of the signal is a function of a) the 
availability of the signals and b) the current qualify of the inputs they provide; third, when 
one contributing signal is completely unavailable the other signal takes over. The real beauty 
of the studies from Banks and Ernst is that for the first time the processes through which the 
brain evaluates and recalibrates sensory signals to maximise the accuracy of its output despite 
the inherently instable and fluctuating nature of sensory processing can be mathematically 
quantified and examined under test conditions.      
 
3.4 The Implications of the MLE Principle: Understanding the Optimal Significance of Redundant Cross-
Modal Signals  
 
 
The natural question we can ask is what insights we can glean from the empirical studies and 
the MLEP with respect to our interest in the optimal significance of cross-modal signalling. 
The first thing we can say is that the default response of the brain is to always combine the 
sensory signals to compensate for the inherently noisy nature of sensory signalling. 
Interestingly, the weighting of the initial combined signal weighed slightly in favour of 
vision. On reflection, this is unsurprising for visual input is the most reliable modality for 
reporting the spatial dimensions of three-dimensional objects. For example, I can judge the 
size of an object just by looking at it. However, if I close my eyes and feel the object I can’t 
judge its size just by holding it. This doesn’t mean that I can’t come to an accurate judgement 
about the size of the object by touching it; rather, vision provides the same data much more 
quickly than touch. Thus, the first way in which the brain optimises the multimodal inputs 
that underpin perceptual outputs is by combining the signals in accordance with their context-
dependent reliability and efficiency. In turn, this entails that the brain must possess prior 
knowledge about the context-sensitive reliability of the modalities.  
    The second important point pertains to the optimal importance of having multiple available 
sources of information about our perceptible surroundings in the first place. At the initial 
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stages of this chapter, the fact that the brain has multiple sensory channels from which it can 
glean information about the world was cast up in terms of a problem in the sense that the 
more sensory information is processed by the brain makes sensory processing noisier. 
However, what the studies show is that having multiple sources of complementary sensory 
information is adaptively advantageous for the brain can exploit their respective, context-
dependent strengths and weaknesses to maximise the accuracy of the driving signal. For 
instance, if I was in the dark room and only had a visual system I would have no other 
reliable resources to rely on to manoeuvre my body safely around the room and locate the 
exit. The MLEP principle neatly explains what is occurring in this situation. In normal 
lighting conditions the weight of our visual signals about our surroundings has a higher 
weight than tactile information. However, in sub-optimal lighting conditions the weight of the 
visual signal decreases and the tactile signal increases because the optimal thing to do is 
increase your reliance on the system that is available and providing a steady stream of 
sensory feedback.  
    What is under discussion here is the optimal significance of redundant sensory signals 
(Ernst, 2006, p.5). Sensory signals are redundant when they report on the same property or 
activity in the world, i.e., they carry equivalent information in their respective formats. Non-
redundant signals carry different information, although they can carry distinct information 
about the same property or event (e.g., a visual signal about the colour of the mug and a 
tactile signal about its shape.) The notion of redundancy in the multisensory integration 
literature is quite distinct from the common-sense understanding of this term. In ordinary 
discourse, the word redundant usually means that something which is redundant is needless 
or is no longer of use or value. The connotations of the word redundant as it is used in the 
context of multisensory integration are important for understanding the significance of the 
way redundant cross-modal signals optimise the mental, cognitive and behavioural capacities 
they support.  
    The working notion of redundancy comes from systems engineering. In systems 
engineering the components of a system are redundant when there are two or more duplicates 
of a particular component part of a system. Typically, whilst one component is active the 
redundant components sit in reserve, but are readily poised to override the functioning 
component if it undergoes a malfunction to some degree. Without duplicates this could lead 
to the system performing less than optimally or failing to work at all if one of its essential 
components has failed. For instance, to prevent a complete system failure most modern 
aircraft have redundant systems built in, including duplicate flight controls, electrical 
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generators and dual-engines. Having redundant systems in place which can perform in the 
exact same way simultaneously prevents against operational failure and ensures that the 
system works to full capacity without major disruption(s). Another way to put the point is 
that having duplicate systems which can perform the same functional role in the system is 
adaptively advantageous for it one fails, the other can replace is so that the operations of the 
system can carry on as normal, or at least as close to normal as possible.  
    If we transpose this line of thought to the sensory systems, the same argument applies to 
the optimal significance of redundant signals, only in this case it is not only one sensory 
module that does the driving work whilst the others are inactive waiting to be activated in 
instances where the driving signal fails. Rather, each sensory signal is active and makes a 
continual contribution to the outgoing signal. Of course, the extent to which the signal is 
contributing to the output is dependent upon the current quality of the information it carries. 
Moreover, as the studies from Banks & Ernst suggest, if one signal is so degraded to the 
extent that it is providing no input, the others) can override and the perceptual process can go 
on as normal. This is the way the brain can maintain stability in the face of the inherently 
unstable nature of its own sensory processes and the context-dependent reliability of the 
sense modalities. As such, Ernst expresses the importance of redundant signals thus: 
 
      ‘Redundant signals’ may to some degree sound like a waste of information. But actually 
       this is not necessarily so. There are two major advantages in having redundant  
       information available: the first is that the system is more robust, because when one  
       estimate is not available at a given time (or its information is degraded) the other  
       estimate can substitute for it. The second advantage is that the final estimate becomes 
       potentially more reliable compared with the reliability of the individual estimates feeding 




Importantly, combining the signals to maximise the accuracy of the signal increases the 
efficiency of the process for the individual by decreasing the amount of variance (i.e., any 
discrepancy) between the perceptual estimate and the actual property being reported. In other 
words, the other side of the coin to maximising accuracy is minimising error (Ernst, 2006, 
p.9). This is an important point because the prior likelihood that the integration between 
signals is likely to produce a high volume of errors determines the integration relationship 
between them (Ernst, 2006, p.11). When the relations between cross-modal signals are likely 
to produce a higher risk of error they are combined which is to say that they are temporarily 
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coupled together for the duration of the estimation process. This entails that the brain still has 
access to the combined signals to recalibrate the signals in accordance with the varying 
quality of the signals. In contrast, when the signals present a lower risk of generating error 
they are ‘fused’ which is to say that when the signals are combined the brain no longer has 
access to the individual signals (Ernst, 2006, p.19).     
    In support of this claim Banks & Ernst55 studied the integration relationships between 
redundant and non-redundant signals. Using a similar experimental set up they compared the 
coupling relations between non-redundant signals within the same modality (visual-only 
signals) and redundant cross-modal signals (visual-haptic signals). What they found was that 
the integration between non-redundant visual signals about binocular disparity and texture 
was fused, whereas redundant visual and haptic signals about size were combined (Ernst, 
2006, p. 19).  
    In general, it makes sense for the brain to retain access to both signals when they are only 
coupled for a temporary duration, such as during tool use. Up until the point at which I pick 
up my rake to collate freshly cut grass the maximum reaching distance of my hand is 
constrained by the canonical boundaries of my body. However, once I pick up the rake the 
reaching distance of my hand instantaneously extends proportional to the length of the rake. 
As such, motor planning needs to be updated to quickly re-adapt my reaching behaviour 
accordingly. In contrast to this, when the coupling between signals does not, and need not, 
change quickly and their integration presents a low risk of error, then access to the individual 
signals need not be retained. In other words, if it is sufficient for related errors to be resolved 
over the long term, then the brain doesn’t (always) need access to the independent signals 
(Ernst, 2006, p.21). Clearly, the experiments from Ernst suggest that the integration between 
visual signals about disparity and texture is one such case. In low risk cases where the 
consequences of error are not serious, repeated exposure to the same property over time is all 









3.5 Reinterpreting the Rubber-Hand Illusion in terms of the MLEP 
 
Ernst’s MLEP provides a rationale for understanding how the relations between cross-modal 
relations optimise perceptual outputs. In general, cross-modal signals are weighed up in 
accordance with their context-dependent reliability and are continually calibrated and 
recalibrated during the perceptual process in response to fluctuating incoming signals. In 
other words, the more reliable the information provided by a sense modality is under current 
conditions, and throughout the process, the more the brain increases the perceptual systems’ 
reliance on it to improve the efficient and accuracy of the output; ensure that perceptual 
processing remains stable, and minimise error. This puts us in a nice position to explain some 
of the empirical data that we considered in chapter one with respect to the ability to 
accurately track the location of sensations on the body. One such example was the rubber 
hand illusion. In this task, the participants see and feel tactile stimulation on their own hand. 
However, the crucial difference is that the hand they see receiving tactile stimulation is a 
rubber hand while the hand they feel tactile stimulation on has been occluded. When asked to 
locate the stimulus, the participants say that they feel the stimulus on the rubber hand. The 
guiding question is why vision trumps proprioception and tactile inputs about the location of 
the hand and the stimulus, respectively. From the perspective of MLEP, the visual signal is 
not coupled with the tactile signal for the visual signal is reporting about the visual location 
of the stimulus in space (which is directed towards the rubber hand). In contrast, the tactile 
and proprioceptive signals are redundant for they are reporting on sensory feedback from the 
actual hand. However, vision is the modality on which we usually rely on to locate objects in 
space and so the prior likelihood that vision will deliver a more accurate estimate than touch 
causes an increased reliance on the visual signal. In this case, the visual signal completely 











The significance of Ernst’s MLE Principle: A Concluding Summary 
 
The overarching purpose of this chapter is to provide an illustration of one of the most 
important works in the multisensory integration literature about the way in which multimodal 
processes optimise the perceptual processes they underpin. What Ernst’s empirical data 
provides us with is an empirically grounded principle (i.e., MLEP) for thinking that the 
default optimisation strategy of the brain is to combine redundant signals to maximise the 
accuracy of the driving signal that determines perceptual output. In turn, the availability of 
multiple sources of sensory information that can fulfil the same functional role in the 
perceptual system means that perceptual processing can carry on as normal if one of the 
signals becomes degraded and/or unavailable. In this case, one sensory channel can override 
the other (malfunctioning) modality. This is just part-and-parcel of the brains’ ability to 
flexibly recalibrate the relations between the signals in accordance with their context 
dependent reliability. In turn, the more accurate the signal the less likely it is to be incorrect. 
As such, the MLEP provides an account of one of the processes through which the brain 
compensates for the instability of sensory signalling and invariantly reliable signal sources to 
enhance its perceptual outputs. However, this can only be part of our story. For one thing, a 
story still needs to be told about how the relevant prior knowledge that’s brought to bear 
during the evaluation and calibration of sensory signals is built up. Furthermore, to get to 
grips with a Bayesian model that will do the job of providing a framework to interpret the 
body image and body schema, we still need a story about the optimal significance of 
multisensory integration for sensorimotor integration. This will be the focus of the next 














There is a relatively newer and updated version of the Bayesian paradigm that was outlined in 
chapter three which has been gaining pace in cognitive science: the prediction error 
minimisation model (PEM). In this chapter, I will look at the central tenets of this framework 
as they apply to perception and action. Under this model, the optimal existence of biological 
agents requires an internal, hierarchical model that can successfully predict the internal state 
changes (i.e., sensory stimulation) that are brought about the external causes of the stimuli (in 
the case of perception) and its actions. So understood, perception and action are united in an 
effort to contribute towards the optimal existence of the agent as a whole by continually 
testing out the predictions and making relevant revisions (i.e., minimising and/or eliminating 
‘prediction errors’) in order to enhance the predictive accuracy of the model. What we will 
discover is that this model provides all the necessary resources we need, and more, for 
understanding how multimodal processes optimise perceptual and motor processes, and 
offers a unifying story about how perceptual and motor processes work together to optimise 
the interactions of agents in their environment.  
 
 
4.1 The Inferential and Predictive Nature of Perception: From Helmholtz to Enactivism.  
 
The prediction error minimisation paradigm (PEM)57 takes its lead from the Bayesian model 
of perceptual inference that was considered in the previous chapter in several key ways. This 
model is, first and foremost, a theory about the structure of information processing in the 
brain for it adopts the principal Bayesian idea that bottom-up sensory inputs are met with top-
down prior beliefs. However, it offers a distinctive view of what kind of mechanism the brain 
is on a whole. In a similar vein to Ernst’s Bayesian perspective, this framework starts with the 
premise that the brain is an optimisation device that seeks to maintain stability and maximise 
the accuracy of its outputs. However, the strategy by which it does this is not by combining 





predict the causes of the stimulus before the stimulus arrives at the periphery, and it does so 
by bringing descending multi-level predictions from cortical and sub-cortical regions to bear 
on the incoming sensory data to try to work out the cause of the stimulus58.  
    As a model of perception PEM adopts the general idea that was outlined in the previous 
chapter about the nature of perception in terms of knowledge driven inference. However, its 
starting point provides a more comprehensive understanding of why we should think of 
perception in this way. To draw out the central tenets of the PEM model, I will take this 
aspect of the theory as my starting point. The standard way of thinking about the nature of the 
mediating transformative processes that transform sensory data into perceptual outputs, such 
as the view espoused by Marr (1982) for instance, take perceptual processes to be the 
processes by which incomplete, inverse, two-dimensional retinal inputs are gradually 
transformed into a complete, world-reflecting, three-dimensional image that is perceive in 
experience. On this view, each level of the perceptual hierarchy makes its own specialised 
contribution to the transformation of the perceptual signal at a particular level of detail and 
scale in isolation from the others, before passing it along to the level above. The process 
continues until the process is complete and the sensory signal is transformed into the final 
percept.  
    However, there is a consensus these days that perception involves more than the 
transformation of available sensory inputs because sensory data does not suffice to provide 
the rich and seemingly detailed experiential content of personal level perception. One reason 
for this concerns the consideration we encountered in the previous chapter, namely that there 
is no one-to-one correspondence between an input and its cause for an infinite amount of 
causes can generate the same input, e.g., the input pertaining to colour, like red, could be 
caused by a red ball, a red car, a red rose, a red tomato etc. and the one output can bring about 
a multitude of effects59.    
    Another consideration comes from Alva Noë60 in relation to what he calls the ‘problem of 
perceptual presence’ where aspects of your surroundings may be ‘present’ in your experience 
but absent from the sensory feedback that the sensory modalities are currently providing. 
Cases of amodal perception are a good example of this phenomenon. To explain, let’s begin 
with the epistemologist’s favourite example of looking at a tomato that’s sitting on a 







experiencing, visually, a whole, three-dimensional, fleshy, juicy fruit but all you can see is 
the incomplete surface properties of the tomato in virtue of its position relative to your field 
of vision. The same applies when you look at a chair tucked under the table for it doesn’t 
seem to you as if your experience of the chair is in any way incomplete, yet all you are really 
seeing is the top of the chair. Hidden from direct view is the back of the chair, its legs and the 
seat. Thus, what we perceive at the level of experience outstrips the sensory data that’s 
currently available (see Noë, 2004, pp.67-69). This means that there must be additional 
mediating processes that provide the additional information about your sensory surroundings 
that you experience and this indicates is that the processes which occur between the uptake of 
sensory data and perceptual output that are involved in determining the content of personal 
level experience involves more than just the impression and transformation of data on the 
sensory apparatus. Instead, it involves making inferences about what’s ‘out there’ in the 
world on the basis of the current sensory data you are receiving. Alas, we have the first tenet 
of PEM which is inspired by the theory of perception from Helmholtz (1878) according to 
whom perception involves unconscious inference. Broadly speaking, he claims that 
sensations merely represent the stimuli that cause them; they are not exact copies of them and 
the learned correspondence between sensations and the perceptible objects that produce them 
is built up through interactive experience.  
    Questions about the nature of the sort of knowledge that underpins the mediating 
inferential processes of perception have been central to sensorimotor and enactive approaches 
to perception (e.g., Noë & O’Regan, 2001, Noë, 2005), according to which the content of 
experience is given by the possession and exercise of a kind of sensorimotor knowledge 
which is a practical knowledge of the systematically causal relationship between the 
movement of the body and the sensory apparatus. For example, in the case of looking at the 
tomato, the amodal content of my experience (i.e., the content which I cannot directly see) is 
given by my understanding that if I were to move my body in precise ways relative to the 
tomato, say by changing my position relative to it, other bits of the tomato would come into 
view. It’s this understanding which gives me the impression that I’m looking at a whole, 
three-dimensional tomato and not a façade of a tomato (e.g., see Noë, ch.2, 2005).  What’s 
distinctive about the enactive view is that perception is inherently anticipatory and that the 
sensorimotor knowledge which underpins a perceivers’ grasp of the effects of movement on 
sensory stimulation is not just causally important to perception, in the same way that the 
availability of light is for instance, it is constitutive of what perception is. Without it, 
perceivers wouldn’t have the kind of perceptual capabilities they have (Noë, 2005, p. 2). 
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    The PEM model adopts the Helmholtzian line of thought that perception is, by its very 
nature, inferential and is underpinned by an understanding of the causal correspondence 
between objects and the sensory stimuli they generate and the enactivists claim that the 
knowledge which underpins perception is inherently anticipatory.  
 
4.2. Hierarchical Perceptual Processing 
 
Under PEM the perceptual knowledge which underpins our perceptual access to the world 
around us is part of a probabilistic ‘generative model’ in the brain of perceiving agents, so 
called because it generates predictions about the correspondence between sensory stimuli and 
the objects which cause them. The generative model is hierarchically structured with higher 
levels eliciting more abstract perceptual and lower-levels which elicit predictions about more 
fine-grained aspects of perceptual detail. At each level, there is a ‘representation unit’ which 
elicits the predictions which pertain to the probable causes of sensory input at the specific 
level of perceptual detail that that level pertains to and an ‘error unit’ which receives error 
signals from the lower levels in the hierarchy (e.g., see Clark, 2012, p.21-32). 
    What is distinctive about the PEM model, Clark tells us, is the story it has to tell about the 
communication that occurs between levels in the hierarchy. On the traditional view, the 
signal itself is passed up the hierarchy. Under PEM, only the error signal is relayed up the 
hierarchy until it is cancelled out. This occurs when one level in the hierarchy can account for 
the erroneous detail. If this fails to happen a change in generative model may be in order. 
Thus, what gets fed downwards through the hierarchy are the predictions. On the standard 
view, each level works in isolation and makes its own contribution to the transformation of 
the signal before passing it up. Under PEM the representation unit at one level can feed into 
the level below to try to cancel out a prediction error via ‘forward connections’.  
Furthermore, the only signals which are relayed in an upwards fashion from low to high 
levels in the hierarchy are the error signals.  In the case of perception this process allows for 
the rapid processing of perceptual data, and the multi-level interactions within the perceptual 
hierarchy allow for the quick detection and correction of prediction errors as any conflicts 
between the predictions elicited under a given model and the inputs can be resolved at an 
earlier stage of perceptual processing (Clark, 2012, p.54). 
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This means that when generative models are employed to explain incoming sensory data, the 
information that is being worked over is the information that is predicted given the current 
model that is under use. Different generative models will thus carry different representational 
units that carry different predictions and replicas of the perceptual data. Thus, it is argued that 
it is not raw sensory input that contributes to the final percept but is instead a ‘virtual version’ 
(Clark, 2013, p.13) of that data. 
    What this gives us is a clean explanation of how top-down and bottom-up processes work 
in tandem to cancel out prediction errors. The selected generative models provide a measure 
against which the detection of errors is made possible for prediction errors can only be 
generated when sensory evidence is evaluated under a given model, and the alternation 
between models helps cancel out a wide array of prediction errors. Within each model the 
multi-level communication between top-down representation units play an important role in 
cancelling out prediction errors at multiple scales of perceptual detail.  This enhances the 
capacity for a given model to cancel out prediction error more successfully for each level in 
the hierarchy will be equipped to resolve discrepancies at different levels of description. It 
also enhances the capacity for prediction error minimisation at each level if each 
representation unit doesn’t work in isolation.  This means that in principle the cooperation 
between each level can cancel out any discrepancies on the spot instead of being passed up 
the hierarchy for further processing.  
    It is for this reason that HPP engenders a ‘gist-at-a-glance’ approach to perception to 
explain the importance of top-down influence (Clark, 2013, p. 14). The idea in mind is that 
when the brain receives a given sequence of sensory data it employs a generative model that 
best captures the more global attributes of the initial inputs. This may include the more global 
aspects of the distal scene, such as the dense expanse of different bodies in a vast crowd. 
However, as more specific sensory feedback comes in more specific inputs may be 
registered, such as the colour of the clothes that people are wearing, their gender, whether 
they are fighting or dancing, and so forth. The adjustments that are made as the incoming 
sensory sequences unfold will depend on how much information is accurately captured by the 
current model, i.e., how much of the visual scene can be accounted for by the representation 
units. If any discrepancies are left unresolved another model might be recruited whose 
predictions are better equipped to account for the incoming data, or perhaps the current model 
will be re-altered so that it is better able to account for the data the next time that it is 
deployed. This means that the importance of top-down and bottom-up interaction within the 
hierarchy is revealed in two different ways. Firstly, sensory input is required to get the 
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prediction error minimisation process started and unfolding sensory feedback provides the 
basis for providing prediction errors. In turn, initial sensory data is met by a selected 
generative model to explain its cause and further amendments to the top-down predictions 
that are generated are driven by the prediction errors which are generated as the sensory 
trajectory unfolds.  
 
4.3 Perception as Prediction: In summary 
 
In summary, the PEM framework characterises perception as a process by which a generative 
model is issued in response to incoming sensory inputs to cancel out prediction errors. This is 
initially facilitated by the multi-level communication between each level in the hierarchy of 
the selected generative model. In cases where the prediction error cannot be cancelled out by 
the initially selected model, a direct switch may be made to an alternative model or the 
alternation back and forth between two or more models may occur to cancel out the error and, 
in doing so, perception optimises the predictive capacities of the brain by making appropriate 
internal changes in response to its inputs. Therefore, the final percept is determined by the 
interactions, and settled agreement, between each level in the hierarchy of the generative 
model that has successfully proven to account for most of the details presented in the current 
visual scene. Thus, PEM differs from the orthodox model of perception in two fundamental 
ways. The first concerns what the perceptual system is doing for under this framework the job 
of the perceptual system is not to reconstruct the sensory data into a percept, but to cancel out 
prediction errors. Secondly, it suggests that the communication between levels is multilateral, 
in other words the predictions at one level can influence the performance of the level below 









4.4. Action-Oriented Predictive Processing: Casting Motor Control in terms of Prediction Error 
Minimisation.  
 
A similar story has been mounted by Karl Friston & his colleagues about the hierarchical 
nature of the motor system and the computational underpinnings of motor processing to 
explain the nature and functional role of motor control (e.g., Friston et al. 2008, 2009, & 
Friston, 2010, 2011). Andy Clark recently labelled this framework the ‘action-oriented 
predictive processing’ (henceforth AOPP) model of sensorimotor functioning61. In a similar 
vein to the story about the nature of the perceptual system, the motor system itself is 
characterised as a hierarchical system that implements sensorimotor predictions about the 
sensory consequences of movement to cancel out perceptual and motor generated prediction 
errors. The authors take as their first step the fact that the motor system is hierarchical in 
nature. For instance, the regions of the brain that are involved in more abstract motor 
planning, i.e., the pre-motor and motor cortex, are in cortical areas like the precentral and 
postcentral gyrus, whereas the regions involved in the ongoing retuning of motor output in 
response to incoming signals, like the cerebellum, are linked closer to the spine and muscle 
networks to produce quick motor readjustments62. Thus, the more stable parts of our action 
routine are situated further away from the spine and those involved in quick motor responses 
are closer to the effectors.   
    The distinctive hallmark of AOPP pertains to how motor signals are characterised in terms 
of sensorimotor predictions. This is quite a radical claim for it states that having sensorimotor 
predictions about the sensory consequences of action is both necessary and sufficient for 
bringing action about: 
 
 
            We only need to have expectations about the sensory consequences of moving 
             in order to elicit movement (Friston et al 2010, p.1.) 
 
 
Friston et al (2010, p.3) use the example of how the fulfilment of expectations about tactile 






we have encountered already where an individual is trying to feel their way around a dark 
room to turn the light switch back on. Feeling ones’ way around the room is directed by the 
expectation that objects can be located by touch and on this basis an individual may probe 
their way around to find the light switch try to confirm those expectations, and will continue 
to do so until they are proven to be correct (Friston, 2010, p. 3). In this case body movement 
in the room is directed by, and aimed towards, the fulfilment of certain expectations about the 
tactile feedback that should be experienced as an individual feels their way around the room.  
In the case of action, prediction errors drive a change in motor output until the desired 
expectation (as dictated by the generative model) has been satisfied. Thus, prediction errors 
engender a change in motor output to bring about sensory data that fits with the generative 
model, not a change to the selected model to fit the data.  
   Mobile agents are capable of actively generating and regulating the streams of incoming 
sensory stimuli that their sensory apparatus is met with on the basis of their implicit 
understanding of how their body movements bring about changes to sensory inputs in 
desirable ways, for instance a shift in eye gaze brings previously unseen parts of the world 
into view and straining one’s eyes brings fuzzy objects into sharper focus. In this case, simple 
motor adjustments at one level (i.e., the sensorimotor level) bring about the anticipated 
changes to the sensory stimuli that satisfy an individual’s expectations about what he or she 
will see at another, i.e., at the level of personal level experience. To explain the thought in 
mind let’s suppose that a motor command is recruited to instruct the hand to reach outwards 
on a given trajectory until it meets a target object, like a cup. However, say that the retrieving 
hand fails to come into contact with the cup once it has reached its maximal reaching 
distance. This will generate a prediction error that will be corrected for by employing another 
motor strategy, like leaning the trunk of the body over to some degree to extend the reaching 
distance of the hand so that it can come into contact with the cup. In this example, prediction 
errors instruct the motor readjustments the body makes until the prediction elicited by the 
generative model has been satisfied.   
    Of course, this is only part of a much bigger computational process that recruits the 
perceptual and the motor system. Recall that whatever the motor system does, it does so in 
conjunction with information about the location of objects relative to the body. 
Proprioceptive information simply isn’t enough to confirm whether an action has been 
successful, for instance confirmation that the hand has successfully grasped the mug might be 
confirmed by visual, tactile and proprioceptive information. As such, AOPP posits that the 
perceptual and motor system work together under an operating principle called active 
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inference where the perceptual system elicits predictions about the state of the body and the 
world and engages the motor system to actively sample the sensory evidence in accordance 
with the brain’s generative model(s). Thus, we are told: 
 
              In this view, the central nervous system is not divided into motor and sensory  
              systems but is one perceptual inferential machine that provides predictions of 




This point needs some clarification as it is potentially misleading. There are no strict lines of 
division between the sensory and motor system under Friston’s version of AOPP because the 
nature of the motor signals are themselves sensory in nature. Nonetheless, that’s not to say 
that there is no distinct perceptual and motor system. On the contrary, their divisions are 
carved up based on the predictions they specialise in. The perceptual system elicits 
predictions about the causal relationships between states of the body and environment and the 
sensory stimuli they produce. The motor system elicits sensorimotor predictions about the 
sensory data that’s generated by the motor behaviours of the agent. Nevertheless, this is not 
to say that they work separately; rather they are unified under active inference to cancel out 
prediction errors63.  
    Under active inference, both perception and action are ‘in some deep sense computational 
siblings’ (Clark, 2013, p. 19) because they subscribe to the same computational profile of 
employing hierarchical generative models to cancel out sensory prediction error even though 
the way they do this is quite different. This is reminiscent of the line of thought about the 
relationship between perception and action from psychologist J.J. Gibson: 
 
               Each perceptual system orients itself in appropriate ways for the pickup 
               of environmental information, and depends on the general orienting system  
               of the whole body. Head movements, ear movements, hand movements, nose 
               and mouth movements and eye movements are part and parcel of the perceptual 
               systems they serve. They serve to explore the information available in sound,  







The overarching point is that PEM and AOPP accords a different job to perception and action 
respectively. The job of the perceptual system is not to reconstruct an internal model of the 
external world, but to retain correspondence between the predictions elicited by the 
generative model about the causes of sensory stimuli and the external objects they represent. 
Likewise, the job of the motor system is not just to produce motor outputs but to do so in a 
way that confirms or disconfirm anticipated sensory feedback which is specified by the 
generative model those expectations. If prediction errors are produced, then it is the job of the 
motor system to readjust the outputs until the expected (sensory) outcome has been achieved. 
As such: 
 
               Sensory prediction error controls movement and top-down predictions control 




In summary, under AOPP perceptual and motor processes prescribe to the same 
computational process of bringing to bear hierarchical generative predictions to bear on 
incoming sensory data to cancel out sensory prediction errors. The perceptual system does 
this by adapting the model to fit the data and the motor system does this by bringing about 
necessary changes to the inputs that will better fit the expectations that have been specified 
by internal generative model(s). As such, perception and action work together to suppress 
prediction errors under active inference. So far this story doesn’t go quite so far as to explain 
how it supports the optimal interactions of the agent. This will be the topic of the ensuing 
sections in this chapter.  
 
 
4.5. Reconceiving the ‘Forward Model’ in terms of the Hierarchical, Prediction Error Minimising 
Scheme.    
 
 
The central argument in defence of AOPP is that it provides an improved understanding of 
the functional structure of a forward model. This concept features briefly in chapter two 
regarding Vignemont’s interpretation of the computational underpinnings of the body 
schema. On her account, an inverse model (i.e., her ‘initial body schema’) computes motor 
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commands on the basis of the intended movement and priors about movement constraints a 
forward model (i.e., her predictive body schema) which elicits sensorimotor predictions about 
the sensory consequences of the selected movement, and the updated body schema provides 
sensory feedback for comparison with the predictions elicited by the predictive body schema.  
In contrast, Friston’s conception of the forward model is much simpler and thus offers a view 
of the motor system which is more computationally tractable, or so he claims. Under his 
interpretation, forward models only consist of sensorimotor predictions and prediction errors; 
there is no need for a dual inverse model for the sensorimotor predictions are already in the 
business of predicting the sensory consequences of movement and prediction errors take on 
the job traditionally ascribed to efference copies (i.e., their presence or absence provides the 
sensory feedback necessary to affirm or disconfirm that the motor prediction has been 
fulfilled)64. Optimal behavioural routines are thus selected for based on their ability to fulfil 
the sensorimotor predictions elicited by the motor system and are built up by active inference, 
not on the basis of their expected utility or reward in relation to the agent’s current adaptive 
goals and intentions65.  
     At this stage, we are in a better position to understand precisely why Andy Clark dubs this 
model of motor control in terms of prediction error minimisation the ‘action-oriented’ 
framework. The notion of action-oriented representation is not new (e.g., Mandik, 2005). 
Ruth Millikan’s ‘pushyu-pullmi’ representations are a good example of action-oriented 
representation. Pushyu-pullmi representations consist of so-called ‘descriptive content’ that 
specifies, or describes, the current state of the world that is important for the guidance for 
action, such as the spatial position of objects relative to the body and ‘directive content’ 
which is a motor command (or sets of motor commands) that instruct the body to move based 
on the information encoded by the descriptive content. The dual content of pushyu-pullmi 
representations is both perceptual and motoric and is very much at the service of directing 
motor behaviour in the environment, hence why such representations are said to be action-
oriented (Millikan, 2008)66. 
    If one accepts that motor processes involve a kind of action-oriented representation then 
one can tell an important, and unified, story about the nature of their content and how that 
content is updated and maintained in terms of active inference. The descriptive content of 








perceptual predictions about the state of the body and world, and the directive content is 
constituted by sensorimotor predictions that elicit movements on the basis of the descriptive 
predictions. Furthermore, the descriptive and directive content of action-oriented 
representations work in conjunction under active inference to cancel out prediction errors to 
optimise the interactions of the behaviours of the agent within its environment.    
    According to Clark there is another added advantage of explicating motor control in terms 
of the kind of action-oriented representations that are posited by the predictive processing 
framework. In a nutshell, he claims that such representations avoid the negative stigma that’s 
usually associated with ‘mental representation’ tout court which usually imply that an 
internal model of the world and the body is internally reconstructed every time there is a 
change to the state of the body and the environment. In contrast, the representational content 
of action-oriented representation is already encoded at various scales and levels of detail at 
each level in the hierarchal and the only information that is directly worked over, and might 
have a role to play in reconfiguring the content of the model, is provided by the prediction 
errors. The point is that the bulk of the work conducted by the representational contents of 
action-oriented representations takes place before inputs impinge on the sensory apparatus. 
This is very nicely explained by Andy Clark thus: 
 
              The brain, in ecologically normal circumstances, is not just suddenly ‘turned on’ 
              and some random or unexpected input delivered for processing. So there is plenty 
              of room for top-down influence to occur even before stimulus is presented. This is 
              especially important in the crucial range of cases where we, by our own actions, help 
              to bring the new stimulus about. In the event that we already know we are in a forest 
              (perhaps we have been hiking for hours) there has still been prior settling into a 
              higher representational state (Clark, 2013, p. 23)  
 
 
Clark’s point is that more often than not, the activities we engage in do not require sudden 
and drastic changes from our internal economy that underpin sophisticated perceptual and 
motoric re-adaptations; exceptions to this rule might include walking out of an enclosed 
building into wide open space or taking part in a triathlon which requires a drastic change in 
motor performance in water and on land within a short period of time. Thus, the bulk of 
motor processing is driven by relevant sensory information in the form of sensory predictions 
about the state of the environment and sensorimotor predictions about the movement of the 
body that act as a proxy for the actual information that should be provided by the body and 
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environment in normal circumstances. Thus, the bulk of the work involved in structuring and 
maintaining action-oriented representations is top-down heavy.  
 
4.6. The Free Energy Principle 
 
The broader issue that emerged out of the earlier chapters of this thesis concerns how we can 
explain how the body image and schema, and the relationship between the two, supports the 
optimal motoric interactions of an agent in his or her environment. What this first requires is 
a story about how perceptual and motor processes optimise behavioural interactions in the 
environment. This is important for at this stage the reader may question why casting up 
perceptual and motor processes in terms of action-oriented representation is relevant to this 
endeavour. Indeed, why frame perception and sensorimotor processing in terms of prediction 
error minimisation in the first place? The answer to this is given by a particular part of the 
AOPP framework under consideration which supports the idea that there is an important link 
between prediction error minimisation and optimal behaviour, and it is explained in terms of 
how prediction error minimisation at all levels of neural functioning is at least a necessary 
condition for optimising the chances of survival of biological organisms as a whole.  
    This line of thought comes from Friston in the context of a particular reading of AOPP in 
terms of the so-called free energy principle (e.g., Friston, 2007). AOPP need not always be 
understood under this principle (e.g., Howhy, 2012), however it provides a clear explanation 
of why the adaptive success of biological agents is essentially dependent on the ability of 
their nervous system to make accurate predictions about the consequences of incoming 
sensory input. The central claim of the free-energy minimisation principle is that for an 
individual agent to optimally thrive in its environment, each state change in its body must 
minimise free energy. Roughly speaking free energy is the upper bound on the (predicted and 
variable) state transitions that an agent will undergo as a result of the interactions of its 
embodied states. This includes everything from cellular and neuronal activity all the way to 
the interactions of the body in the physical and social environment (Friston, 2007, p.1). In 
other words, the principle states that if the world is in state X, then the agent is likely to be in 
state Y. Likewise, it states that if the agent performs some action X, it will cause internal state 
change Y, given the current model and anticipated sensory evidence. The free energy of a 
biological agent is a function of its sensory inputs and what Friston calls a ‘recognition’ or 
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‘ensemble’ density which is a model of the formal constraints on the motion of the agent’s 
states (i.e., as each state transitions from its current state to the next) given its morphological 
requirements. As such, the recognition density is: 
 
       […] specific to each class of agent. The ensemble density can be regarded as the 
       probability of finding an agent in a particular state, when observed on multiple 
       occasions or equivalently, the density of a large ensemble of agents at equilibrium 




In effect, the recognition density is characterised as the provider of the best probable guess on 
the most likely cause of a given internal state of the agent given the current internal state of 
the agent and incoming sensory data. Likewise, the recognition density also encodes the 
effects that the agents’ alterations to, and actions upon, its environment bring about in terms 
of internal state change. Free energy is the difference between expectation about cause of 
input as specified by the recognition density and the actual input. Therefore, the more the 
sensory input complies with the expectations of the recognition density the more it minimises 
their free energy. On their formal specification, the more that each and every state change 
strives to minimise free energy the more they increase the long-term entropy of the agent, i.e., 
its state changes, perceptions and behaviours. In turn, this maximises its resistance against 
disorder.  
    Thus, the underlying rationale of the free-energy principle is that the survival of an animal 
depends on its having an internal model of how its internal states are affected by the states 
and activities of its environment: 
	 
           Not only does the agent embody the environment, but the environment embodies 
           the agent. This is true in the sense that physical states of the agent (its internal milieu) 
           are part of the environment. In other words, the statistical model entailed by each 
           agent includes a model of itself as part of that environment. This model rests upon  
           prior expectations about how environmental states unfold over time. Crucially, 
           for an agent to exist, its model must include the prior expectation that its form and 
           internal (embodied) states are contained within some invariant set.  





In a nutshell, the free-energy principle puts constraints on the behaviours of the animal for the 
higher the likelihood that an agent (or its brain) can accurately predict the changes that it will 
undergo as a result of changes to its embodied states which are produced by its activities at 
all levels of description before they occur, the less energy it has to consume readapting to 
unexpected changes. In turn, this ensures a higher probability that it can withstand (i.e., 
survive) those changes to its embodied states.  
    Thus, the adaptive success of different classes of biological agents and their individual 
members is directly dependent on their ability to satisfy their basic homeostatic requirements, 
e.g., secure food, shelter, warmth and procreate. In their pursuit of these basic requirements 
they must be able to regulate their internal states within certain parameters to sustain their 
physiological integrity. This means that changes to its internal states must be kept within 
morphological bounds. In short, for an individual agent to exist in a more than sub-optimal 
state it requires that its embodied states – i.e., activities and changes at the genetic, molecular, 
cellular, neuronal, and bodily level do not compromise its physiological integrity.  This 
provides the first line of justification for the first claim that an agent must have a model of 
itself as part of its environment. The second line of justification is explained via the role of 
the recognition density for generating expectations about how environmental events will 
unfold and bring about internal state changes to the agent to ensure that the activities of the 
agent are constrained within certain bounds. Being able to maintain a state of equilibrium in 
its internal milieu during ongoing state variation presupposes that an agent (or at least its 
brain) can predict the consequences of those changes.   
 
 
4.7. The Importance of the Free Energy Principle: A Brief Summary 
 
 
In sum, the importance of prediction error minimisation for optimising the activities of 
biological agents is best understood from the perspective of the free-energy principle. It states 
that the optimal existence biological agents requires that their internal state changes 
minimises their free-energy which, in turn, ensures that their internal activities respects their 
morphological constraints. One way of ensuring that internal state changes stay within 
appropriate bounds is to be able to predict the consequences that are brought about as the 
internal economy of the agent transitions from its current state to the next. So far, this has 
85	
	
been explained under the free energy principle in terms of an internal model (the recognition 
density) and current sensory input. In response to the current input the recognition density 
elicits predictions about the most likely cause of the input (under the current model). Free 
energy is the difference between the predicted and the actual cause of the sensory input. 
Thus, the more the state changes of the agent minimise free energy the more precise the 
predictions about the consequences of its behaviours become. This characterises the adaptive 
significance of the importance of sensory related predictions under the free-energy 
minimisation principle. By striving to minimise free energy at all levels of description, from 
cellular interactions to motoric behaviours, the brain attempts to minimise its own predictions 
errors about the causes of its sensory inputs. 
 
 
4.8. Understanding the Optimal Significance of Multimodal Integration in terms of Free Energy 
Minimisation and Active Inference. 
 
If the biological brain really does constrain the activities of the agent on the basis of the free-
energy principles then it gives us a better grip on the role that prediction error minimisation 
plays in the selection and refinement of the interactions of the agent at the behavioural level 
because, if this is the case, behaviours are selected for and built up on the basis of their 
capacity to support the optimal interactions of the agent in its environment. This means that 
not just any old behavioural strategy that will fulfil the predictions elicited by the generative 
model will be selected; rather, optimising behaviours are those which have predictable 
consequences under the agent’s recognition density to minimise potentially hazardous and/or 
fatal consequences.  
    Importantly, Friston et al, 2010 attempt to demonstrate this line of argument to show how 
multimodal processes underpin active inference support optimal motor behaviours. Using a 
sophisticated system of Bayesian mathematical algorithms they constructed simulations of 
different generative models that predict the state of the environment and instruct the 
behaviours of the ‘system’ that are governed by free-energy minimisation. In one experiment, 
Friston and his colleagues attempted to simulate a generative model that mimics the visuo-
motor system and a visual object. The purpose of this model was to instruct the simulated 
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visuo-motor system to track the movement of the visual object in the same way that the eye 
traces an object so that it stimulates the central foveal region of the retina. The guiding 
question is whether priming the model with different prior expectations that would provide 
the basis for creating prediction errors about the movement of the stimulus would influence 
the saccadic behaviour of the eye67.  
    At the first stage the model was primed to expect that the object would remain stationary. 
In turn, the stimulus was programmed to remain in the same position so that the expected and 
actual movement of the object were the same. In other words, no prediction error should be 
generated in under this initial condition and as expected no movement of the visuo-motor 
system was observed. At the second stage an intentional prediction error was generated by 
priming the visuo-motor system to expect that the object wouldn’t move and programming 
the object to move. Under this condition, the prediction error was cancelled out by the 
activity of visuo-motor system which ‘tracked’ the movement of the stimulus. In this case, 
the generated prediction error compelled the movement of the eye to cancel it out.  
    The explanation the authors provide for this result is that when the foveal region of the 
retina is fixed on an object it provides consistent and stable stimulation to the retina. Moving 
objects come in and out of the foveal region and as such provide sporadic and unstable retinal 
stimulation. One way of stabilising the perception of the object in the visual field so that it 
doesn’t appear to pop in and out of visual awareness is to visually track the object so that it 
continually stimulates the centre of the retina. Shifting the gaze in accordance with the 
movement of the object cancels out the prediction error because it provides a continual and 
steady supply of visual data to the retina in the same way as stationary objects do when they 
eye is fixed on them. The simulation provides an example which is analogous to the way in 
which retinal stabilisation can cancel out movement induced prediction errors. This might not 
be a true reflection of how retinal stabilisation is achieved in all ecologically realistic 
conditions, but not enough is built into this specific simulation to account for this fact. For 
example, background motion may play an important role in facilitating retinal stabilisation 
but the specific experimental set up here is silent on this point for the activity of the simulated 








                     Orienting or tracking behaviour […] enables the perception of a moving 
                     target as if it was stationary. Although the target may be moving, the full  
                     extent of this movement is not registered by perception. This is because the 
                     prediction error…is explained away by action, and action is not part of the 
                     perceptual model. In other words, from the moving point of the agent, the 




In other words, the visuo-motor activity of the eye elicited by the oculomotor system cancels 
out a prediction error that has been generated by the perceptual system which it could not 
cancel out on its own. At the next stage of the experiment, the generative model was primed 
to expect that the object would move towards a target area. In this case the object remained in 
the same position such that a prediction error is generated when there is a shift in gaze but the 
object does not move in tandem and this is precisely what occurred. The gaze shifted in the 
direction of expected movement before returning to back to the visual target. In this case the 
initial eye movement is guided by the expectation about movement of the stimulus, and 
cancelled out by moving the gaze back to the stimulus (Friston et al, 2010, pp. 14).  
    The key upshot of the simulations, the authors argue, is that they provide a very simple 
demonstration of how priors about the sensory consequences of movement produce initial 
behaviours and how prediction errors induce corrective behaviours to cancel them out. If we 
take the set ups and results at face value, then they provide a useful gloss on the free-energy 
minimising underpinnings of retinal stabilisation and the eye tracking behaviours in the 
oculomotor system.  
    At the next stage of their experiments the authors wanted to show why actions specified in 
terms of sensory predictions are optimal. Using the same schematic set up they introduced 
exogenous interruptions (i.e., unpredictable, hidden effects) to test the behaviours of the 
system. In this case the process remained undisturbed and was carried out as normal, in other 
words, the process supporting eye tracking and retinal stabilisation remained insulated from 




                 […] if we only have to specify the consequences of an intended or expected  
                 movement, then the actual action will be robust to variations in the true generative 
                 process or unexpected perturbations to that process. In other words, specifying 
                 a movement in terms of what we want to see, as opposed to what we want to do 






If we accept this interpretation of the experiments in terms of free-energy minimisation, then 
what we have is a reasonably clear demonstration of how optimal action can be specified in 
terms of pre-established expectations about the sensory consequences of movement that are 
resistant to intervening disturbances.  
    To develop this line of argument further, Friston used the same experimental set up to 
simulate active inference during visuo-proprioceptive integration during a visually guided 
reaching task to provide an account of how visuo-proprioceptive signals are weighted to 
enhance optimal action. In this case top-down visuo-proprioceptive predictions and bottom-
up visual and proprioceptive predictions errors converge to maximise the outcome of 
multimodal sensorimotor integration during cued reaching movements. In this scenario, a 
simulated generative model of a two-joint arm which had to reach for a coloured target was 
used. The proprioceptive input corresponded with the angle of both arm joints and the visual 
signal corresponded with the position and brightness of the target and the distal extremity of 
the arm. The same mathematical equations were used to prime the generative model to expect 
that the distal extremity of the arm would accelerate towards the target only when it was 
illuminated. This causes the arm joint to move towards the target when it is lit up. In this case 
the expectation that is driving the movement is visuo-proprioceptive because the generative 
model is primed to expect that when the stimulus is illuminated the movement of the distal 
extremity of the arm joint towards the target is both ‘seen’ and ‘felt’.  
  At the first stage of the experiment, Friston and his colleagues deliberately added a 
significant amount of noise to the proprioceptive signal, but not the visual signal. What they 
observed was that the movement trajectory of the arm towards the target was seamless 
despite the disturbances to the proprioceptive signal. The explanation given for this is that 
given that if, under active inference, action is elicited to seek out and cancel prediction errors, 
then the visual and proprioceptive prediction errors will be initially weighted relative to their 
ability to provide a steady supply of prediction errors. By this, I think they mean errors which 
make it clear what mistake has been made (e.g., that the hand has not met the target as 
expected). By adding noise to the proprioceptive signal in such a way that the information 
provided by the proprioceptive error signal is not clear, but the visual signal remains 
undisturbed such that it can reliably produce salient prediction errors (errors which the 
system is more likely to be able to correct for), then the visual signal is the more reliable and 
stable out of the two and so the visual signal is given more weight. Given that the reaching 
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movement remained unperturbed by such disruptions we can reasonably assume that this is 
the case. Thus, we are told: 
 
 
              This robustness to proprioceptive noise rests on optimising expected precisions in 
              both modalities. The ensuing optimisation boosts visual prediction errors relative to  
              proprioception and ensures that the relative contributions of both modalities is 
              balanced in a Bayes optimal fashion (for perception and action). 
              (Friston et al 2010, p.8)   
 
 
The weighing up of the contributing signals based on their capacity to reliably produce salient 
prediction errors does two things. Firstly, it allows the motor process to be carried out as 
normal despite degradation to one of the signals; secondly, it enhances the predictive 
capacities of one modality relative to the other whenever they have been brought together to 
produce motor output.  To justify this point further, Friston worked out four expected 
precisions of the visual and proprioceptive signals under high and low levels of noise. What 
he found was that vision can substitute for proprioception and vice versa, and no disturbance 
to the movement is observed. Only in cases where both signals were degraded was movement 
compromised (Friston, 2010, p.10). 
    This story about why intermodal predictions must be weighed up in a prediction-error 
minimising, Bayes optimal fashion, is one we’re already familiar with for it follows the part 
of Ernst’s MLE principle which states that the weighing up of calibrated signals is, in part, 
determined by current levels of reliability of each signal. Of course, there are subtle 
differences over what’s meant by ‘reliability’ here. On Ernst’s view the reliability of a signal 
implies its capacity to provide high-fidelity probabilistic information about whatever property 
its informational content pertains to. On Friston’s view, the reliability of a signal is 
determined by its capacity to detect relevant prediction errors such that active inference can 
still take place. Furthermore, the Bayesian view that Ernst adopts is ‘bottom-up’ heavy in the 
sense that the informational content of the contributing signals enters the content of the 
driving signal that determines the outgoing percept. On Friston’s view, the bulk of the 
processing which shapes the outgoing signal is top-down as it is primarily shaped by pre-
established cross-modal predictions. In his view, the only way an occurrent incoming signal 
may have a determinate effect is if it signals that a prediction error has been made.   
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What is clear under both interpretations is that there is a mounting body of empirical 
evidence within the Bayesian research paradigm which indicates that multimodal integration 
is important for maintaining optimal behaviours in the face of sensory signals which vary in 
their reliability at different times and under different conditions. What’s important to both 
models is that the objective of sensory processing is to maintain a close match between the 
properties and activities of the body and environment and the sensory signals they generate. 
Where the prediction error minimisation model gains leverage, I think, is that it has a broader 
theoretical framework which helps us to make better sense of how these observations about 
the importance of maximising accuracy/minimising error during cross-modal integration at 
the sensorimotor level contributes to the optimisation of the activities of the animal when this 
story is couched in terms of active inference and the free-energy principle. When one 
considers the constraints placed on the multisensory processes which underpin motor 
behaviour from the perspective of a framework which helps us better understand how the 
activities of the agent is constrained at all levels of description, it provides one with a nice  
rationale for thinking that it is prediction error minimisation which plays an important role in 
shaping the cross-modal underpinnings of movement given that motoric behaviours must 
contribute to the optimal behavioural performance of the animal as a whole. In doing so it 
provides a story about the link between the functional properties of sensorimotor process at 
one level support the optimisation of motor output at another (i.e., the behavioural level) 
which Ernst’s model lacks68. 
 
 
4.9 Challenges for the PEM model of Perception and Action. 
 
Despite the wealth of insight the prediction error minimisation framework offers with respect 
to the nature of perceptual and motor processes, and their respective and collective functional 
role, I’d like to finish by laying out some reservations I have with the radical stance that 
Friston et al take with respect to the necessary requirements for motor control. The first 
worry concerns the radically reductionist take that Friston take on the nature of motor 







on this account, are sensorimotor predictions which elicit motor commands and prediction 
errors which drive necessary motor adjustments in accordance with the requirements of active 
inference, or in more formal terms free-energy minimisation. Aside from their explicit 
statement to this effect that was quoted above, this same line of thought was also observed, 
for instance, in the commentary quoted above by Friston et al (2010) in section 4.6 in relation 
to their studies on active inference during cross-modal reaching tasks. I refer to their claim 
that ‘specifying movement in terms of what we want to see rather than what we want to do’ 
allows for a seamless movement transition as the motor trajectory remains undisturbed by 
irrelevant perturbations (Friston et al , 2010, p.14). It might be said that this may be true at 
one level of explanation, that is the sensorimotor level, but not true at others, e.g., the 
intentional level. In other words, even if motor behaviours are produced and guided by 
sensorimotor predictions at one level, this is only within the context of the higher-level 
intentions of the agent. For instance, it may be true to say that, at one level, the movement of 
the arm towards the cup may be produced by visuo-tactile-proprioceptive predictions about 
the sensory feedback that should be provided when the hand successfully meets the cup and 
is re-modified in response to incoming cross-modal prediction errors. However, this process 
takes place within the context of my personal level intention to pick up the cup to take a 
drink69.  Andy Clark articulates this worry very nicely when he tells us: 
 
             […] that would not immediately justify us in claiming that it thereby constitutes  
             the cognitive economy. To see this, we need only reflect on the fact that it’s all just 
             ‘atoms’, molecules and the laws of physics too, but that doesn’t mean those provide  
             the best constructs and components for the systematic descriptions attempted by 
             cognitive science. The desert landscape theorist thus needs to do more, it seems to 
             me, to demonstrate the explanatory advantages of abandoning more traditional  
             approaches to value, reward and cost[…]. (Clark, 2013, p. 59)     
 
 
I think this is an important point. Understanding motor production and re-modification in 
terms of active inference at the level of sensorimotor predictions is important, but this does 
not, by default, falsify the claim that adaptive intentions and goals play a crucial role in 
determining and shaping the behavioural strategies biological organisms employ to optimise 
their interactions in their environment. Still, this worry doesn’t undermine the theoretical 





do not accept the radical stance Friston and his colleagues adopt. A weaker reading could still 
allow for the fact that the claims from Friston can be true at one level of explanation and can 
be incorporated into a model which incorporates the insights from AOPP to explain the link 
between motor processing and optimal behavioural performance at other levels of 
explanation70.     
   In summary, there is a big concern that currently faces the AOPP model of motor processes 
that pertains to the overly reductionist take that Friston and co take when they claim that 
understanding the nature of the motor processes and how it supports optimal behavioural 
performance can be purely understood in terms of the fulfilment of sensorimotor predictions. 
I argue, following Clark, that whilst this may be true at one level of explanation, there is still 
scope to incorporate this understanding of the link between the operating principles of 
sensorimotor integration and optimal behaviour with other levels of explanation, like the 
intentional level. Thus, I adopt a weaker reading of AOPP which acknowledges that the 




The PEM model of perceptual processing and its extension to motor processing under AOPP 
hold the promise of transforming our understanding of the nature of the perceptual and 
sensorimotor system. Both systems are characterised in terms of hierarchical generative 
models which generate perceptual and sensorimotor predictions to explain incoming sensory 
data to produce rapid and accurate perceptual and motor outputs respectively. Furthermore, 
the perceptual and motor system work together under the principle of active inference to 
minimise, if not cancel out completely, prediction errors. This constitutes an ‘action-oriented 
representation’ for maintaining an updated representation of the environment with which to 
coordinate motor outputs. What is important for our purposes here is the cohesive and 
seemingly coherent story that the AOPP model provides helps us make better sense of the 
importance of the underpinning operating principles of perceptual and motor activity, and 
their role in optimising the behaviours of biological agents in their environment. This model 
helps us better understand the importance of multimodal integration for prediction error 






of this gives us a plausible story about the nature of perceptual and motor processes, their 
interrelations and how they support optimal performance of biological agents in their 
environment. As we will see, it gives us the right kind of theoretical tools to begin to build a 
story about the relationship between the body image and schema and their importance for 



























The Body Schema as Sub-Personal Action-Oriented Representation: A Unifying Account of the 




The key argument in chapter 2 of this thesis is that a comprehensive analysis of how the body 
percept and the body schema make independent and collective contributions to the 
development, transformation and optimisation of motor behaviours requires a clear 
characterisation of the body schema. Therein we also looked at the respective philosophical 
analyses of the body schema from Gallagher and Vignemont in terms of a functional 
description of its components. In this chapter I will use the resources provided by the 
prediction error minimisation framework to define the nature and operational principles of the 
body schema in terms of a sub-personal system of hierarchically structured action-oriented 
representation(s) that is driven by prediction error minimisation, respectively. I will then 
proceed to illustrate how this characterisation provides a reading of the body schema that is 
consistent with Vignemont’s action-oriented model of the computational structure of the 
body schema. However, I will argue that my model has more explanatory leverage than 
Vignemont’s and avoids the criticisms I levelled against her model in chapter 2. With respect 
to Gallagher’s model I will argue that my interpretation of the body schema in terms of 
action-oriented representation is broadly consistent with his functional interpretation of the 
components of the neurological components of the body schema, and that the active-
inference principle helps us make sense of the significance of his functional and behavioural 
analyses of the body schema. However, I anticipate that this model will invite criticism from 
Gallagher who argues against representational analyses of the body schema at a later stage of 
his 2005 where he considers how the body schema needs to be synthesised to best serve the 
explanatory ambitions of cognition. I conclude that whilst Gallagher’s criticism may apply to 
the sort of representational analysis Vignemont provides, my interpretation of the body 
schema from the perspective of action-oriented cognitive science can meet these objections 
and provides a better way of synthesising the insights Gallagher’s analysis provides.      
	
	
5.1. The Philosophical Analyses of the Body Schema: A Reminder of their Motivations and Implications 
 
The pursuit of a story about the significance of the operational principles of optimal cross-
modal cue-integration for perceptual and sensorimotor processing is, in part, motivated by the 
important developments that emerge out of Shaun Gallagher’s conceptual dissociation 
between the body image and the body schema, and his functional/behavioural analysis of the 
body schema. The gravity of the confusions that have surrounded this concept has been 
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serious enough for psychologists and one philosopher to argue that the distinction should be 
dropped altogether. However, it could be said that the confusions don’t come about because 
of the inherently problematic nature of the body schema; rather, the problems emerge out of 
the failure to respect the conceptual boundaries of the body image and the body schema. In 
response, Gallagher provides a conceptual distinction between the body image that remains 
faithful to the traditional characterisation of the distinction. The body image categorises the 
multisensory, conceptual and affective processes which underpin the personal-level 
perceptual recognition, understanding and apprehension of the body. In contrast, the body 
schema categorises the multimodal sensorimotor processes that facilitate and regulate motor 
behaviours below the threshold of consciousness. As such, both concepts admit of separate 
questions about how their respective processes fulfil the functional role that is ascribed to 
each system. The processes of the body image provide a story about how sensory, conceptual 
and affective processes shape and enable body perception. The processes of the body schema 
provide a story about the multimodal sensorimotor processes work in conjunction to produce 
and remodify motor behaviour. As such, Gallagher ascribes to the body schema two 
components that are responsible for processing and calibrating multisensory information 
about the position and movement of the body and objects in the surrounding environment, 
respectively. He also includes a motor component that is responsible for producing motor 
behaviours by activating all the musculoskeletal networks that are required for the 
maintenance of balance and motor behaviours. Importantly, his analysis of the interactions 
between the body schema and the body image shows that body schematic processes do not 
require personal-level deliberation or monitoring. Recall the example of being visually and 
proprioceptively aware of your hand reaching towards your coffee cup, but being unaware of 
your hand forming into the right shape (a grasp) for picking up the cup. Furthermore, the 
analysis of deafferentation shows that having a body schema that can operate below the 
threshold of consciousness to produce and regulate motor output optimises our behavioural 
performance as individuals who are completely reliant on their body percept for the guidance 
of movement produce motor outputs that are slower, less precise and more cognitively 
demanding. The important conclusion that was reached with respect to Gallagher’s analysis is 
that we need a story that can take us from his functional analysis of the components of the 






Recall Vignemont’s alternative model of the body schema in terms of an action-oriented 
representation the processes of which are about, and directed towards, the body73. There are 
three functional components of this action-oriented representation that make up the body 
schema. The initial body schema is involved in the selection of motor output based on prior 
information about the movement constraints and capabilities of the human body; the 
predictive body schema anticipates the sensory feedback that should be provided by the 
motor outputs selected for by the initial body schema, and the updated body schema provides 
the actual sensory feedback that’s generated by the motor activities of the individual for 
comparison with the predictions of the predictive body schema. Thus, whatever the body 
schema is, it involves motor selection that is based on stored information about the motor 
repertoire of the human body, as well as the interactions between sensorimotor predictions 
and incoming sensory feedback.  
   In chapter 2 of this thesis I argued that the conception of the body schema in terms of these 
three components is the only aspect of Vignemont’s model that is plausible and worth 
preserving. However, there is a caveat for I argued that we should dismiss her account of the 
sort of action-oriented representation the body schema is insofar as she claims that it is a) 
conscious and b) its processes only underpin motor behaviours that are directed towards the 
body. My claim is that this only serves to blur the boundaries between the body percept and 
the body schema and Gallagher’s analysis makes it clear that sub-personal motor processes 
are directed towards the environment is correct, contra Vignemont74. The question is how we 
can use the theoretical resources from action-oriented cognitive science to make headway on 
the open issues that the respective functional descriptions of the component parts of the body 
schema create.  
 
 
5.2. The Optimal Significance of Multimodal Processing for the Operations of the Body Schema: A 
Response to Gallagher and Vignemont 
 
 
With the theoretical resources of the Bayesian models of sensory processing in place, this 
puts us in a much better position than before from which we can understand the optimal 






schema. Despite the obvious differences over how the body schema should be 
conceptualised, the respective models of the body schema from Shaun Gallagher and 
Frederique de Vignemont emphasise the importance of multisensory processes for optimising 
the behavioural outputs it produces and regulates. However, this only raises the fundamental 
question that both interpretations fail to address: how and why do cross-modal processes 
optimise motor behaviour. At this stage, we can answer the ‘how’ question in the following 
way. In accordance with the general thread of the Bayesian models we can say that cross-
modal inputs are brought together and weighed up based on their context and task-specific 
reliability to maximise the accuracy of the driving signal they support. The flip side of the 
coin is that the maximisation of accuracy minimises the possibility of error. Furthermore, 
having multiple sources of sensory information that carry equivalent information means that, 
in the event one malfunctions or is further degraded, another can override it so that the 
process can carry on as normal. Thus, the answer to the ‘why’ question from Ernst and 
Friston is that having multiple sources of concurrent sensory information from the distinct 
modalities which are brought together to maximise the accuracy of the signal (by minimising 
errors) makes for a more stable, robust and efficient process. For Ernst, the answer to the 
‘why’ question stops at why error minimisation optimises the output. However, Friston & co 
provide the additional story that optimising every process in real time equates to minimising 
free-energy over the long term and, in doing so, optimises the interactions of biological 
agents in their environment. The next question is, how do we interpret the components of the 
body schema from the perspective of AOPP that is consistent with the standard definition? I 
address this question in the next section.    
 
 
5.3. An Analysis of the Body Schema in Terms of a Prediction Error Minimising, Sub-Personal, 
Hierarchical Action-Oriented Representation  
 
 
The most plausible functional description of the body schema conceives of its components in 
terms of multimodal sensorimotor processes that calibrate cross-modal inputs and produce 
motor output below the threshold of consciousness. So defined, the prediction error 
minimisation framework as it is applies to action, i.e., action-oriented predictive processing 
(or AOPP as I refer to it in chapter 5) would conceive of this system in terms of a sub-
personal hierarchical action-oriented representation (or set of representations) that elicits 
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cross-modal sensory predictions about the state of the body and environment and 
sensorimotor predictions about the sensory consequences of its movements. The sensory 
predictions pertain to the probabilistic causal relationship between the sensory apparatus and 
the state of the body and environment (i.e., the position and movement of its body and objects 
in the environment). In turn, the sensorimotor predictions pertain to the internal changes (i.e., 
the sensory stimulus that should be fed back to the system) that come about as a result of the 
individual’s motor behaviours. As such, the range of motor responses produced by the body 
schema would, in part, be shaped by a recognition ensemble in the brain which defines the 
permissible (and impermissible) parameters of action for the individual based on the internal 
state changes those actions bring about, i.e., whether they bring about causal changes to the 
internal states of the agent that maintain its homeostasis (or not). Furthermore, the body 
schema includes sub-personal cross-modal predictions about the current motor state of the 
body (i.e., its postural position and movement) and the state of the environment which 
constrain the range of available actions that are available to the agent. Furthermore, sensory 
inputs provide the necessary feedback required for verifying the veracity of the predictions 
and, more importantly, for the identification and minimisation of prediction errors (i.e., 
deviations from anticipated sensory feedback). So conceived, the body schema is a 
hierarchically structured, sub-personal, action-oriented representation that is shaped by 
prediction error minimisation.  
    To get a clearer sense of how this characterisation of the body schema works consider 
again the example of your hand forming into a grasp to pick up your coffee cup outwith the 
scope of your awareness. Your recognition ensemble enables and restricts the range of 
possible actions that you can take with respect to the mug because there are more and less 
effective ways of interacting with the cup; you can grasp it with two hands or with only one 
hand, you can cusp your fingers around the surface of the mug, or you can grasp the rime of 
the mug with the tips of your fingers, and so forth. Therefore, there are many ways you can 
grasp the mug. However, the available range of actions might be narrowed down further on 
the basis of probabilistic sensory predictions about relevant aspects of the environment or 
relevant contextual cues; for example, the three-dimensional configuration of the cup, such as 
its size, might determine how you grasp the mug. Grasping the handle of a particularly large 
mug with your fingers might be more effective if your hands are too small to grasp the body 
of the mug firmly. Furthermore, if you are reaching your hand down towards my coffee cup 
when you are driving your car it is more effective to grasp the mug with a firmer grip 
compared to the kind of grip you might have on the mug when you pick it up to clear it away 
99	
	
(I’ll come back to this point in due course). Therefore, the sub-personal top-down processes 
of the body schema are important for defining and re-defining the selection of the motor 
outputs for they will play a key role in determining the sensorimotor predictions that will be 
elicited to produce the selected motor behaviour (e.g., corresponding proprioceptive and 
tactile feedback which report that the fingers have latched onto the handle of the cup in the 
intended way). In turn, the incoming sensory data the motor trajectory generates provides 
necessary feedback to determine whether the movement is unfolding in the anticipated way, 
or not. 
   In sum, a description of the functional components of the body schema in terms of a sub-
personal action-oriented representation in accordance with AOPP goes as follows. The body 
schema is part of the individual’s internal generative model which elicits probabilistic 
predictions about the state of its environment and the two-way causal effects of its behaviours 
on its embodied states and its environment, and vice versa. More precisely, the recognition 
density defines the motor repertoire of the body schema in accordance with the free-energy 
minimisation principle and, together with sub-personal sensory predictions about the current 
state and activities of the body and the environment (as specified above), selects the 
appropriate sensorimotor predictions that produces the selected motor behaviour. Any 
relevant prediction errors are quashed by eliciting alternative, or additional, sensorimotor 
predictions to bring about necessary changes to the motor outputs in accordance with the 
active inference principle75.    
  
 
5.3. A Response to De Vignemont  
 
 
This story about the kind of system the body schema is (i.e., a hierarchical multimodal 
sensorimotor system) is compatible with Vignemont’s functional description of the different 
aspects of the components that make up her action-oriented interpretation of the body schema 
in some ways, but not in others. Let me explain. On her account, the initial body schema 
includes prior information about the motor repertoire of the human body and is involved in 
the selection of motor output based on their capacity to achieve the motor outcome in the 





how, and why, the parameters of the motor repertoire are so determined. From the 
perspective of the free-energy minimisation principle the more economical an action is, the 
more it minimises free-energy because it uses fewer of the agent’s predictive resources and 
ensures the best fit between the sensorimotor predictions of the individual’s generative model 
and the sensory evidence, in comparison to other available actions with the same functional 
properties. Minimising free-energy, in the context of action, is an optimising strategy for the 
selection of motor behaviours which produce outcomes that support the activities of the 
individual, make fewer demands on its cognitive resources and ensure that equilibrium is 
maintained within its internal economy contributes to the long-term survival of biological 
agents over the long-term.       
      This brings me to the next aspect of the body schema - the predictive body schema which 
elicits sensorimotor predictions about the sensory consequences of the selected movement, 
i.e., motor induced sensory feedback that is exclusively about the body. The predictive 
component of my interpretation of the body schema cuts across the sensory predictions about 
the state of the body and the environment, and sensorimotor predictions about the movement 
of the body, for reasons I have elucidated in my interpretation of the example above. 
Vignemont’s updated body schema provides new and updated sensory feedback for 
comparison with the predictions of the predictive body schema. My interpretation of the body 
schema also includes this component but has additional explanatory leverage over her 
account because it provides the theoretical resources to explain the importance of the 
incoming sensory data for the overall operation of the components of the body schema. The 
incoming sensory data verifies whether the predictions have been fulfilled in the anticipated 
way, and prediction errors drive a change to the predictions to bring about a change in motor 
output.  
   The overarching implication of this pertains to the criticisms I levelled against Vignemont’s 
model in chapter 2 pertaining to her objection to Gallagher’s account of the body schema and 
her account of the kind of action-oriented representation the body schema is. First, I argued 
that, contra Vignemont, simply providing a functional description of the components of the 
body schema in terms of internal representation does not give her model any additional 
explanatory leverage until she provides the additional story of how the neurophysiological 
underpinnings of the body schema carry out the functions ascribed to them. In comparison, 
by drawing upon the theoretical resources of AOPP to mount my interpretation of the body 
schema, my model can provide such a story in the precise way I have outlined here. 
Furthermore, I argued that her account of action-oriented representation is problematic on 
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several grounds. First, it goes against the grain of standard conceptions of action-oriented 
representation; second, there is no rationale for thinking that the processes of the body 
schema are exclusive to the behaviours that are directed towards the body; third, her account 
of the body schema as a conscious action-oriented representation not only perpetuates the 
conceptual confusion surrounding the body schema, but her line of justification is based on 
an inconsistent analysis of the body percept and the body schema.   
    My interpretation of the body schema avoids these problems for it is consistent with the 
standard conception of action-oriented representation. The key difference, in light of the 
considerations from chapter 4, is that the sensorimotor processes that underpin the 
representation(s) of the body schema are probabilistic predictions. Furthermore, through my 
analysis of the example of grasping the hand, I have made it clear that such an action-oriented 
representation is sub-personal and is an open feedback loop that is constantly engaged with 
the environment. Therefore, to the best of my understanding, there are no inconsistencies 
between my interpretation of the body schema in terms of action-oriented representation and 
the usual requirements for a satisfactory conception of the body schema76.   
 
 
5.4. An Explanation of how the Prediction Error Minimising Processes of the Body Schema Optimise 
Motor Behaviour: The First Reply to Gallagher.   
 
 
Likewise, the model of the body schema I offer here is consistent with Shaun Gallagher’s 
interpretation of the functional structure of the underlying neurological components of the 
body schema. The first component registers cross-modal sensory information from the low-
level sensory systems and sends them to the ‘intermodal capacities’ which ‘facilitate the 
communication’ between cross-modal inputs. According to my interpretation, this process is 
a top-down process where the communication between cross-modal signals entails the 
temporary coupling of the cross-modal signals to provide task-specific, contextually 
appropriate, probabilistic multisensory predictions about the state of the environment and the 
body. The communication also occurs in a bottom-up fashion by way of prediction errors. 







schema are top-down and bottom-up. Furthermore, top-down motor processes are prior 
information and sensorimotor predictions.  To this extent, the models are not incompatible for 
the key difference boils down to a difference over the shape of the underlying information 
processing.  
    The model I offer also has additional explanatory advantage insofar as it puts us in a much 
better position to make better sense of Gallagher’s observations of the relationship between 
the operations of the body schema at the functional level and how their workings are 
manifested at the behavioural level. If the body schema can generate sensory and 
sensorimotor predictions about the probable current state of the body and the environment, 
and of quashing incoming prediction errors, independent of the body percept, then motor 
responses can be produced and regulated without making so much demands on our cognitive 
resources. From the perspective of free-energy minimisation, it makes good adaptive sense to 
have a system that can facilitate the same tasks as the body percept, but which utilises fewer 
of our predictive resources. The case of Ian Waterman shows that behaviours that require, 
and are produced by, continuous personal-level perceptual guidance are slower, less precise 
and place more demands on our cognitive resources77.  
    This raises the important question of how the relationship between the body image and 
body schema gets to this point. For Gallagher, a conceptually satisfying account of the body 
schema can’t just make reference to its neurological components for:  
            
           Without a certain amount of selectivity, built up by practice and the cultivation  
           of habitual movements, the body might move in any one of multiple ways, since 
           the possibilities allowed by physiology are much greater than the particular  
           movements necessary…Thus the body schema is much more selectively attuned 
           to its environment than what physiology on its own will specify (Gallagher, 2005, 




Here Gallagher is expressing the point that the interactions between the body and 
environment over different timescales put further constraints on the outputs of the body 









any of multiple ways, since the possibilities allowed by physiology are much greater than the 
particular movements necessary’ he is expressing the same point I mentioned earlier about 
the fact that the constraints set by the body on action are not sufficient to narrow the selection 
down for the current state of the environment will put further constraints on action.  Hence, 
we arrive at the claim that the body schema is ‘much more selectively attuned to the 
environment than what physiology on its own will specify’. The overall point Gallagher 
expresses is that the body schema is a ‘holistic system’78 wherein ‘the brain attunes itself to 
what the body and environment affords’79     
    It is quite difficult to provide a fully fleshed story without making reference to the body 
image in light of Gallagher’s analysis of how the motor functions of the body schema are 
built up. Recall his analysis in chapter 2 pertaining to the role of the body percept (i.e., the 
cross-modal processes which underpin perceptual awareness of the body) in shaping motor 
behaviours that are then deferred to the body schema once they have been sufficiently 
mastered. The prediction error minimisation is a story about how we come into meaningful 
perceptual and motoric contact with our body and environment. In other words, how we 
become sensitive and responsive to our body and environment. Successful perceptions and 
actions are brought about when equilibrium is met between the predictions of our generative 
model and the sensory feedback our perceptual and motor processes generate. This process is 
built up through a process of active inference in real time and is regulated over the long-term 
by free-energy minimisation.  
   At the point in time when the body schema is producing behaviours without the 
intervention of the body percept, it is because it has undergone an extensive prediction error 
minimising period where the motor behaviours of the body have been monitored at the 
personal-level to test out the sensory and sensorimotor consequences of the behavioural 
routines in question. Once the prediction errors have been minimised to such a degree that the 
individual can carry out the process without perceptual monitoring, the sensorimotor 
predictions are then subsumed to body schema to regulate the behaviours below the threshold 
of consciousness. Every time the body schema elicits motoric interactions it provides another 
opportunity to test out the accuracy of the sub-personal models of the body schema about the 
causal interactions of the body in the environment. Thus, is it not the case that action-oriented 








                    aim to engage the world in some action-neutral fashion, and they are firmly 
                    rooted in the history of organism-environment interactions the sensory  
                    stimulations that installed the probabilistic generative model. (Clark, 2015, p. 4) 
 
 
Remember as per the free-energy principle, different organisms with different embodied 
configurations and homeostatic requirements will possess their respective species specific 
generative models that are further customised along developmental and life-long trajectories. 
The upshot is that even with its emphasis on the internal models and representations, AOPP 
does not overlook the fact that the particular embodiment an animal has, and its 
environmental interactions, are crucial to the nature and functioning of action-oriented 




5.5. The Relationship between the Body Schema and Intentions: The Second Response to Gallagher. 
 
 
A related point is that as much as the agent’s particular embodied configuration and its 
environment play an important role in enabling and constricting its general motor repertoire, 
this can’t be the whole story for an individual’s responsiveness to their surroundings is often 
shaped by their intentions for action, and this narrows down motor selection further. The 
body schema, Gallagher tells us, is not an intention; rather, it makes an important 
contribution to the intentional purposes of the agent80. Studies from Jeannerod et al81 lend 
empirical support to this claim. They showed that the rotation of the wrist is different 
depending on whether an individual intends to pick up an object or throw it away. The 
question, then, is what sort of contribution the body schema makes to the fulfilment of 
intentions. The place to start is by providing an explanation of what we mean by intention. 
Clearly, the working notion of intention at play entails the intention to do something. More 
particularly, it involves the personal-level intentions of the agent, such as intending to pick up 
the cup, throw the ball, open a door, etc. Thus, the issue in need of explanation is how the 






As a first step, I suggest that we adopt Ruth Millikan’s conception of personal-level 
intentions in terms of a pushmi-pullyu representation (PPRs). Pushmi-pullyu representations 
have ‘descriptive content’- information about the current state of the world is - and directive 
content which is a motor instruction (or class of motor instructions). Here is her description 
of intentions in terms of PPRs 
 
                 Human intentions are probably an example of PPRs in thought, serving at once 
                 to direct action and to describe ones future so that one can plan around it.  
                 (Millikan, 1984, pg.1)   
 
Thus defined, PPRs that underpin human intentions produce motor behaviours on the basis of 
the anticipated outcomes they bring about for the agent. For all intents and purposes, such 
PPRs are a species of personal-level action-oriented representation for they direct motor 
outputs based on their capacity to bring about the intended and/or expected outcome they are 
recruited to produce. The question is how the processes of the body schema are recruited by, 
and assist the activities of, this kind of PPR. To explain, I will appeal to Susan Hurley’s82 
distinction between basic and non-basic intentions. A non-basic intention is the intention to 
perform a action, like picking up an apple or pushing a button. Basic intentions instruct the 
non-conscious movement of the body; in other words, a basic intention is a motor intention 
such as moving the finger or shifting my gaze that is performed without my knowing I am 
doing this83. According to Hurley, basic intentions are ‘where your intentions begin’ (I’ll 
come back to this point)84.  
    The question is how this bears on our interest in explaining the responsiveness of the body 
schema to the personal-level intentional activities of the agent. In accordance with the 
definition between the body image and the body schema, non-basic intentions would include 
personal level intentions to move my body in the way required for performing the intended 
action (like picking up the coffee cup). Thus, non-basic intentions are the province of the 
body image.  Basic intentions (such as forming the hand into a grasp) are the province of the 
body schema. Thus, to tell a story about how the processes of the body schema are, in 




84	Hurley:	1998,	p.357   	
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about how basic intentions are recruited by non-basic intentions. Hurley’s line of thought is 
that the development and transformation of non-basic intentions is built up through a process 
of using pre-existing motor strategies (i.e., other non-basic intentions and basic intentions). 
Crucially, the selected pre-existing motor strategies are chosen based on their predictable 
outcomes: 
 
Sensory feedback allows me to select among already available intentional actions one 
that has the desired effects, thereby bringing those effects under intentional control. 
This is similar to what happens when we discover that something we can do has a 
reliable consequence we were previously aware of. We thereby acquire a new 
description under which such acts can be intentional (Hurley, 1998, p. 366). 
 
A complete story of how the basic intentions of the body schema are developed and 
transformed can only be told through an analysis of the interaction between the body percept 
and the body schema over the course of development. Such a story goes beyond the scope of 
this chapter85. However, we can still use Hurley’s line of thought to provide a rough-and-
ready sketch about how the operations of the body schema are responsive to the intentional 
purposes of an individual in real time for her account meshes well with AOPP.  
    To begin I invite the reader to cast their eye back to Clark’s point that I outlined in chapter 
486 where he says that in most normal circumstances a lot of the representational activities of 
the agent will have already been brought into equilibrium as their sequences of motor 
behaviours are produced. Therefore, to intend to pick up the cup is to intend to bring about a 
new series of visual and proprioceptive sensory feedback. Thus, to intend to pick up the cup 
is to elicit predictions about its sensory profile (e.g., visual predictions about its size) and 
predict that picking up the cup requires the generation of a certain sequence of, say, visual 
and proprioceptive feedback. Thus, when I intend to pick up the cup I elicit a sequence of 
body movements that include the non-basic intention to pick up the cup and, in turn this 
elicits relevant basic intentions, e.g., the formation of the hand into a grasp. This non-basic 
intention is constituted by personal-level predictions (i.e., about what I should see and feel as 
my arm stretches over the cup) and sub-personal predictions (e.g., the visuo-proprioceptive 
predictions about the feedback that should be provided by the hand forming into a grasp and 







its size, the grasp will have been incorporated into this motor sequence on the basis that it has 
successfully fulfilled the underlying visual-proprioceptive predictions of similar intentions in 




5.6. Why an Analysis of the Body Schema in Terms of a Prediction Error Minimising, Action-Oriented 
Representation is not just Another Instance of ‘Body Snatching’: The Third Response to Gallagher 
 
 
I provide the aforementioned responses to Gallagher in anticipation of a line of objection that 
I think he might mount against my position. His claim that the operations of the body schema 
cannot be fully understood and explained in terms of its underlying neurological components 
on account of its sensitivity to bodily and environmental constraints and intentions is part of a 
much bigger argument he levels against representational analysis of the body schema in his 
2005. In turn, this reflects his anti-representational stance about mental and cognitive 
phenomena in general.  
   To set the scene, consider the following point. The intended characterisation of the body 
schema and body image is ripe for an analysis from the perspective of embodied cognition. 
Why? Well, the body schema is supposed to explain how the central system and peripheral 
sensory systems work together to localise the position of the body parts in space. The body 
image is supposed to help explain how information from the peripheral sensory apparatus is 
processed for the purpose of producing perceptual awareness of the body. This is just another 
way of saying that the body schema and body image can help us to analyse how low-level 
processes of the body (i.e., the sensory apparatus) works in conjunction with the brain to 
produce motor output and body perception, respectively. In chapter 6 of his book, Gallagher 
makes it clear that a proper conception of the distinction can take us some of the way towards 
a theory of embodied cognition, but not all the way. For example, an analysis of the body 
image can help us explain how the body appears in the perceptual field, whereas the body 
schema can help us understand the processes that occur ‘behind the scenes’ to constrain the 
perceptual field87. However, a complete story of human cognition requires the synthesis of 





With that said, the first step Gallagher takes is to criticise some of the major contenders in in 
philosophy of mind and cognition which have banked on the assumption that a full 
explanation of cognition doesn’t need to consider the contribution made by the body. 
Cartesian dualism is one example he cites where the role of the body is, one the one hand, 
completely denied, but afforded dubious status at another stage of the argument. In his 
Meditations Descartes states that the mind can be analysed independently of the body and, in 
another, acknowledges the intimate link between the mind and the body88. As part of his 
ontological and metaphysical arguments for mind-body dualism, he states, roughly speaking, 
that the mind and body are two ontologically distinct substances in the sense that the former 
is immaterial and the latter material (hence, we arrive at ‘Cartesian substance dualism’). As 
such, it is logically possible that each can exist independently of the other. One important 
implication, amongst many, of Cartesian substance dualism is that a full understanding of the 
nature of the mind can be secured via an explanation of its ontological, metaphysical and 
epistemic properties. Broadly construed, this amounts to the idea that the mind is an 
immaterial substance which can exist independently of the body, and can only be accessed 
and known through introspection, respectively89. Of course, in paragraph 20 of Meditation VI 
an interesting tension emerges with respect to the relation between mind and body: the ‘mind-
body problem’. One version of the problem90 is how to explain how the material body can 
causally influence an immaterial mind during our day-to-day lives, and vice versa. For 
example, bodily events such as the rubbing of the linings of the stomach and a decrease in 
fluids, cause mental events like the experience of hunger and thirst, respectively. In turn this 
fosters the desire to satiate our hunger and thirst (another mental event) which causes us to 
move our body in the direction of sources of food and water (another bodily event). The 
apparent site of the interaction, the story goes, is the brain because ‘the mind is not 
immediately affected by all parts of the body, but only by the brain’ Descartes, 1641, Med.6. 
par.20). Therefore, even though Descartes provides a clear acknowledgement that the body 
and mind are inextricably bound up in intimate ways, insofar as the body does influence the 
mind it does so only indirectly via the effects of its activities on the brain.  
    A more contentious approach for Gallagher is one which purports to acknowledge the 
importance of the (non-neural) body, but fleshes out its contribution in terms of how the body 








‘91invasion of the body snatchers’. Body snatchers are those who have infiltrated the 
embodied cognition camp and who come guised as embodied cognition theorists, but are 
covert computationalists and/or representationalists. The purported problem with such 
theorists is that they presuppose that all that matters for a complete analysis of the nature and 
operation of mental and cognitive phenomena is an explanation of the underlying mental 
computations and, in turn, an analysis of the internal representations which mediate the inputs 
and outputs (i.e., what is happening in the brain. As such, body snatchers are interested in the 
contribution of the body to mental and cognitive processes only insofar as it contributes to the 
operations of the brain, but even then, its importance is only considered to be instrumental. 
This approach is what Hurley92 called the ‘Sandwich’ conception of cognition where 
perceptual inputs (one slice), cognition (the meat) and motor outputs (the other slice of bread) 
are causally related in a linear fashion, and cognition is the only real source of interest. 
Insofar as perception and action are important, it is only because they provide the means of 
facilitating ‘real’ cognitive processes.  
    Therefore, Gallagher claims, representational accounts of the body schema (and cognition 
in general) are doomed to fail. In virtue of their exclusive focus on the operations of the brain 
they can only provide an incomplete analysis of what the operations of the body schema are 
doing after sensory inputs arrive from the periphery and motor outputs are selected. What 
they don’t consider is the influence that the body has on the operations of the body schema, 
nor the environment. A good illustration of this is Vignemont’s account of the body schema 
as a system of processes which exclusively direct the movements that are directed towards 
the body. I argued in chapter two that she is mistaken in her assumption that an account of the 
body schema in terms of the functional structure of its neurological components is 
explanatorily superior to Gallagher’s non-representational account. Vignemont supposed that 
by conceptualising the functional components of the body schema in terms of representations 
gave her account additional explanatory leverage over Gallagher’s model. The problem with 
this, I argued, is that it simply does not without an additional story about how the 
neurological components fulfil the function they are ascribed. Furthermore, her conception of 
the body schema only served to fuel the confusions. Even more serious is the fact that 
representational accounts of the body schema have, up to date, only led to a dead end.  
    However, here is an important point. In my view, Gallagher’s position faces the same 






schema. Extending this account to say that the components are sensitive and responsive to 
constraints set by the body, the environment and intentions is one thing, but providing an 
explanation of how this comes about is another. This is where I think my account has 
explanatory leverage over both accounts of the body schema for it does have the underlying 
story about how the functional components of the body schema fulfil their function along 
different timelines. Andy Clark expresses this point beautifully when he says: 
 
 
        […] it is surely that very model invoking schema that allows us to understand how it 
        is that these looping dynamical regimes arise and enable such spectacular results. The 
        regimes arise and succeed because the system self-organises around prediction error so  
        as to capture organism-salient patterns at various scales of space and time in the partially 
        self-created input stream. These patterns specify complex, inter-animated structures of  
        bodily and worldly causes. Subtract this guiding vision and what remains is just the 
        picture of complex looping dynamics spanning brain, body and world. (Clark, 2015, p.6 




The point is that without this story, all we would be left with is the acknowledgement that the 
body and the environment are important for enabling and constraining our myriad of mental 
and cognitive processes. Furthermore, much like the similar confusions that surround the 
concept of the body schema, the use of the term representation is not, in principle, 
problematic. The problem is how it has been used to interpret the body schema.  The real 
difference between representational and non-representational accounts, it seems to me, is a 
difference in emphasis about the scope of the operations of the body schema. However, I 
hope to have shown here that the account I offer can help work towards bridging the gap 
between the opposing models with its emphasis on the operating principles which determine 
the body schema across development and in real time, and the accompanying explanation of 
how the body schema builds up its responsiveness to the environment and intentional 












5.10 Taking stock 
	
The principal argument of this chapter is that thinking of the functional multimodal 
sensorimotor components of the body schema as constituting a sub-personal action-oriented 
representation(s) which are shaped and driven by active inference/free energy minimisation 
can help us make good progress on understanding the optimal significance of multimodal 
processing for motor control. It also helps us make better sense of the pre-existing 
interpretations of the body schema from Gallagher and Vignemont. With respect to 
Vignemont’s model I stressed that my interpretation is consistent with hers in the sense that 
she outlines the body schema in terms of an action-oriented representation that consists of 
priors about the movement constraints of the body, sensorimotor predictions and sensory 
feedback. However, I offer a more plausible reading of the body schema in terms of action-
oriented representation in comparison to Vignemont for on my interpretation the body 
schema is not conscious and its operations are not exclusively directed towards the body. 
Moreover, where her model fails to provide a causal explanation of how the functional 
components of the body schema fulfil their function, I offered here the additional background 
story about the operating principle of sensorimotor processes from the AOPP framework: 
prediction error minimisation. With respect to Gallagher’s model I have argued that the 
interpretation on offer is consistent with his broadly functional assessment of its neurological 
components and can go some way towards meeting the requirements he sets for a 
comprehensive analysis of the body schema. In doing so, I have attempted to offset a 
potential objection from Gallagher on the grounds that my interpretation analyses the body 
schema in terms of internal representation by explaining how it is not as neurocentric and 
reductive as pre-existing accounts of the body schema have tended to be. Furthermore, I 
claim that without the necessary story about the underlying principles at play, Gallagher’s 
model has no explanatory advantage over Vignemont’s model until his account is 
supplemented with a story about the processes which drive and optimise the processes of the 
body schema. As such, I hope to have shown how the model I provide straddles both sides of 
the divide in a more productive way. However, this is only part of our story for providing a 
definition of the body schema and providing an explanation of the nature of its multimodal 
sensorimotor processes is the first step towards a theory of the body image and body schema 
distinction. Therefore, our next step is to reconsider the Gallagher’s behavioural analysis of 
the interactions between the body percept and the body schema from the perspective of PEM 
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and AOPP to expand this story about how multimodal processes optimise perceptual and 
motor outputs, and address important deficits in developmental psychology. The next and 
final chapter, which will bring to bear the insights of the action-oriented model on 
Gallagher’s behavioural analysis of the body image and schema distinction, will act as a 



























A Re-evaluation of Gallagher’s Behavioural Analysis of the Body Image and Body Schema from the 
Perspective of the Prediction Error Minimisation Framework: Towards a Comprehensive Theory of the 






My purposes with respect to the body schema and body image distinction are twofold: First, 
to make good progress on our understanding of the body schema, and how its processes 
optimise behavioural output; second, to build upon Gallagher’s behavioural analysis of the 
body percept and the body schema. Having focused primarily on the issues pertaining to the 
body schema in the preceding chapters, in this final chapter I will re-examine Gallagher’s 
interpretation of the body percept and his analysis of the role it plays in the optimisation of 
behavioural output under conditions in which an individual whose sensorimotor skills are 
under-developed must use their body to successfully perform an action, or must use their pre-
established motor skills to successfully navigate their environment in conditions that could 
have potentially risky or fatal consequences. The overarching conclusion is that the predictive 
processing framework that has been advanced in this thesis can help us make better sense of 
Gallagher’s line of thought. The common feature of both cases is that they require an 
individual to act in conditions that present the risk of making substantial motor errors and the 
central claim of this chapter is that the best way to optimise behavioural performance under 
such conditions is by way of perceptual and active inference. The broader implication is that 
this puts us in a much better position to explain the underlying operating principles at play in 
the case studies that were discussed in chapter one of this thesis. Moreover, it gives us the 
right sort of theoretical resources to begin the proceedings of working towards a Bayesian 
style neuroconstructivist analysis of the interaction between the body image and body 
schema. As such, it allows us to address two important deficits in developmental psychology: 
the lack of a theory of the body image and body schema and the lack of a causal explanation 




6.1. The Divisions over the Future of the Body Image and the Body Schema Distinction in Cognitive 
Science.    
 
 
As the line of discussion in chapters one and two of the thesis unfolded it became 
increasingly more clear that the future of the distinction between the body image and the 
body schema is in jeopardy because of the conceptual confusions that have loomed over the 
latter. Some support for this position is given by the fact that more contemporary definitions 
of the concept of the body schema still exhibit inconsistencies over the issue of where the line 
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between the sub-personal body schema and the personal level body image should be drawn 
up. For instance, recall the definitions from chapter one which conceptualise the body schema 
in terms of the awareness of the spatial position of the body and/or the understanding of its 
movement constraints93. Such characterisations implicate the body schema in personal level 
awareness and understanding when it should not be; rather, such capacities are the province 
of the body image. Nonetheless, I argued against the approaches taken towards disposing of 
the distinction on three grounds. First, those who argue against the retention of the distinction 
misdiagnose the source of the problematic conclusions their analyses of the body schema 
give rise to; second, the alternative proposal to replace the distinction from Charles Spence & 
Nicholas Holmes has never materialised; third, the attempt to redefine the body schema from 
Vignemont before she concedes that the distinction should be jettisoned muddles the 
boundaries of the distinction between the body image and body schema. This is the upshot of 
chapter two of the thesis. The overarching conclusion of these preliminary chapters is that the 
situation that emerges from these arguments is one in which prospective researchers are left 
with multiple, and unworkable, definitions of the body schema and alternative proposals 
which either muddy the confusion further or are half-baked at best. Either way, the current 
state of the debate seems to have reached a stalemate for those who were interested in 
providing analyses of the body image and body schema distinction have all but given up and 
a viable alternative explanatory model is yet to be established. I have taken the lead from 
Shaun Gallagher and re-defined the concept of the body schema in terms of cascading 
forward models that are part of a much bigger hierarchical action-oriented representation. Up 
to this point, I have demonstrated how this redefinition helps address the key points of 
difference in the debate between Gallagher and Vignemont over how the body schema should 
be conceptualised and the explanatory import of the concept. Now I want to extend this 
approach to the important points raised in chapter one of the thesis about the place of the 
distinction between the body schema and the body image in perceptual psychology for 
another important step towards rectifying the current situation is to re-evaluate the distinction 
considering the current interpretation of multisensory integration on offer. More specifically, 










6.2. How to make a Proper Distinction between the Body Image and the Body Schema 
 
 
The emerging question is how to apply the insights gleaned from the model of perceptual and 
motor processes that has been advanced in this thesis under the predictive processing scheme 
to a theory of the body schema, the body image and their interrelations. The approach I will 
take up will involve laying out the distinction as it would be carved up under the PEM and 
AOPP models of perception and motor processes respectively, and a re-examination of the 
important studies from chapter one and two about how motor-generated cross-modal relations 
shape and transform the perceptual apprehension and understanding of the perceptual features 
and motor capabilities of the body. In short, I will explore the role of active inference in 
determining the relations between motor control and body perception.    
     Differences in the sensory information that the body image and the body schema work 
over is nicely demonstrated in the case of Ian Waterman. Prior to the neuropathy which 
destroyed his motor capabilities his behaviours were guided by visual and interoceptive 
proprioception, i.e., sub-personal information about the postural configuration of his body 
that is generated by proprioceptors in the muscles, tendons and joints. Nonetheless, there is 
another source of sensory information that provides the same information that can directly 
structure the body percept: visual proprioceptive awareness. It is this latter source of 
information that Ian relies on to produce and regulate his motor behaviours after his 
neuropathy. In Ian’s case, visual proprioceptive awareness that is provided by his (still intact) 
visual body percept has compensated for his lack of visual and interoceptive proprioception 
that was usually produced by his (now defunct) body schema. If we construe this under the 
predictive processing framework, then it amounts to the idea that the body image and schema 
are distinct insofar as they consist of distinct generative models that dispense different 
predictions, some of which scale up to the level of personal awareness (i.e., the sensory 
processes of the body image – the body percept) and some of which do not (i.e., the sensory 











In chapter one of the thesis I gestured towards the idea that a new window of opportunity has 
opened for the distinction between the body image and body schema to do useful explanatory 
work within more contemporary developments on the interrelations between motor control 
and body perception in developmental psychology. An emerging body of empirical evidence 
suggests that a primordial body schema and body percept develop prenatally and continue to 
develop and transform across the course of development (more on this below). It is unclear, 
and indeed seems hard to determine, when the body schema could be considered ‘complete’. 
We continually undergo motor transformations throughout our entire lifetime as we pick up 
new skills and lose our capacity to perform certain behaviours, say through neuropathy or 
lack of practice over an extended period. However, the evidence would suggest that 
developing infants have a complete body percept by the age of two at which stage he or she 
displays an appreciation of his or her body not as just the aggregation of distinct body parts, 
but as a unified whole94. The principle matter of interest to developmental psychologists 
when it comes to the body schema and the body image is the causal influence that each has 
on the other, if any. This is with a view to explaining how the perceptual apprehension of the 
body, motor control and their interrelations develop and are transformed out of sensorimotor 
couplings. For Manos Tsakiris95 these issues represent an important explanatory gap in 
developmental psychology that only an understanding of the interrelations between the body 
schema and body image can address. He bemoans the fact that more ink has been spilled on 
the issue of how to separate these two concepts relative to the issue of how the different 
systems that fall under each concept work together. The reason for thinking that a story about 
the interplay between the body schema and the body image is important comes from a 
growing body of observational evidence which would suggest that developing infants’ 
perceptual understanding of their body is important for his or her grasp of what she or he can 
do with it.  Consider this extract from Holmes & Spence about a 4-month-old baby who, after 
a period of curious visual fixation with its hand, exhibited surprise and distress when it failed 
to grasp its own hand because he or she fails to appreciate the fact that whilst one can grasp 
one’s hand using the opposite hand, say by using the left hand to grasp the right hand, one 
cannot, for instance, use one’s right hand to grasp one’s right hand. Here is an account of 








                Sometimes the hand would be stared at steadily, perhaps with growing intensity 
                until intensity had reached such a pitch that a grasping movement followed as if 
                the infant tried by an automatic action of the motor hand to grasp the visual hand 
                and it was switched out of out of the centre of vision and lost as if it had magically 
                vanished (Hall, 1898, p. 351) in Holmes, Lewkowicz & Spence, 2012, p.113) 
 
             
The important upshot is that the surprise exhibited by the infant demonstrates a failure to 
appreciate the movement constraints of its body and this feeds directly into its failure to 
select a more appropriate action. As such, it represents a case where a failure to understand 
the motor potential of the body at this young age leads to motor errors.  
   Scale errors are a manifestation of a similar phenomenon, only in these cases the 
developing infants’ perceptual misapprehension of the scale of their body, its size in this case, 
is the cause of a related motor error. To get the picture consider the following. Mature adults 
in possession of a healthy and normally functioning perceptual system and high-level 
cognitive faculties understand that the size of their body matters when it comes to 
manoeuvring their body in their environment. For example, the height of an individual will 
determine whether he or she can walk through an entrance without having to duck their head, 
and the breadth of their body will determine whether he or she can fit through narrow spaces. 
For the purposes of the ensuing discussion it is important to acknowledge the fact that the 
body of an adult human is much too large to fit in a small car that is no bigger than the size of 
their foot. In contrast, young toddlers demonstrate a lack of understanding of this kind by 
attempting to get into a car that is just about the size of their foot. Of course, this is an 
obviously impossible task and the toddler will not be able to fit their body into the small car 
no matter how many times he or she tries. This kind of error is a scale error. DeLoache et al 
explain that scale errors demonstrate a clear dissociation between the perception of the body 
and motor behaviour96. In more precise terms, the infants’ failure to apprehend the 
significance of their body size relative to the car feeds directly into their failed attempt to 
make an appropriate motor choice. The interesting point is that personal level appreciation of 
the body in terms of its scale and motor potentiality is important for determining whether an 
infant is capable, or not, of making appropriate motor choices. As such, it is crucially 





the course of development there is ample opportunity for the developing infants’ experience 
of its body to continually readapt to the changing motor capabilities of its body, and vice 
versa. For example, the young baby at only a few months old who can only lie on his or her 
back will have a much different visual experience of their legs to the young toddler learning 
to walk for the first time. The former infant will typically be able to see her legs by raising 
them up towards their torso, while the letter infant will typically look down to look at her legs 
as one moves in front of the other. Likewise, the visual experience an infant has of their hand 
meeting a cup when they can reach for and grasp it at around 8-months-of-age will be 
different to the experience a younger infant who is yet to develop the ability to extend their 
hand towards objects in an intentionally purposive way.97     
    The upshot is that within recent empirical work that’s currently going on in developmental 
psychology, the body image and schema distinction has the potential to make an important 
contribution to a story that can help explain the underlying processes which underpin young 
infants’ apprehension of the interdependent relationship between the configuration of its body 
and its motor capabilities has an important role to play in the development of its perceptual 
apprehension of its body and motor repertoire, and how incremental changes to their 
interrelations drive appropriate changes to the perception and movement of their body. 
Telling this kind of story requires a theoretical framework that will allows us to explain the 
distinct features of the the body image and the body schema which can then be brought 
together to explain their interrelations. The natural question is what theoretical framework 
developmental psychologists should appeal to. The proposal I offer in the remaining sections 
of this chapter brings together the neuroconstructivist model of development that was 
discussed in chapter one and Shaun Gallagher’s analysis of the developmental relationship 













The rationale of the neuroconstructivist model of development was outlined and explored in 
brief detail in chapter one of this thesis with respect to the neuroconstructivist interpretation 
Holmes & Spence support in relation to their developmental studies on the stages at which 
young infants lack, and subsequently come to possess, the ability to visually track the spatial 
rearrangement of their body parts by way of a process that involves, in part, Bayesian style 
predictions. It is now time to consider the aims of neuroconstructivism in some more detail. 
As the name suggests, neuroconstructivism98 is, in part, based on the constructivist outlook 
from Piaget (Piaget, 1955) which seeks to understand the transformative effects of 
experience-dependent knowledge on the gradual acquisition and progression of the mental 
and cognitive skills of developing children that are acquired through their active engagement 
with their (physical and social) environment. The ‘neuro’ in neuroconstructivism refers to its 
commitment to the idea that the structural configuration; functional segregation; integration 
and specialisation of specific regions in the brain are built up out of a process by which the 
capabilities of individual neurons and classes of neurons is determined by the interactions 
between neighbouring neurons. In turn, the mental and cognitive capabilities that these neural 
populations support is further shaped by the embodied entity in which they are enveloped 
(i.e., what kind of body the agent has) and the interactions of the body in the physical and 
social environment. Ultimately, neuroconstructivists endorse a collective approach to 
understanding mental and cognitive approach that draws upon the insights from various 
disciplines including genetics, neuroscience, biology, psychology, embodied and social 
cognition and phenomenology. Neuroconstructivism is a rich and multifaceted framework, 
but for present purposes it is important to note that an important and distinctive hallmark of 
neuroconstructivism is that it places strong emphasis on the need for a causal explanation of 
the driving forces which are responsible for the unfolding of mental and cognitive 
phenomena along developmental timelines. Thus, we are told: 
 
                       The biggest challenge facing developmental psychologists is to link 
                       these observations into a developmental trajectory and to explain the  
                       causes of developmental change that allow the child to progress from  
                       one set of abilities to another, more complex one. 









The importance of this requirement stems from a dissatisfaction with what 
neuroconstructivists call the standard ‘snap-shot’ approach in developmental psychology. As 
the label suggests, this involves psychologists taking a very brief ‘snap-shot’ of the 
capabilities, or lack thereof, of children at different stages of development for comparison. 
For instance, Piaget demonstrated that children at 7-, but not at 10-years-of-age, lack the 
concept of conservation which is important for understanding that the objective configuration 
of objects remain the same even if their perspectival properties change. Youngsters of 7-
years-of-age lack the understanding that even though the round plate looks elliptical, it 
remains round. However, by their tenth-year children have acquired this perceptual 
understanding (Piaget, 1955). The claim of the neuroconstructivist is that this approach is 
informative in one sense, but uninformative in another. It is informative because we at least 
know the ages at which there is a difference in the child’s understanding of the relationship 
between what Locke would call the primary and secondary qualities of objects. The primary 
qualities are those attributes of the object which remain constant no matter the conditions 
under which the object is perceived, i.e., the actual shape and size of the object. Therefore, 
primary qualities are perceiver independent. Secondary qualities are perceiver-dependent, 
e.g., the (perceived) colour; shape; taste of the object, etc. (Locke, 1689). However, the 
information such studies provide is also not very informative in the sense that it doesn’t 
account for how the relevant knowledge is acquired for it only tells us that this acquisition 
occurs at some as-yet-unspecified time between 7- and 10-years-of-age. A three-year age gap 
is a big leap in terms of development, and in the absence of an understanding of the processes 
that drive this change the ‘snap-shot’ approach doesn’t tell us very much. As such, 
neuroconstructivists argue that developmental psychology is currently subject to an important 
deficit that can only be rectified by: 
 
 
                    […] causal theories regarding what makes complex behaviours emerge  
                    These theories need to explain behaviours on multiple time scales. They  
                    must explain how and why behaviours unfold as we observe them in real 
                    time, as well as how they unfold in developmental time. To do this, we need 
                    more than just a very detailed description of the behaviours that can be observed 
                    at any point (Mareschal, et al. 2008, p. 331, my emphasis).  
 
 
Thus, to tell a sufficient story about the relationship between the body schema and the body 
image we need to explain the mutual transformative effects that each has on the other along 
developmental timelines and in real time. To do so, I shall revisit Shaun Gallagher’s 
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behavioural analysis of the relationship between the body schema and the body percept 




6.5. Gallagher’s Developmental Behavioural Analysis of the Body Percept and the Body Schema: A 
Brief Reminder.  
 
 
In chapter two of the thesis it was observed that in addition to showing how dissociations 
between the body image and the body schema can be made, Shaun Gallagher also provides an 
analysis of the reciprocal relationship between them during motor learning. Let’s return to 
that analysis. During motor learning developing infants and mature adults build their motor 
repertoire by adding a novel motor skill (or set of motor skills) to their pre-established set of 
motor skills. Through the process of learning and developing new motor skills the developing 
infant faces the additional challenge of understanding how the continually changing 
proportions of its body directly affect its motor capabilities and constraints. The important 
issue that emerges out of Gallagher’s line of thought is why learners exhibit an increased 
reliance on their body percept during the development of his or her motor skills. I think we 
can make better sense of this observation in terms of free-energy minimisation and active 
inference.  
   To tell a story about the developmental significance of the body percept for the 
development and transformation of the motor behaviours of the body schema is to tell a more 
general story about the processes through which motor processes are developed and 
transformed by the influence of personal-level perceptual processes. If the prediction-error 
minimisation model is correct, then it is through the process of establishing an equilibrium 
between the perceptual predictions about our body and sensory feedback that gives us 
meaningful perceptual access to the state and significance of our body.  
    Under Gallagher’s interpretation, the body percept is underpinned by the sensory feedback 
that’s generated by the body, e.g., visual, proprioceptive, tactile and auditory information 
about the perceptible features of the body. In terms of the prediction error minimisation 
framework the body percept is a distinct set of sensory and sensorimotor predictions that 
pertain exclusively to the perceptible features and motor activities of the body. For ease of 
exposition, let’s agree that the body has a distinct cross-modal predictive profile which is 
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made up of the class of predictions which are exclusively about long-term properties of the 
body (e.g., its canonical configuration), its short-term properties (e.g., its current postural 
position) and any other relevant perceptible properties (e.g., motor generated feedback.) As 
such, the body percept is a class of hierarchically structured predictions that separate the body 
from other objects in the environment that are characterised by other distinct cross-modal 
predictive profiles.) The job of the body percept is to provide us with meaningful perceptual 
contact with our body, such as what it looks like in general; what it looks like when it moves; 
what it is currently like in its current postural positions; how it differs from any other object 
in space, and so forth. Thus, to tell a story about the body percept is to tell a story about how 
multisensory processes establish, transform and maintain perceptual awareness and 
recognition of the body. In turn, making a distinction between the body percept and the body 
schema requires an account of the differences between them in terms of the distinct 
predictions they elicit. 
    Under active inference successfully generating novel actions requires a lot of fine-tuning 
for the predictive capacities of the recognition density to come into line with the trajectory of 
sensory inputs that are generated by previously untested movements. In such cases, the 
predictive capacities of the recognition density are under-developed such that it can’t reliably 
predict the sensory consequences of the movement(s) with any degree of accuracy. During 
ordinary motor learning, there is an extensive period of fine-tuning between the predictions 
elicited by the recognition density and sensory feedback that’s produced by the movement.  
When the predictions and sensory inputs are brought into equilibrium (i.e., the model can 
accurately predict the variable sensory consequences of the movement) they can be 
performed below threshold of consciousness. This applies just as much to the growing infant 
who is learning to crawl and walk as it does to the mature adult learning to dance. In cases 
where the individual is carrying out an action that could result in possible injury or death, the 
potential for producing a sensory prediction error remains high until the action has been 
successfully carried out. This could perhaps explain why the conscious deliberation and 
monitoring of movement throughout the duration of the movement. The key point is that 
under active inference learned behaviours are tested and mastered in accordance with 
personal-level expectations until the repeatable sensory feedback they generate and the 
predictions elicited by the recognition density are brought into equilibrium. In cases where 
one is entering a high-risk situation, it helps to proceed at a slower rate than usual and 
consciously keep track of our movement for it isn’t always easy to predict the consequences 
of action when we find ourselves in risky situations. In this case, it makes sense to explain the 
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behaviour in terms of the desire to avoid injury as opposed to the fulfilment of certain 
expectations about the sensory consequences of action. From a free-energy perspective the 
more a behaviour minimises unpredictable (i.e., erroneous) effects that are not accounted for 
by the generative models the higher the prior likelihood that it will minimise free injury and, 
as we know, minimising free energy equates to securing the optimal existence of the agent in 
its environment. 
  This important point proceeds from the common-sense observation that learned behaviours 
start off unsteady and imprecise but, through practice, become increasingly more accurate, 
refined and effective. Once mastered, motor tasks can be performed without conscious 
deliberation and planning. As we have observed before, a mature adult can walk, reach for 
objects and pick them up, walk upstairs etc., without having to consciously think about how 
to do the bodily movements that make up those kinds of actions. By this stage, the behaviours 
have already been deferred to the body schema to be produced and regulated below the 
threshold of personal-level consciousness (Gallagher, 2005, pp.45-52). However, the fact that 
mature humans perform these tasks with relative ease and little conscious reflection makes it 
easy to underestimate the protracted and extensive sensorimotor learning period that preceded 
this mature state. If able, the reader will most likely be able to recall the many times they 
ended up with grazed knees and elbows that go along with learning to ride a bike and, except 
for beginner’s luck, the many failed attempts that took place prior to being able to throw a 
netball into the net with a sufficient frequency of success. As Gallagher points out, when we 
are learning to do these activities successfully, we tend to pay more close attention to our 
body, such as the overall posture of our body when we are sat on the bike. In this case the 
trunk of our body must stay fully erect and tense for if our body sways too much to one side 
we will likely fall over. The same applies to the speed at which the hand is extended towards 
the net as the ball is released towards it. If one releases the ball too forcefully when one is 
near the net, the ball may just recoil off the backboard. However, if one is much further away 
more exertion and force is required to propel the ball from a greater distance. The point is that 
effective motor learning requires more personal-level guidance relative to motor behaviours 
we have already mastered. The same applies to the more fundamental universal motor skills 
that underpin advanced motor skills such as the ability to sit and stand up straight, walk, jump 
and so on.  Likewise, developing infants tend to pay close attention to movement of their 
bodies during the development of their motor skills. Think of the infant learning to walk for 
the first time who pays close attention to the movement of her feet as she while being held up 





6.6. The Developing Body Image: An Analysis of Canonical and Postural Remapping 
 
 
The preceding line of thought puts is in a better position to analyse the developmental studies 
from Holmes & Spence in their 2012 apply to their 2008 developmental studies to explain 
how the body percept might be established through knowledge driven perceptual inference. 
Recall that the studies employ the preferential looking paradigm to investigate whether the 
visual responses of young infants (i.e., eye tracking) can accurately keep track of tactile 
sensations on the body parts as they move across their visual space99. The upshot of such 
studies is that infants at six-and-a-half months of age do not exhibit the ability to visually 
track the movement of their body whereas infants at the age of ten-and-a-half months of age 
can do this.   
    The underlying gist of the story is that, as mature adults, we understand that when our body 
parts are in their canonical (i.e., typical) spatial positions they occupy the respective spatial 
region of our visual field. The left side of our body occupies the left region of visual space, 
and vice versa for the right side of the body and visual space. However, if the arms are 
crossed over to the other side such that, say, the right hand now occupies the left side of 
visual space, any activity of, or in relation to, the right hand is still registered in terms of the 
activity of the right hand or in relation to it. Therefore, the movement of this hand is still 
registered as movement of the right hand, not the left. Likewise, if a fly were on this hand the 
tactile stimulus it generated will still be registered as coming from the right hand. Therefore, 
when my right hand moves it generates visual stimuli that occupied the left region of visual 
field. As such, I may glance to my left instead of my right if, say, I want to work out what is 
causing the tickly sensation on my right hand as a fly walks across the surface of my skin. 
Holmes and Spence established that the ability to readapt visual responses in line with the 
movement of the body parts is present in infants at ten-months-of-age, but not at six-and-a-
half months. The six-month-old infant will glance to their right because this is the typical way 
to gain visual access to the right hand as they fail to appreciate that the movement of the hand 






    Recall that from a general Bayesian perspective the visual behaviour of the ten-month-old 
infant and the mature adult is underpinned by the antecedent expectation that looking to the 
left when my right hand is positioned at the left side of my body will give me perceptual 
access to my right hand. Under PEM the story would, initially, follow along the same lines. It 
would be agreed that the crossover of the right hand from the right side of the body to the left 
side provides updated proprioceptive information about the position of the right hand. This 
causes a change in the antecedent visual-proprioceptive expectations about how perceptual 
access to the right hand can be brought about. Therefore, the cause of the change in 
conditional expectations about the sensory consequences of events in relation to the right 
hand is the switch to a more complex set of visuo-tactile-proprioceptive predictions. 
Additionally, the appropriate changes in motor behaviour, i.e., glancing to the left instead of 
the right can be explained in terms of active inference. The stimuli produced by the fly 
landing on my hand would instigate a generative model which would predict the cause of the 
stimulation. In turn, the perceptual system would engage the oculomotor motor system to 
direct the eye in the direction of the tactile stimuli on the body to sample the sensory data to 
verify that the predictive power of the generative model is accurate (i.e., that it is a fly on the 
hand) or detect any relevant prediction errors that need to be suppressed by further perceptual 
or active inference. Looking to the right in this case will produce a prediction error because 
the hand won’t be visually located. In turn, the incoming prediction error should generate 
alternative motor behaviours until the prediction error is quashed by looking to the left.  
    Recall that it is precisely because this adult-like behavioural response is present in ten-
month-old infants, but not those of six-and-a-half-months, Holmes and Spence posit the 
existence of two distinct multimodal ‘body representations’. The ‘canonical’ body map 
represents the canonical configuration of the body and is used to localise sensations on the 
body when they are positioned in their standard positions. Then there is ‘postural remapping’ 
which localises sensations on the body in accordance with the changing positions of the body 
parts. They speculate that the latter emerges out of the former at some point between six-and-
a-half months and ten-months- of- age. Under PEM the canonical body map and postural are 
two distinct but interrelated perceptual generative models which encode probabilistic 
predictions about the location of sensations on the body part, and the establishment of the 
latter is driven by active inference. For example, it’s anyone’s guess as to precisely when the 
infant develops this understanding between the specified age ranges that Holmes & Spence 
investigate. However, when the six-and-a-half-month old infant looks to the right under the 
expectation that they will see their right hand only to see that their hand is not there this will 
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generate a prediction error which in turn instigates further active inference, such as more 
looking behaviours until the right hand can be seen at the left side of their visual field. In turn 
this engenders the establishment of an alternative generative model which elicits more 
accurate visual-proprioceptive predictions that underpin more appropriate behavioural 
response next time around.  
 
     




Under active inference, scale errors provide an important opportunity to provide relevant 
sensory and sensorimotor prediction error(s) that are important for updating the developing 
infant’s generative model with a new prior (e.g., the prior likelihood of the body fitting into 
enterable objects of the same size of the car is nil). This should inhibit the behaviour for 
under active inference the sensory and sensorimotor prediction errors may instigate further 
attempts to enter the car. However, each failed attempt cannot satisfy the initial predictions 
that are responsible for eliciting this behaviour because the body will never fit into the scaled 
down car. The overarching point is that it is through interactive experience the developing 
infant develops the predictions and priors necessary for enabling a suitable array of 




6.8. Gallagher’s Behavioural Analysis of the Body Image and Schema in Real Time. 
 
 
Gallagher tells us that there are two circumstances under which the movement of the body 
requires conscious perceptual guidance that is provided by the body percept. In such cases the 
body percept assists the body schema to ensure that the body moves successfully through the 
environment. We have looked at the first case of motor development. The second pertains to 
conditions in which an individual must manoeuvre his or her body in situations that are 
potentially risky and/or fatal. To begin let’s recall the proposition that it is the job of the body 
schema to keep the body poised for swift and precise fine-grained interactive motor 
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behaviours, such as avoidant responses like ducking the head to avoid a collision with a low 
hanging tree branch and quickly raising the hand to swat wasps away to avoid a painful sting. 
However, there are occasions where it seems that the sub-personal body schema is not 
enough to initiate behavioural responses that get an individual out of an unwanted and 
potentially hazardous situation. Gallagher tells us that when an individual is walking along an 
icy pathway or a high ledge he or she must proceed with caution, lest they make a serious 
miscalculation that could result in a serious fall which could leave them seriously injured or 
dead. To do so, it makes sense to switch from the ‘auto-pilot’ mode of the body schema to 
consciously guide our actions using, in part, the sensory processes of the body percept. In 
such a situation, we carefully slow down our pace, deliberate each step before we carry it out 
and visually monitor our progression in a similar way to the unsteady and accident prone 
infant who is learning to walk for the first time who closely watches her legs as she makes 
each step or the mature adult learning to dance for the first time (I’ll come back to this point).  
    This immediately raises the issue of why we defer to our body percept in such situations 
when, as we have just observed, often the movements produced by the body percept are less 
effective than those produced by the body schema. To a first approximation this may seem 
like a counterintuitive strategy but it is not. First,	 the motor procedures produced and 
regulated by the sub-personal processes of the body schema can only be considered optimal 
when they produce quick, precise, and efficient motor responses that don’t make as much 
demands on our cognitive workload and can reliably eliminate any impending threats to the 
same degree as the conscious guidance of actions. In some cases, this might be true. For 
instance, swatting away insects with our hand is usually enough to deter them. However, 
slowing down the rate at which we move could bring about an adaptive payoff in situations 
where the stakes are high. Moving too swiftly might cause a motor error that requires a 
corrective measure (or sequence of corrective measures) to rectify it. Such compensatory 
measures will make more demands on our cognitive resources. In turn, the shock of falling or 
injuring oneself will place further demands on our cognitive apparatus. For instance, the 
adrenaline rush and come down period that comes with the shock of falling, the injuries 
sustained and the metabolic resources required to get back up. Therefore, it is surely worth 
the cognitive effort required to calculate the next manoeuvre at each stage in high-risk 
situations such as these to avoid the consequences and after-effects of motor mistakes.    
This provides two important insights when it comes to thinking about the importance of the 
body percept and body schema for motor performance. The first is that having a personal-
level body percept, on its own, is insufficient to optimise motor performance.  Having a body 
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schema that can function without the need for ongoing personal-level deliberation and 
monitoring optimises behaviours because the behaviours it produces are quicker, more 
precise100 and place less demands on our cognitive resources. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean 
that the body schema is sufficient, on its own, to effectively manoeuvre the body in space; 
rather, having a body percept that can take over the role of the body schema to guide the 
movement of the body is adaptively advantageous, for the reasons specified above. The 
fundamental question is why we alternate between the body image and the body schema in 
this way. One such case was the deafferentated patient Ian Waterman. After a sensory 
neuropathy Ian lost all control over his motor behaviours.  He lost the sensation of touch (i.e., 
sensation of pressure on the skin) and proprioception (i.e., the sensation of the position of his 
limbs). In short, Ian suffered a complete loss of his body schema and a partial loss of his body 
percept for he still his access to his visual percept. In other words, he still receives the visual 
information about the position and movement of his body which structures his visual 
awareness of his body. After extensive rehabilitation Ian, recovered his motor skills. 
However, now he is completely reliant on his visual percept. Following the considerations 
that were discussed in the previous chapter it seems that having a body percept that can 
perform the same functions as the body schema is adaptively beneficial for Ian in the sense 
that without his visual percept he wouldn’t have been able to regain his motor skills at all. In 
other words, not only does this case suggest that there are dissociations to be made between 
the body image and the body schema, it also suggests that having two functionally equivalent 
systems which can take over if the other fails. However, Ian’s behaviours are far from 
optimal. His movements are slower, less precise, and make more demands on his personal-
level resources (through the constant requirement of visually fixating on his body.) The 
natural question is why this is the case. Ordinarily, you or I can alternate between personal-
level visual guidance and sub-personal motor planning, so why can’t Ian? It is difficult to 
give a clear-cut analysis, but here are my speculations from the perspective of the prediction 
error minimisation approach. 
Ian has made the switch from a malfunctioning system to a degraded system as he can only 
rely on visual proprioceptive awareness. To re-establish his motor skills Ian has had to form 
entirely novel ways of performing the same action. What’s more is that only one sensory 







The studies from Friston show that ordinarily the training of one modality is sharpened up by 
its coupling with other modalities during different tasks and under different conditions. In 
other words, the predictions a single modality carries are fine-tuned to be made more precise 
to compensate for its context-dependent and task-specific limitations and so that it can 
perform the job of the others in their absence. On top of this, in chapter 3 we observed that 
perceptual estimates are inherently probabilistic in virtue of the inherently noisy nature of 
signalling. As such, Ian is relying on a single source of information which doesn’t offer the 
same robustness as two or more cross-modal signals engaging in active inference would 
when they are in the business of working together to quash modality-specific and cross-
modal prediction errors. Therefore, Ian is missing two crucial components of the normal 
motor learning process: cross-modal prediction and exposure to cross-modal prediction 
errors.   
   The second important point is that the role of the body percept in conditions which are 
likely to pose a serious risk of injury can be explained in terms of free-energy minimisation 
and active inference. Behaviours for which the outcomes are less predictable and less certain 
present the real risk of increasing free-energy. For example, when we’re walking on ice each 
time one foot is raised off the ground we are at risk of slipping, and the same applies to each 
time our foot comes back into contact with the icy surface as we place one foot in front of the 
other. The same applies to walking along a high ledge. All it takes is a miscalculation about 
how one should proceed (e.g., placing the foot on unstable terrain) for one to be seriously 
injured and/or dead. As such, it is harder to maintain equilibrium between the cross-modal 
predictions that are driving the behaviours and the consequences those behaviours produce. 
The common thread that runs through both conditions under which we may recruit our body 
percept is that they carry a greater prior likelihood of generating a big prediction error, by 
which I mean they raise the possibility of the brain making a mistake in its predictions about 
the sensory consequences of the movement that could have major consequences for the 
individual. In turn, big prediction errors could potentially compromise the optimal function of 
the agent or ultimately cause its death. Furthermore, the prior likelihood of various kinds of 
prediction errors coming in at a much faster rate is also higher in situations where the brain is 
less able to calculate the outcomes of behaviours to a reasonable degree. Under the free-
energy principle the actions of the agent are produced to test out the predictive power of its 
generative models whilst respecting its morphological constraints and homeostatic 
requirements. Choosing any potential course of action that could result in serious injury or 
death violates the free-energy principle.  
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  This is an admittedly rough-and-ready sketch of how Gallagher’s analysis can be 
illuminated when it is reconsidered in terms of active inference and free energy 
minimisations, but it provides us with just enough to provide a plausible story about the 
neural underpinnings which drive the switch from the body schema to the body image. Once 
it is built up to a sufficient degree the body schema can successfully produce and regulate the 
context-and task-specific motor performances of the body without the need for personal-level 
deliberation and/or monitoring because each time it initiates a motor behaviours provides an 
opportunity to test their free-energy minimising potential. Doing this at a sub-personal level 
is the optimal thing to do as it means that the agent is not dependent upon their more 
cognitively demanding personal-level capacities to regulate their behaviours. If this is indeed 
the case, it makes adaptive sense to only elevate to the personal level to assess the situation of 
the body in unpredictable and/or hazardous conditions to calculate the nature and severity 
level of the risk and select the movements that are most likely to successfully navigate the 
body in such conditions, i.e., by minimising and/or removing the risk of imminent threats. 
Thus, the difference between the threat of overhanging tree branches and icy pathways is that 
the former presents a threat that can be dealt with because the body schema is equipped with 
a proven successful behavioural strategy to deal with it (e.g., ducking the head.) Thus, it is 
expected (i.e., predicted) that that behavioural strategy will remove the threat of a collision. 
The consequences of walking on an icy pathway are less predictable, and more dangerous, 
and the behavioural strategies the body is equipped with do not guarantee that the individual 
won’t fall with the same level of expected certainty. In short, whether the body schema or 
body percept is deployed to guide the movement of the body depends on how predictable the 
consequences of the behavioural strategies produced are going to be.        
 
 
6.9.  An Interpretation of the Rubber Hand Illusion from the Perspective of Predictive Processing. 
 
 
At various stages of this thesis we have observed the invaluable insights that can be gleaned 
from an examination of the effects that can be brought about by altering cross-modal 
couplings in various ways. This strategy gives us some leverage to work with when it comes 
to examining and explaining how multisensory processes optimise the perceptual and motor 
processes they support. The first instance of this kind of methodological strategy was outlined 
in chapter one of the thesis in relation to the so-called ‘rubber-hand illusion’ where 
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participants report experiencing sensations on a rubber hand. As such, the rubber-hand 
illusion is important for analysing the way in which cross-modal sensory relations shape our 
perceptual apprehension of the boundaries of our body. Recall that the experiment involves a 
participant who has one hand occluded behind a screen and a realistic rubber hand is 
substituted in its usual place. At the same time, their occluded hand and the rubber hand 
receive identical tactile stimulation. When asked to locate the sensation on their body part 
most participants report that they feel the location of the sensation on the rubber hand, not 
their occluded hand.  
    I mentioned along the way (in chapters one and three) that a common explanation for the 
fact that visual input overrides tactile-proprioceptive input in this case is because vision 
remains the dominant modality when it comes to localising the position of our body parts, 
and the location of sensations thereon. This assumption squares nicely with Ernst’s maximum 
likelihood principle from chapter three for we have good reason to believe that whenever 
redundant visual and tactile inputs are coupled to provide a cross-modal estimate of the size 
of an object, the visual signal will always be given a higher weighting than the haptic signal. 
In this respect the rubber hand illusion provides a nice illustration of how our perceptual 
understanding of the boundaries of our body is shaped and altered by cross-modal relations 
about the location of sensations on the body. But we are still far away from an explanation as 
to why the visual modality overrides tactile inputs and perhaps this is best explained in terms 
of perceptual inference as it is construed under PEM. When the occluded and rubber hand 
receive tactile stimulation, this creates a conflict between the visual stimuli and tactile stimuli 
about the location of the sensation (i.e., on the rubber vs. occluded hand, respectively) and 
proprioception (about the location of the occluded hand). The experimental design that 
produces the rubber hand illusion thus creates a conflict between visual-tactile inputs about 
the location of the stimuli and tactile-proprioceptive inputs about the location of the stimulus 
of the real hand. To quash the prediction error, the visual-tactile predictions about the 
location of the stimulus on the rubber hand overrides the tactile- proprioceptive predictions 
because of the prior likelihood that the visual signal is the more reliable signal about the 
location of the stimulus, even though this generates a perceptual error (i.e., the impossible 
judgement that the subject feels the sensation on the rubber hand). However, perhaps this is 
the small trade-off we pay for the fact that multisensory processes make perceptual and motor 








To be able to tell a story about the body image and body schema distinction in accordance 
with the requirements set by neuroconstructivism one must be able to provide an explanation 
of the nature of the driving forces, i.e., causal, behind the perceptual and motor capabilities 
they support in a way that will help us understand how and why they unfold in real time, and 
over the course of development. In turn, to tell a story about the respective processes which 
characterise the body image and the body schema, as well as the relationship between them, 
is to tell a story about the respective nature of perceptual and motor processes and the 
unifying principle(s) which unite them to support body perception and body movement. In 
chapter four such a story was provided under the Bayesian inspired hierarchical predictive 
processing models of perceptual and motor processing. Perception, under this framework, is a 
process of knowledge driven inference through which an individual gains meaningful 
perceptual access to their environment. More precisely, pre-acquired knowledge about the 
causal structure of the body and environment is encoded in hierarchically structured 
generative models) which elicit probabilistic predictions about the cause(s) of incoming 
stimuli. In the case of action, motor behaviours are produced by hierarchical generative 
models which elicit probabilistic sensorimotor predictions about the trajectory of sensory data 
that should ensue at each stage of the movement trajectory.  Therefore, insofar as perceptual 
and motor processes are distinct it is because they deal in different predictions. However, 
they are united a common goal: prediction error minimisation. Under the active inference 
principle, the perceptual and motor processes of the agent are united to optimise the 
predictive capabilities of the generative models by actively sample its sensory environment to 
quash prediction errors. Remember that an agent whose predictions can best account for all 
the sensory data its activities induce is at equilibrium with its environment and, under the 
free-energy principle the optimal existence of classes of animals, and their individual 
members, necessitates that their brains encode a generative model (or sets of models) about 
the predictable (and random) effects that its activities have on its internal economy at all 
levels of functioning. This gives us two different timelines from which to explain how 
perceptual and motor processes develop and transform. By applying this framework to 
Gallagher’s behavioural analysis of the body schema and body percept distinction I have 
illustrated the ways in which we can provide a neuroconstructivist picture of how the 
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behavioural transformations which are driven by changes to the perceptual apprehension of 

































The driving motivation of this thesis has been to explain the nature of the optimisation 
strategies that determine the contribution multisensory processes make to whatever mental 
and cognitive phenomena they support. I used the pre-existing discussions in cognitive 
psychology and philosophy as a platform from which to illuminate the key questions which 
shape contemporary multisensory integration research in cognitive & developmental 
psychology and philosophy. Across the first two chapters we saw that the initial strategy is 
always the same: to clear up the conceptual confusions pertaining to the body schema. Of 
course, the methodological approach is quite different for whilst psychologists attempt to pin 
down the neurological underpinnings of the body schema, philosophers seek to provide a 
clear conceptual analysis of this concept. Either way, the first two chapters of this thesis 
illustrate that in each camp confusions over the body schema remain, objectionable 
interpretations and assumptions remain unchallenged, and the value of the distinction remains 
unacknowledged. By using Shaun Gallagher’s analysis I hope to have taken reasonable steps 
towards remedying these issues by continuing his project of clearing up the conceptual 
confusion; challenging the unwarranted presuppositions of his opponents about the nature of 
the body schema and the future of the distinction between the body image/schema in 
cognitive science, and showing how the distinction is a useful explanatory tool for working 
towards a neuroconstructivist model of the developmental relationship between the body 
image and body schema. This story is by no means complete, but it is, I believe, the 
beginnings of a more illuminating story about how multisensory integration shapes and 
transforms body perception, motor control and their interrelations.  
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